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Abstract 
The Cost of Rankings?  The Influence of College Rankings on Institutional Management 
by 
Jeongeun Kim 
 
Chair: Michael N. Bastedo 
 
Increasing college costs and financial consequences for students and families have 
created a need to collect and disseminate information about institutions to better inform 
students and parents as they make an important and expensive education decision.  To fill 
this need, several media outlets, including the U.S. News and World Report started to 
publish college rankings for commercial purposes.  Rankings (otherwise referred to as 
ratings systems) have proven popular and influential as evidenced by growing sales and 
attention to their numerical ranking by publishers, educational observers, and higher 
education administrators and faculty. Until recently, ranking systems were viewed as 
tools for increasing information leverage and accountability of higher education 
institutions.  Yet, there have been growing concerns about the unintended consequences 
of rankings.  Specifically, rankings intensify institutional competition for prestige, 
making institutions increase their expenditures.  The cost escalation might have 
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unintended consequences on access and equity as well as teaching and learning on 
campus. 
These concerns about rankings/ratings systems are linked with the nature of 
rankings.  Rankings evaluate colleges based on criteria chosen by the producers of the 
rankings, and the evaluated results are organized numerically or by arbitrary 
classification of universities.  Also, ranking is a volatile system because an institution’s 
position can fluctuate from year-to-year.  However, only limited empirical research exists 
on how these attributes of ranking systems affect the resource allocation behavior of 
universities.  Given the growing interest in employing ranking systems and the potential 
impact of rankings on the management of higher education institutions, this study 
examines the causal link between rankings and resource allocations of colleges and 
universities, addressing the unique features of rankings. 
Utilizing the U.S. News and World Report’s Best Colleges Rankings (USNWR) 
1987-2009, this study examines changes in institutional expenditures, particularly in the 
three areas that are heavily weighted in rankings: (1) student selectivity, (2) financial 
(educational) resources, and (3) faculty resources.  Employing a differences-in-
differences and differences-in-differences-in-differences approach based on the 
unexpected changes in the methodology of USNWR, this study demonstrates that the 
numerical ordering of universities encourages institutions comply with what rankings 
measure by increasing expenditures in all three areas.  The event-study specification 
results indicate that expenses that are related to student selectivity are the ones that 
schools respond to immediately, while the effect lasts over time for financial resources 
and faculty resources.  The areas of expenditures that experience significant changes 
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differ between National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  Furthermore, 
the arbitrary grouping of rankings serves as an important mechanism that drives 
institutional responses to rankings.  Schools ranked near at the cut-off of the ranking 
groups (Top 1, 25, 50, and 120) take on a bigger increase in the expenditures in the areas 
that rankings directly measure.  Year-to-year changes in the ranking positions encourage 
universities to move resources from a routinized, universal expenditure  (e.g., instruction) 
to categories that are perceived to provide more leverage to improve rankings (e.g., 
institutional fellowships, proportion of full-time faculty, student-faculty ratio).  The 
study’s findings have important implications for the use of rankings/ratings systems in 
higher education as well as future research on the pursuit of prestige and institutional 
behaviors. 
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
The rapid increase in the cost of higher education over the last decades has raised 
concerns about quality and affordability (Archibald & Feldman, 2012).  Since the 1980s, 
expenses of colleges and universities have increased, exceeding the overall inflation rate. 
As cost has been growing at such a fast pace and colleges do not have revenue to cover 
costs, the financial sustainability of many higher education institutions has become 
weaker (Denneen & Dretler, 2013).  The cost burden has been passed down to students 
via tuition (Bowen, 2012): over 30 years from 1984-85 to 2014-15, the average published 
tuition and fees rose by 146% at private four-year colleges, and by 225% at public 
institutions (Baum & Ma, 2014).  Student debt has also been a serious issue: as of 
December 2014, student loan debt stands at $1.16 trillion nationally, which is the largest 
form of consumer debt outside of mortgages; it rose by 81.3% ($520 billion) between the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and the fourth quarter of 2014 (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 2015).  On the other hand, students now value institutional quality in college 
choices, consider resources offered by schools (Brewer, Eide, & Ehrenberg, 1999; Hoxby 
& Long, 1999; Long, 2004) and reputation (Eagan, Lozano, Hurtado, & Case, 2013; 
Marklein, 2006) as a proxy for eventual returns.  These trends in college cost and 
financial consequences on students and families have created a need to collect and 
  2 
disseminate information about institutions to better inform students and parents as they 
make an important and expensive decision (Clarke, 2007; Hossler & Foley, 1995).  
To fill this need, several media, including the U.S. News and World Report started 
to publish college rankings for commercial purposes (Dill & Soo, 2005; McDonough, 
Antonio, Walpole, & Perez, 1998; Sanoff, Usher, Savino, & Clarke, 2007).  Ranking 
providers have argued that rankings offer information that should be relevant to the 
choices students make about where to study (Kehm & Stensaker, 2009), as their rankings 
compare at a glance the relative quality of university teaching and research (Brown, 
2006).  Rankings have proven popular and influential as evidenced by growing sales 
(Dichev, 2001; Jin & Whalley, 2007; McDonough et al., 1998) and attention to their 
numerical ranking by publishers, educational observers, and higher administrators and 
faculty (Hossler, 1998).  The success of USNWR spawned many imitators both within 
the United States and Internationally (Espeland & Sauder, 2009).  
Even though rankings have grown in popularity, some researchers and 
practitioners in higher education have expressed concerns that rankings intensify the 
aspiration for prestige (Hossler, 2000), and fuel the higher education expenditure race 
(Ehrenberg, 2003).  Researchers have demonstrated that the cost increase in higher 
education institutions is due to the growing tuition discount rate, costs of research, faculty 
salaries, regulatory burdens (e.g., reporting requirements), informational technology or 
new facilities, expenditure on alumni affairs and development activities that seek to 
expand the flow of external gifts, especially when universities face a long-run decline in 
per full-time equivalent student state appropriations (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; 
Ehrenberg, 2012; Harvey, Williams, Kirshstein, O’Malley, & Wellman, 1998).  As these 
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expenditures are items that tend to be the focus of ranking surveys, schools might allocate 
even more resources to student selectivity, facilities, and faculty, and in turn, the cost will 
escalate (Shin & Toutkoushian, 2011).  
As institutions try to attract selective students and faculty to improve rankings, 
schools change admission processes and financial aid practices, increase faculty salaries 
and benefits, emphasize research activities rather than teaching (O’Meara, 2007), spend 
more on amenities and facilities (Capraro, Patrick, & Wilson, 2004; Hartley & Morphew, 
2008; Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013; Toma, Dubrow, & Hartley, 2005), and increase 
administrative expenditures (Morphew & Baker, 2004).  These changes may have 
significant consequences for policy goals, such as equity and diversity (Meredith, 2004; 
Shaw & LeChasseur, 2005), as well as institutional effectiveness and efficiency (Frank, 
1999; Hossler, 2000; Winston, 2000). 
Despite these concerns, rankings are penetrating into the policy arena.  First, 
media rankings are used as an accountability device.  In the U.S. context, states fold 
rankings and ratings into their policies (Morphew & Swanson, 2011).  For example, 
Minnesota, Indiana, and Texas included the domestic and international ranking of public 
institutions in their state assessments and accountability policies (Sponsler, 2009).  In 
other countries, rankings are used as tools for international benchmarking and quality 
assurance (Hazelkorn, 2011) and are linked with resource allocation (Maassen & 
Stensaker, 2011).  Furthermore, government or non-profit entities have employed 
ratings/rankings systems for monitoring institutional practices and increasing 
transparency.  The U.S. Secretary of Education’s Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education (Spellings Commission) (2006) noted the need for comparable information on 
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student achievement in higher education to inform students and families.  Although the 
commission’s work did not lead to a solid measurement system, different sectors of the 
higher education community have designed distinct approaches for disseminating 
information to stakeholders of postsecondary education, while avoiding ranking colleges 
(Sponsler, 2009).  The Voluntary System of Accountability program, Measuring up-
National Report Card on Higher Education, and College Scorecard provide examples of 
this movement.  Recently, the Obama administration has proposed the Postsecondary 
Institution Ratings System (aiming for delivery in the academic year of 2015-16) that 
would rate colleges and universities and tie the results to institutional eligibility for 
federal student financial aid programs.  Although the administration has tried to quell the 
controversy (Stratford, 2014), the premises of ratings have generated concerns.  Many in 
the higher education community still believe that the ratings scheme will become a de 
facto ranking (Espinosa, Crandall, & Tukibayeva, 2014).  Furthermore, there has been a 
fear about the ratings system driving institutional behavior, especially when the result is 
tied to federal funding (Bastedo, 2014).  The possible unintended consequences on 
student composition (e.g., reduced access for low-income and other underrepresented 
students in exchange for higher rankings), as well as teaching and learning at institutions 
(e.g., lowering academic quality, graduate unqualified students), have been the major 
concerns (Hillman, 2014). 
The concerns about rankings/ratings systems stem from the nature of rankings or 
ratings. Rankings evaluate colleges based on criteria chosen by the producers, and the 
evaluated results are organized numerically.  In addition, rankings provide arbitrary 
classification of universities based on the numerical order.  For example, USNWR 
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designates the number one or best National University or National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
Also, institutions are grouped into the top 1-25, 26-50, and 51-120 (Ehrenberg, 2002; 
Lynch, 2014; Webster, 2001).  Whether an institution belongs to a specific ranking group 
(e.g., top 25) rather than another group (e.g., top 26-50) has significant consequences for 
schools (Alter & Reback, 2014; Bastedo & Bowman, 2011; Luca & Smith, 2013; 
Meredith, 2004).  Thus, being located at the upper or lower margin of the cut-offs (i.e. 
Top 1, 25, 50, and 120) might be a factor that colleges attend to when they comprehend 
rankings.  Also, ranking is a volatile system because an institution’s position can 
fluctuate from year-to-year (Ehrenberg, 2002; Longden, 2011; Wedlin, 2006).  Therefore, 
when examining the effect of rankings on institutional behavior, these unique features of 
rankings should be addressed. 
However, only limited empirical research exists on how these attributes of 
ranking systems affect the resource allocation behavior of universities.  Previous research 
on rankings has focused on two major areas.  First, researchers have been interested in 
understanding the effects that rankings have on higher education stakeholders.  In 
particular, studies have focused on how rankings affect admissions outcomes, revenue, 
and institutional reputation.  Findings from these studies suggest that changes in ranking 
positions are associated with the number of applicants, acceptance rates, matriculation 
rates, and the quality of incoming students (e.g., through standardized test scores) at both 
the undergraduate and graduate levels (Griffith & Rask, 2007; Luca & Smith, 2011; 
Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999; Sauder & Lancaster, 2006).  These results were most 
pronounced among public institutions rather than private; no significant effect has been 
found for liberal arts colleges (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Meredith, 2004).  
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Demonstrating the influence of rankings on resource attainment from different 
sources, Bastedo and Bowman (2011) indicated that the impact of rankings might not be 
significant for resource providers who are on the periphery of the organization field and 
can buffer them from rankings, such as foundations and industry.  Ranking is more 
influential for those who are vulnerable to the status hierarchy of higher education, 
particularly college administrators, faculty, alumni, and out-of-state students.  Rankings 
(the U.S. News & World Report and National Research Council) had a strong correlation 
with research and development funding from the federal government and industry, and 
alumni donations; rankings did not have an effect on funding from foundations (Grunig, 
1997), or on the amount of private gifts, grants, and contracts a university received 
(Meredith, 2004).  The proximal effect of rankings on financial resource attainment was 
weaker for shorter periods (i.e., within two to four years) than over longer periods (i.e., 
eight or more years) (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011).  However, it is difficult to conclude 
whether rankings bring more resources to institutions, since there are factors that affect 
both financial resources and rankings (e.g., student selectivity, faculty quality).  
Employing the differences-in-differences approach, Jin and Whalley (2007) argued that 
appearing in rankings, regardless of the institutions’ position, increased state 
appropriations but decreased private gifts; but rankings did not have a significant effect 
on tuition and fees, government contracts, and endowments.  Finally, several studies 
found that rankings affect future peer assessments of reputation (Bastedo & Bowman, 
2010; 2011; Espeland & Sauder, 2007) and perceptions by employers about institutions’ 
academic programs (Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2010; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & 
Sever, 2005). 
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Meanwhile, a relatively smaller body of research has been conducted on how 
institutions strategically respond to rankings.  Findings from studies in this area suggest 
that top managers of higher education institutions actively respond to rankings, despite 
their skepticism about the process (Corley & Gioia, 2000).  Organizational changes seem 
to occur in a way that corresponds with ranking criteria.1  For example, Conlin, Dickert-
Conlin, & Chapman (2013) found campuses change admission requirements and 
financial aid policies (e.g., no change in sticker price, but greater price discount) to boost 
admission selectivity results (Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999).  Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) 
study showed that rankings matter for the resource allocation of law schools.  
Particularly, schools expanding spending on marketing and merit scholarships to attract 
students with high entrance exam scores.  Based on a survey of top administrators around 
the world, Hazelkorn (2006) found that top administrators consider ranking formulas to 
be an explicit part of target agreements between rectors and faculty members, and 
therefore, use them as budgetary tools.  
Some studies suggest that the effect of rankings on higher education institutions 
might be segmented by the arbitrary groupings that rankings classify.  The influence of 
rankings on admission outcomes, resource attainment, and reputation is different for the 
institutions at different positions, such as the top 25 versus top 26-50 groups (Alter & 
Reback, 2014; Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Bastedo & Bowman, 2010).  Furthermore, a 
retrospective analysis of USNWR data for eight years indicated that ranking positions are 
sticky, and do not move at a high rate.  Also, different criteria create competitive 
                                                 
1 For example, the U.S. News & World Report rankings produce ranking scores based on 
academic reputation, retention, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources, 
graduation rate, and alumni giving rate.  
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advantage for the institutions ranked in the top 10 and top 40 (Grewal, Dearden, & Lilien, 
2008).  It is also notable that ranking positions have a strong tendency to revert in the 
following years (Dichev, 2001), and the movement happens within a small interval (+/-4 
points), mostly due to statistical noise (Gnolek, Falcino, & Kuncl, 2014; Grewal et al., 
2008). 
To summarize, previous research has suggested that rankings have significant 
consequences for colleges and universities, particularly with regard to admissions 
outcomes, resource attainment, and future reputation.  Furthermore, a small number of 
empirical inquiries indicate that top managers of academic departments and institutions 
may engage in strategic behaviors to improve their rankings, regardless of their 
skepticism about rankings.  These efforts appear to involve changing institutional 
practices in ways that boost performance on rankings criteria.  However, the impact of 
rankings might be dependent on the characteristics of the system.  Specifically, the 
arbitrary groupings of colleges based on their rankings as well as the volatility of the 
ranking positions might result in a different level of motivation and the strategic behavior 
of institutions.  
Purpose of the Study 
Our understanding of the extent to which rankings influence college and 
university resource allocation is limited in several ways.  In particular, we do not know 
what areas of expenditure rankings impact, and to what degree.  Second, studies have not 
explained the mechanisms through which rankings influence institutional behavior given 
the unique characteristics of rankings—numerical order, arbitrary grouping, and 
volatility.  With few exceptions, most studies assume that the competition intensity is the 
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same at all ranked levels and treat all institutions as if their motivation to change 
organizational behavior is identical.  Finally, existing studies only capture cross-sectional 
changes, and miss the temporal dimensions in the relationship between rankings and 
organizational changes.  Previous inquiries are often limited in the extent to which they 
account for the issue of endogeneity and omitted variable bias.  Without parsing out 
confounding factors that influence institutions’ rankings as well as resource allocation 
behaviors, we cannot infer the casual effect of rankings.   
While ranking systems have attracted the interest of higher education 
stakeholders, there has been increased criticism of rankings that claims rankings engender 
the cost escalation among colleges and universities.  Yet, previous studies are limited in 
theory and methodology to fully explain whether and how rankings impact institutional 
management.  This dissertation aims to fill the void in the research by exploring the 
effects that college rankings have on college and university resource allocations.   
Employing four data setsThe Higher Education General Information Survey 
(HEGIS), the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS), and the U.S. News and World Report’s Best 
Colleges Rankings (USNWR), this dissertation considers how the motivation to perform 
well on rankings affects the strategies universities use and the consequences of the 
rankings phenomenon from a longitudinal perspective.  This study contributes to the 
research on prestige maximizing behavior of higher education institutions by identifying 
behavioral patterns of striving institutions.  The study also seeks to understand if 
competition among higher education institutions generated by ranking activities increases 
homogeneity of the U.S. higher education system, while reducing its diversity.  
  10 
Moreover, from a methodological standpoint, the study will benefit the research and 
discussion about rankings and university practice by isolating the causal impact of 
rankings.  The findings will help us consider if rankings promote an expensive 
competition by encouraging higher education institutions to comply with rankings.  
Research Questions 
This dissertation investigated the strategic behaviors that higher education 
institutions employ to improve their ranking positions.  The following overarching 
question guided the study: How do college rankings impact resource allocations by 
higher education institutions?  In order to explore this question, three sub-questions were 
addressed in relation to the features of ranking systems—numerical order, arbitrary 
grouping, and volatility: 
1) How do rankings affect institutional expenditures in the areas that rankings emphasize, 
particularly student selectivity, financial resources,2 and faculty resources over time?  
2) How does arbitrary grouping of rankings affect institutions’ expenditure behaviors?  
3) How do year-to-year changes in ranking positions lead to changes in expenditure 
behaviors? 
Definitions of Key Terms 
To estimate the effect of rankings on institutional expenditures, this study 
employed the U.S. News and World Report’s the America’s Best Colleges rankings 
(USNWR).  While USNWR consists of multiple rankings that compare different types of 
                                                 
2 Financial resources refer to the criteria that USNWR measures. It includes expenditures on 
instruction, research, student services, and related educational activities. 
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universities, this study focuses on the National Universities and National Liberal Arts 
Colleges. 
National Universities are institutions that offer a full range of undergraduate 
majors, plus master’s and doctoral programs, and emphasize faculty research.  National 
Liberal Arts Colleges focus most exclusively on undergraduate education and award at 
least 50 percent of degrees in Arts and Sciences.  
This dissertation focuses on how the ranking system affects institutional 
expenditures, using the three distinctive characteristics of rankings.  First, only limited 
numbers of National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges are ranked at a 
specific position that is defined as a number.  Hypothesizing that this feature of the 
ranking system serves as an important mechanism for institutional behaviors, I define the 
ranking status of an institution as ranked for schools having specific numerical orders in 
the top 25, 50, and 120, and tiered for National Universities or National Liberal Arts 
Colleges that are aggregated into a category with other similar schools, but not in a 
particular hierarchical order.  
Due to the expansion of numerical rankings, there are variations among the 
ranked schools in terms of timing, meaning the year they were first numerically ranked.  
One of the significant expansions occurred in 2003, as the numerical ranking changed 
from the top 50 to top 120.  Thus, I further distinguish the ranked schools into schools 
that were ranked before the expansion in 2003 and schools that were ranked for the first 
time in 2003 and thereafter.  
Another important characteristic of the rankings is arbitrary 
grouping/classification of institutions, which produces results in which the overall 
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ranking of schools is subdivided into intervals.  The term ranking group will refer to the 
arbitrary classification of institutions based on numerical rankings into the best college 
(top 1), top 1-25, 26-50, and 51-120 schools.  I define the ranking group cut-offs as top 1, 
25, 50, and 120 and indicate whether an institution is located at the upper or lower 
margins of each cut-off.  As changes in the rankings often occur at +/- 4 points from the 
cut-offs (Dichev, 2001) and movements within 0-4 intervals from the cut-off points are 
due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 2008), I specify the upper 
margin as 0 to 4 points above the cut-off points, and the lower margin as -1 to -4 points 
away from the cut-offs.  I also examine the movement in the rankings around different 
ranking group cut-off points to verify these findings. 
The last dimension of rankings addressed in this study is the volatility of rankings, 
defined as year-to-year changes in an institution’s ranking.  Assuming the year-to-year 
changes in an institution’s position drive institutional behavior, I define Drop as a 
negative change in an institution’s ranking compared to the previous year’s ranking, and 
Improving or Maintaining as a positive change or no change from the previous ranking, 
respectively.  
Significance of the Study 
This study has important implications for research and practice.  First, the study 
will contribute to the understanding of mechanisms through which college rankings affect 
the management of colleges and universities.  In particular, I consider the three 
distinctive characteristics of rankings system—numerical order, arbitrary grouping, and 
volatility—in estimating the effect of rankings on institutional expenditures.  In 
estimating the causal impact of rankings, this study also attempts to investigate how 
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quickly institutions respond to rankings by changing their resource allocation.  From the 
findings of this study, I will be able to identify colleges that strive the most according to 
rankings, which will significantly contribute to the conceptualization of pursuit of 
prestige and strategic behaviors.  Also, the study will foster our understanding of how 
rankings, as institutional forces, encourage universities to spend more on the areas that 
are valued by rankings and increase the homogenization of higher education over time.   
In a context where college costs and cost containment are among the top policy 
issues in higher education, this study will help policymakers understand the consequences 
of competition for rankings and prestige on institutional spending.  Prior to using college 
rankings in the construction of public policy, policymakers need to consider the effects 
rankings can have on institutional behavior and policy goals, such as equity and diversity, 
as well as financial efficiency and effectiveness.  Furthermore, the findings will provide a 
meaningful perspective to top administrators with limited resources who are considering 
how to balance the pressure for competition with the needs of students and faculty.  
Finally, ranking providers can find ways to improve current methodology, which has 
been criticized as driving an expensive arms race (Machung, 1998; Michael, 2005).  
They can consider the pros and cons of the current methodology and ways to improve the 
practice in relation to various ways of presenting college information.  If rankings are 
here to stay, the questions of how we could improve the ranking practice and how 
stakeholders could make better use of rankings are critical.  I believe this study has 
potential to guide these discussions.  
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Organization of the Dissertation 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I will provide a brief history and 
overview of the practices of the USNWR in order to contextualize the inquiry.  The 
existing literature on college rankings will be reviewed.  Since little empirical research 
exists on the effects of rankings on institutional management, research on organizational 
prestige seeking behavior informed the current study.  A detailed discussion of the 
theoretical framework for the study will then be proposed.  The third chapter describes 
the research methodology including a description of data, sample, variables, and 
identification strategy.  Chapters 4 and 5 present the study results, addressing the 
descriptive statistics and each sub-research question.  In the final chapter, a discussion of 
the key findings as well as implications for future research and policy will be provided.   
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Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A Brief History of Rankings by the U.S. News and World Report 
The emergence of college rankings 
Rankings originally began with a sole interest in academic reputation.  In the early 
1900s, a number of researchers including Cattell (1910), Visher (1928), Kunkel (1930), 
and Prentice (1951) published rankings of American colleges based on the number of 
eminent undergraduate alumni.  Similarly, Raymond Hughes (1925) and Hayward 
Kiniston (1959) compared graduate schools and comprehensive research universities 
based on faculty’s reputational ratings of the programs.  Due to institutions’ opposition to 
the pecking order, the results were presented in alphabetical order with each institution’s 
score.  Rankings done by news media (e.g., Chicago Sunday Tribune, 1957) also started 
to appear.  In the 1960s and 1970s, reputation rankings, mostly of graduate programs or 
professional schools (e.g., Cartter, 1966; Roose & Anderson, 1970; Blau & Margulies, 
1973), were produced.  The Gourman Report (1967) rankings of undergraduate programs 
were initiated during this time period as were the United States National Research 
Council’s (NRC) rankings (1982) of research-doctorate programs.  The latter were based 
on a reputation survey as well as other quantitative measures about institutions. 
Intensified attention to reputational rankings began with the publication of 
rankings by the media (Walleri & Moss, 1995).  The U.S. News & World Report 
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(USNWR) published their first ranking in 1983.3  The success of the first two editions of 
college rankings based on a reputational survey encouraged USNWR to produce their 
publication annually, beginning in 1987.  Despite opposition from higher education 
institutions, the popularity and impact of the rankings have grown over time (Freedman, 
2007; Jin & Whalley, 2007).  While there have been other types of college 
classifications—College Guide Books (e.g., Fiske’s guide to colleges, Peterson’s Four-
year colleges, Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges) and the Carnegie classification—
dating back to as early as 1870, the USNWR has arguably influenced the format of most 
college rankings and how the information about colleges is communicated (Hossler, 
1998; Lynch, 2014).  Following the USNWR, other media rankings of U.S. 
undergraduate and graduate programs such as those in Money, Forbes, Business Week, 
The Wall Street Journal, and Washington Monthly were published.  Subsequently, 
magazines in different regions started to produce global and regional rankings.  For 
example, in 2003 Times Higher Education (THE) and Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) 
started ranking the top 200 global schools, and the first publication of the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) by Shanghai Jiao Tong University attracted 
attention from universities, governments, and public media worldwide.  Beginning in 
2008, USNWR joined with QS and published the World’s Best Colleges and Universities 
rankings.   
Most of the rankings, including USNWR evaluate institutions based on a number 
of criteria weighted differently and placed institutions in a numerical order, along with 
arbitrary grouping of schools.  This design of rankings inspired debates over rankings in 
                                                 
3 The year that appears on the issue is different from the year of publication. For example, the 
Best Colleges 2004 (i.e. 2004 edition) was published in 2003. In this study, rankings are based on 
the year of publication, not the years appear on the issue (edition). 
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three main ways.  First, rankings have been criticized for threatening the diversity of 
higher education institutions.  By choosing a particular set of indicators and using them 
as proxies for institutional quality, rankings set a one-size-fits-all approach in judging 
institutional performance (Dill & Soo, 2004; Usher & Savino, 2006; 2007).  Furthermore, 
some stakeholders in higher education argue that what rankings measure are not 
necessarily good proxies for educational quality.  Conforming to rankings methodology 
creates incentives for higher education institutions to focus disproportionate resources on 
data elements that can change rankings without necessarily changing the quality of the 
institution (Machung, 1998).  Second, the aggregation of multiple aspects and ordinal 
presentation of institutions exaggerate insignificant differences between institutions that, 
in turn, cause misperceptions about institutional quality.  Finally, the source of data 
matters because institutions can manipulate or distort the data to perform better in the 
rankings (Ehrenberg, 2005). 
In response to these critics, ranking providers have made efforts to gain 
legitimacy as valid sources of information about institutional quality.  Ranking providers 
insist that they have frequent dialogue with institutions, college officials and stakeholders 
to improve their measures and transparency (Sanoff et al., 2007).  In addition, the major 
ranking providers such as USNWR and THE, in association with United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and Institute for Higher 
Education Policy (IHEP), launched the International Rankings Expert Group (IREG) in 
2004.  They announced the Berlin Principles in rankings of higher education institutions, 
emphasizing ethical practice in the collection of data, ranking analysis, and dissemination 
of information (Sponsler, 2009).  
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Criticism of rankings led to recent efforts to develop alternatives. For example, 
Avery, Glickman, Hoxby, and Metrick (2005) created revealed preference rankings based 
on students’ preference for one school relative to other schools to which they had been 
admitted.  The authors concluded that using revealed preference as an additional 
component in rankings would be beneficial for students trying to find schools that attract 
the best students.  Moreover, in response to concerns that rankings’ measurement criteria 
do not reflect the quality of education that students actually receive, some researchers 
suggest using the National Survey of Student Engagement (Pike, 2004), or the Collegiate 
Learning Assessment (CLA) to judge institutional quality.  Recently, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched the Assessment of Higher 
Education Learning Outcomes (AHELO) (OECD, 2009), and the European Commission 
started the U-Multirank project to measure and compare student learning across 
countries.  While AHELO aims to measure what individual students in higher education 
know and can do upon graduation through generic and discipline specific skills, U-
Multirank focuses on the five dimensions of institutional practices: teaching and learning, 
research, knowledge transfer, international orientation, and regional engagement. 
Changes in the USNWR methodology 
The first two publications of USWNR published the top ten schools in the five 
institutional categories (National Universities, Liberal Arts Colleges, Regional Liberal 
Arts Colleges, (Regional) Comprehensive Institutions, and Smaller Comprehensive 
Institutions) based solely on institutional reputations.  College presidents were asked to 
name the single top (in 1983) or top five (in 1985) undergraduate schools from a 
provided list of institutions similar to their own.  
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Since 1987, the America’s Best Colleges has been published every year, listing a 
limited number of top colleges for the institutions in four categories—National 
Universities, National Liberal Arts Colleges, Regional universities and Regional Liberal 
Arts colleges—defined by the Carnegie classification.4  Over time, the rankings 
methodology has been modified.  In particular, the measurement criteria and weights 
have been revised, and the scope of the numerical order has been expanded.  All changes 
in the methodology are summarized in Table 2.1. 
Since the annual publication started in 1987, an institution’s ranking has been 
determined based on reputation (25% of the overall score; 22.5% in 2010) and objective 
measures of input and output (75% of the overall score). Data are self-reported.  If 
colleges do not provide data, USNWR uses supplemental data from other sources such as 
the American Association of University Professors, the College Board, the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, the Council for Aid to Education, and the U.S. 
Department of Education.5  In that year’s rankings, all data are standardized in the 
calculation of the rankings.  The top school in each institutional category receives a score 
of 100, and the relative score is calculated for the rest of the schools based on the 
rankings.  Although USNWR argued that this allows the ranking results to reflect the size 
of differences between schools on each component of the rankings, this practice became 
                                                 
4 Prior to 1989, schools were categorized as National Universities, Liberal Arts Colleges, 
Regional Liberal Arts Colleges, (Regional) Comprehensive Institutions, and Smaller 
Comprehensive Institutions.  The modification of the Carnegie Classification also changed the 
institutional categories in USNWR and evaluated schools within each category.  
5 When schools do not meet certain conditions, USNWR marks the institutions as Unranked and 
does not publish the ranking scores.  The conditions include: no use of SAT/ACT scores, few 
responses in the peer assessment survey, enrollment size less than 200, and a high proportion of 
non-traditional students.  Also, institutions without first-year students and institutions that focus 
on special areas (e.g., technical universities) are also unranked. When an institution’s ranking is 
calculated but editorial reasons prevent publication of the data, the school is categorized as Not 
Published. In this study, rankings of those schools were treated as missing for the respective year.  
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controversial as universities assume it exaggerates minor differences between the 
universities (Sauder & Espeland, 2006). 
The objective measures of input and output are composed of broad evaluation 
criteria that are measured through multiple statistics.  The broad evaluation criteria 
include student selectivity, faculty resources, retention and graduation, and educational 
resources with a varying degree of emphasis.6  Student selectivity (12.5% of overall score) 
is measured through acceptance rate (10%), the proportion of freshmen who were in the 
top 10% of high school (25%) as well as average SAT/ACT score (65%).  Yield rate was 
removed from the selectivity measure in 2003.  Financial resources (10% of overall score) 
are measured by average spending per student on instruction, research, student services, 
and related educational expenditures (other/general expenditure per student was removed 
in 1999).  As a last category, faculty resources (20% of overall score) include class size 
(proportion of classes with fewer than 20 students (30%) and with 50 or more students 
(10%)), faculty salary (35%), proportion of professors with the highest degree in their 
field (15%), the student-faculty ratio (5%), and the proportion of faculty who are full time 
(5%).  Over time, USNWR reduced weights on student selectivity (25% to 15%), 
financial resources (20% to 10%), and faculty resources (25% to 20%).  Retention and 
graduation rates (5% to 25%) carried more importance, and the graduation rate 
performance7 (5% since 1996, 7.5% in 2010) and alumni giving (5% since 1993) were 
added to the measurements.  
                                                 
6 Measurements and criteria reported here are based on the 2015 methodology. 
7 USNWR calculates the predicted six-year graduation rate for each school, based on student 
characteristics (e.g., test scores and the proportion receiving Pell Grants) and spending. Then the 
difference between a school’s actual six-year graduation rate and the predicted rate is measured. 
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Along with measurement changes, the number of institutions ranked among the 
top colleges and universities expanded over time.  For the first annual ranking in 1987, 
only the top 25 institutions were selected, with no other institutions listed in the 
publication.  In 1990, USNWR created a tier system: schools that were not included in 
the top 25 National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges were divided into 
four quartiles (tiers) and within each tier institutions were presented alphabetically 
without numerical order.  In 1995, USNWR expanded the numerical list of rankings to 
the top 50.  This placed the first quartile schools in specific numerical order and the rest 
of the schools into tiers (Top 50 plus Tier 2, 3, and 4).   In 2003, the magazine started to 
assign numerical rankings to the top 50 percent of colleges and universities in both 
National University and Liberal Arts College rankings.  Universities that were previously 
called Tier 2 now received specific numbers.  The rest of the schools were grouped in 
two tiers and listed alphabetically (Tier 3 and 4).  This resulted in about 125 and 110 
universities and colleges being ranked in the National University and Liberal Arts 
College categories, respectively.  USNWR once again expanded the scope of numerical 
rankings in 2010.  In observance of this change, the top 75% of institutions received a 
specific numerical order (i.e. Top 200), and the remaining 25% (that were formerly 
categorized as Tier 4) were categorized as Tier 2.  
Some argue that these methodological changes reflect a marketing ploy by 
ranking producers to maintain the popularity by making changes in the rankings in 
forthcoming editions (Federkeil, 2008; Stella & Woodhouse, 2006).  Dichev (2011) 
found that USNWR’s annual rankings have a strong tendency to revert to earlier rankings  
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Table 2.1 Changes in methodology, 1987-2010 
Year Reputation 
Student 
Selectivity 
Faculty 
Resource 
Retention 
and 
Graduation  
Financial 
Resource 
Alumni 
Giving 
Graduation 
Rate 
Performance 
Numerical Orders 
1987 25 25 25 5 20 0 0 Top 25 
1989 25 25 25 5 20 0 0  
1990 25 25 25 5 20 0 0  Top 25 + Tier 1, 2, 3, 4 
1992 25 25 25 7 18 0 0   
1993 25 25 20 10 15 5 0   
1994 25 25 20 15 10 5 0   
1995 25 15 20 25 10 5 0 Top 50 + Tier 2, 3, 4 
1996 25 15 20 20 10 5 5   
1997 25 15 20 25 10 5 5   
1999 25 15 20 25 10i 5 5   
2003 25 15 ii 20 25 10 5 5  Top 120 + Tier 3, 4  
2010 22.5iii 15 20 25 10 5 7.5 Top 200 + Tier 4  
Notes. i) Prior to 1999, expenditure was measured by educational expenditure per student (80%) and other and general expenditure per 
student (20%). Since 1999, only educational expenditure was included in the expenditure. 
ii) Since 2003, yield rates was dropped from the indicators; weights on the remaining indicators were changed: acceptance rate (from 
15% to 10%), % freshmen who were 10% of high school (additional 5%), average SAT/ACT (additional10%). 
iii) Since 2010, reputation score is based on the peer survey (66.7%) and high school counselor’s rating (33.3%). 
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in the following two years.  About 70 to 80 percent of the variation in the rankings 
change was due to transitory and reversible noise, and as little as 10 percent of the  
variation in annual rankings change was due to real changes in school fundamentals.  
Year-to-year changes in the positions mostly happened only within a small window of 
ranking points (Grewal et al., 2008).  
The influence of college rankings on higher education institutions 
Discussions of rankings in publications have increased over time, following the 
emergence of USNWR and global rankings (Stergiou & Tsikliras, 2014).  However, 
empirical inquiries into the impact of rankings on colleges and universities are limited 
and tend to focus on the benefits that accrue from higher ranking positions (Kehm & 
Stensaker, 2009).  Few empirical studies examine the responses of higher education 
institutions to rankings, such as whether resources are reallocated to achieve that can 
enhance institutional standing (Hazelkorn, 2011).  It is not clear how the unique 
characteristics of the system of ranking/ratings—numeric order, arbitrary grouping, and 
volatility of positions—constitute mechanisms that motivate institutions’ resource 
allocation behaviors.  
The benefits of higher rankings 
From an economic perspective, rankings serve as a signal of a campus’ 
underlying quality since students cannot directly evaluate its quality before their 
enrollment and experience.  Gormley and Weimer (1999) conceptualize rankings to a) 
provide consumer information on academic quality, utilizing measures that closely 
approximate or are linked to valued outcomes (Fombrum, 1996), b) inform and influence 
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student choice of university (Hossler & Foley, 1995), and c) encourage universities to act 
in anticipation of the potential effects of published rankings and/or respond to student 
choices by genuinely improving the educational benefits universities provide. 
Results from empirical studies have indicated that rankings have a significant 
effect on admission outcomes, including numbers of applications (Luca & Smith, 2011), 
acceptance rates, matriculation rates, and academic achievement levels of incoming 
classes (Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999).  Out-of-state and international applicants (Griffith & 
Rask, 2007) and students from high-income families who are high achieving and have 
higher educational motivation (McDonough et al., 1998) are particularly sensitive to 
rankings.  The effect of rankings on admissions varies across schools with different price 
flexibility and missions: the effect is bigger at public institutions compared to private 
universities (Meredith, 2004).  Rankings are only influential for admission outcomes of 
National Universities in USNWR, but not for those of National Liberal Arts Colleges 
(Bowman & Bastedo, 2009).  
Signaling theory also posits that rankings provide information for stakeholders as 
they decide on resource allocations.  From a rational choice perspective, resource 
providers would be expected to gravitate toward high-status institutions as the best 
chances for return on their investment (Brewer et al, 2002).  Studies have documented 
administrators’ perceptions that rankings affect outside constituencies such as 
government, university trustees, research foundations, and employers.  Higher rank 
positions (USNWR and NRC) significantly increase research and development funding 
from federal government and industry (Grunig, 1997), while it does not affect funding 
from foundations.  In contrast, Meredith (2004) and Jin and Whalley (2007) found no 
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evidence that changes in the rankings were associated with changes in the amount of 
private gifts, grants, and contracts. 
A line of research has applied sociological perspectives in explaining the 
consequences of rankings on higher education institutions.  These perspectives emphasize 
that rankings shape the social recognition, rather than function as a sheer source of 
information.  Applying the theory of spectacle (Debord, 1967), Chang and Osborn (2005) 
explained that rankings convert images of colleges and universities into discrete numbers. 
As rankings gain legitimacy, the discrete numbers replace an institution’s excellence and 
value.  Along the same line, Wedlin (2007) explained that the numerical image is 
meaningful as it functions as social recognition.  Rankings serve as templates that define 
groups by specifying measures that determine belongingness to a group.  The numerical 
order signifies how successful an organization is in meeting what is considered desirable 
and proper in relation to the comparison organizations.  Social recognition, in turn 
improves material resource flows, creating a kind of virtuous circle of accumulative 
advantage (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011).   
Rindova et al., (2005) describes the mechanism through which media rankings 
affect employers’ perception of MBA graduates of different programs.  From an analysis 
of 107 U.S. business schools that are included in the Business Week rankings, the authors 
found that the rankings indirectly increased the average starting salaries for MBA 
graduates by shaping recruiters’ assumptions about programs’ reputations.  Better 
performance, higher starting salaries in this case, enabled institutions to charge higher 
levels of tuition, which in turn could be used to underwrite initiatives to further boost 
program reputation (Boyd, Bergh & Ketchen, 2010). 
  26 
Rankings also influence peer assessments of reputation.  Bastedo and Bowman 
(2010) found that overall rankings, tier level, and changes in tier level of previous 
rankings significantly change the following year’s reputation ratings (Bastedo & 
Bowman, 2010).  Furthermore, the anchoring effect of rankings—adjusting final 
judgment for an ambiguous subject based on a particular value that is available—is 
strong when there is limited information about reputation, as is the case for international 
higher education institutions.  In this case, even higher education experts refer to rankings 
to judge institutions (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011).  
Yet, the influence of rankings depends on constituencies’ positions in the higher 
education field.  Bastedo and Bowman (2011) analyzed 225 U.S. research universities 
and found that being ranked in the top tier (i.e. tier 1, top 25) of USNWR rankings 
significantly increased research and development funding from federal government and 
industry, proportion of alumni donation, and out-of-state tuition and fees while it did not 
have an effect on funding from foundations.  The authors explained these findings as 
different stakeholders’ capability to buffer themselves from rankings’ influence.  In 
addition, rankings’ effect on constituencies and their behavior may not be immediate, and 
may change over time.  Measuring the effects at different time periods, this study also 
found that the effect of rankings on financial resource attainment was weaker over a 
shorter period of time (2 to 4 years later) than over a longer period (8 years later).  
Finally, a number of studies suggested that the unique method of presentation of 
the USNWR that places the top schools (e.g., top 50) in numerical order and the rest of 
the institutions into tiers (e.g., tiers 2-4) might result in a different impact of rankings on 
schools.  Studies found that movement between the top tier and the second tier had a 
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stronger impact than movement within the top tier.  While being ranked in the top 50 
leads to a substantial improvement in admissions indicators in the following year, one 
rank increase within the top group only has a limited effect (Meredith, 2004).  Also, 
rankings’ effect on admissions is more substantial for the competition among the top 25, 
compared to the movement between the 26th and 50th positions (Bowman & Bastedo, 
2009).  Furthermore, the drop from the top tier has a stronger negative impact on 
reputation than a drop among lower tiers (Bastedo & Bowman, 2010).  
Alter and Reback (2014) attempted to estimate the effect of USNWR on 
application outcomes by different groups of institutions: a) all National Universities listed 
in the USNWR, b) the 25 schools ranked in earlier editions, and c) schools included to 
the top 10 vs. top 11-25.  The study found ranking position affected admission outcomes. 
Academic competitiveness and the fraction of out-of-state freshmen increased when 
schools were ranked and were higher in the numerical order.  When colleges were one of 
the top 25 schools in the first two editions, the number of applications increased by about 
6%.  Among the top 11-25 schools, peer institutions’ ranking status affected an 
institution’s admission outcomes (number of applications and academic competitiveness). 
Luca and Smith (2013) framed this as the effect of salience of information.  The 
authors assumed that salience, the simplicity of information, would be higher when 
USNWR published ordinal rankings.  The more salient the rankings, the more significant 
the impact of rankings on students’ application decision.  Taking into account the 
changes in ranking methodology, which converted alphabetically listed schools to ordinal 
rank of the top 26-50, the study found no effect on application decisions when colleges 
were listed alphabetically; but a one place improvement in ordinal rankings led to a one-
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percent point increase in the number of applications.  Thus, an investigation into the 
responses to the rankings needs to consider the way USNWR organize the information—
both numeric order and arbitrary groupings of colleges.  
Institutional responses to college rankings 
The constant and vigilant interest in rankings and institutional efforts to increase 
position in rankings are explained by higher education institutions’ dependency upon 
external resources.  As increases in rankings yield increases in important resources, 
universities develop a set of cognitive and strategic responses to the rankings.  How 
institutions respond to rankings as a threat in the environment are explained by resource 
dependence theory and institutional theory (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011). 
Based on the resource dependence theory, Bastedo and Bowman (2011) suggest 
tactics that institutions might employ to manage rankings.  Such options include 
cooptation (e.g., providing alternative sources of institutional information), influence 
tactics (e.g., manipulating data, and other tactics for influencing reputation surveys), 
collective actions (e.g., associations and alliances among institutions), and executive 
contracts (e.g., tying rankings and incentives for presidents).  Sauder and Fine (2008) 
described how business school administrators synthesize, simplify, and select information 
in ways that best represent their institutions to public and ranking agencies.  Analyzing 
business school data, Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2005) showed that controlling for deans’ 
personal characteristics and performance measures (e.g., financial management), a poor 
ranking increased the probability of the dean’s departure in one or two years.  However, 
changes in leadership did not have a significant effect on enhancing upcoming years’ 
rankings. 
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While resource dependence theory provides useful perspectives on how schools 
respond to rankings in order to control the impact of rankings on resources, this 
perspective is limited in its ability to fully explain institutional responses.  First, the 
theory does not explain how universities comply with the ranking measurements by 
changing practices and how the compliance persists.  In the context of higher education 
rankings, there is an inconsistency between the top managers’ ambivalent perception of 
rankings and their actual managerial behavior.  While they are skeptical about the 
soundness of rankings as a measure for the quality of institutions, they appear to conform 
to what rankings measure, by allocating more resources to relevant areas (Corley & 
Gioia, 2000) without guarantees that more resources would enhance prestige and quality 
of educational activities (Oliver, 1991).  Furthermore, tactics that resource dependence 
theory predicts such as associations and alliance may have limited influence on 
environment (e.g., failure of boycotting USNWR (e.g., Jaschik, 2007)).  The managerial 
anxiety about rankings and competition with other universities might lead universities to 
fail to resist rankings, and succumb to the allure to game the rankings system (Sauder & 
Lancaster, 2006). 
In addition, resource dependence theory focuses on the internal organizational 
shift of power that results from environmental factors.  As the environment (e.g., 
rankings) imposes uncertainties, constraints, and contingencies, those subunits (e.g., 
academic or administrative departments) that are able to bring the most critical resources 
to aid in the survival of the organizations come to hold more power.  The new power 
dynamics modify organizational actions and structures (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  Thus, 
empirically examining the effect of rankings requires data and analysis within 
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universities, not a simple demonstration of field-level changes (Bastedo & Bowman, 
2011; Davis & Cobb, 2010). 
Meanwhile, some studies explained institutional responses to rankings from an 
institutional theory perspective.  Rankings, as a third-party system forms a significant 
part of the normative environment of universities (Rao, 1994; Sauder, 2006).  Higher 
education administrators estimate their relative position to other institutions and judge the 
institutions’ performance based on what rankings measure.  In some organizations, 
discrepancy between the expected ranking position and actual position causes an identity 
threat to institutions (Elsbach & Sauder, 1996; Martins, 2005), which encourages 
institutional actions that accommodate the ranking criteria.  Sauder and Espeland (2009) 
argued that universities cannot decouple themselves from rankings.  The managerial 
anxiety about rankings and competition with other universities leads top administrators to 
fail to resist rankings and encourages them to game the rankings system.   
According to institutional theory, organizational changes happen through 
isomorphism and conformity to ranking criteria (Martins, 2005).  Studies on universities 
and professional schools have documented that rankings significantly change institutions’ 
resource allocations, admissions processes, and definitions of work in some departments. 
Being reactive, institutions expand spending on marketing, put greater emphasis on 
entrance exam scores and offer generous grant aid to students with high test scores 
(Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999). Collecting and reporting data 
becomes a major task for administrators.  Administrators experience dilemmas between 
improving educational activities versus obtaining better positions in rankings by 
manipulating data, but they perceive that boosting rankings is still doing what’s best for 
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the school (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  Administrators at universities across countries 
reported that global rankings influence academic activities.  More emphasis is placed on 
the research productivity of faculty, as well as improving the structure of teaching and 
output (e.g., the number of degrees conferred) (Hazelkorn, 2008).  Based on a historical 
analysis of 30 years in the context of U.K. business schools, Wilkins and Huisman (2011) 
found that the structure of academic programs becomes isomorphic as institutions start to 
offer programs that turn out to be successful in rankings measures.  
Gnolek et al. (2014) projected that pursuit of a higher ranking will involve a 
higher level of costs.  The authors simulated changes in each ranking criterion required to 
move an institution from mid-30s to the top 20 in National Universities rankings.  
Improving only financial resources per student and average faculty compensation would 
require a sustained increase of over $ 112,000,000 per year, in addition to the expenses 
for decreasing class sizes, increasing graduation rates, or attracting greater numbers of 
highly qualified students.  Furthermore, moving to the top 20 is impossible without a 
corresponding change (0.8 points) in undergraduate reputation, which has a less than a 
0.01% of probability of occurring.  The study also noted that the changing rank of +/- 4 
points is due to statistical noise.  While this study sheds light on how expensive the 
ranking games might be, it is still unknown whether universities are actually employing 
these strategies and spending at the levels the authors forecast. 
The costs of competition may vary across the ranking positions.  Analyzing eight 
years (1999-2006) of USNWR data for the top 50 National Universities, Grewal et al. 
(2008) captured the localized nature of rankings competition.  First, ranking positions are 
sticky and do not change rapidly.  The study found that the probability of a university 
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being ranked within four points of its current rank is about 90%.  Second, when analyzing 
how sub-ranks on each ranking criteria are associated with the overall ranking, different 
criteria matter for institutions with different ranks.  For an institution ranked in the top 
10, financial resources and graduation and retention rate were most important, while 
alumni giving and selectivity appeared to be the least important.  For the top 40 
institutions, academic reputation, as well as graduation and retention were most 
important, while financial resources was least important.  Thus, the authors concluded 
that highly ranked universities get more leverage from growing financial resources while 
lower ranked universities get more leverage from improvements in academic reputation.  
The different nature of competition between the higher and lower-ranked 
institutions might be due to the fact that low-ranked institutions are limited in their ability 
to take strategic actions to improve their rankings by a lack of resources.  Gardner (2010) 
showed that a low-tiered school perceives that it was disadvantaged in attracting high 
quality students and invested a significant amount of budget in hiring faculty to enhance 
its rankings.  Yet, since the study is drawn from the case of one school, it is difficult to 
generalize that all low-ranked institutions have the same issues. 
In summary, rankings inspire higher education institutions to improve their 
rankings because they have a significant influence on admissions, financial resources, 
and reputation, and on self-perceived legitimacy.  Prior research suggests colleges 
incorporate changes in organizational practice and structure in order to secure a better 
ranking.  Yet, limited research exists in terms of changes in the resource allocations over 
time that are consistent with the structure of ranking systems.  The strategic responses of 
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universities to rankings might be informed by the literature on prestige and striving 
behaviors.   
Pursuit of prestige and striving behavior of universities 
The strategic behavior of institutions toward ranking is not a new concept. 
Prestige maximization has been one of the most critical goals of higher education 
institutions (Ehrenberg, 2000; James, 1990; Melguizo & Strober, 2007).  Yet, the 
definition of academic prestige remains unclear.  Studies suggest that selectivity of 
students and faculty research as well as resources to attract and support students and 
faculty are indicators of prestige.  Brooks (2005) explained that in U.S. higher education, 
the academic prestige of an institution or educational program has often been assessed by 
reputation, faculty research, and student characteristics such as students’ academic 
achievement and educational outcomes.  Volkwein and Grunig (2004) summarized three 
models that have been used to explain prestige.  Resource-reputation models (Astin, 
1985) highlight the importance of faculty and financial resources, external funding, and 
student selectivity.  Strategic investment models emphasize return on investment, 
particularly graduation rates or time-to-degree, in relation to expenditures per student 
(Burke & Minassians, 2002).  Client-centered models (Seymour, 1992) consider prestige 
to be determined by how well an institution responds to students as customers, measured 
through student services, faculty availability, and the level of tuition and financial aid.  
The emergence of systems such as the Carnegie classification and ratings, particularly 
USNWR, made prestige in American higher education more visible, more 
institutionalized, and more quantifiable (Geiger, 2000).  These systems increased the 
awareness of an institution’s reputation and prestige as major assets (Zemsky, Wegner, & 
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Massy, 2005).  The ratings now construct the prestige goals that colleges and universities 
pursue (O’Meara, 2007).  
While there is little agreement on what prestige is, studies have documented 
prestige-seeking behaviors of campuses.  The strategic behavior of universities to 
improve prestige is defined as striving behavior.  The desire to become prestigious can 
lead to institutional choices that may be viewed as irrational (Clotfelter, 1996; Melguizo 
& Strober, 2007; Rothschild & White, 1995; Winston, 1999). For example, the pursuit of 
prestige is driving up costs (Gross & Grambsch, 1973) and causing net losses (Veblen, 
1918; 1993) as institutions attempt to keep up with the Joneses.  Bowen (1980) also 
explained that the dominant goals of institutions are educational excellence, prestige, and 
influence, and there is virtually no limit to the amount of money an institution could 
spend for seemingly fruitful educational ends.  Each institution raises all the money it can 
and spends all it raises which leads to ever increasing expenditures.  
Striving behaviors involve changes in institutional structures, practices, and 
resource allocations on campuses.  Aspiring to increase the selectivity of students and 
faculty as well as resource allocation to the level of prestigious institutions, striving 
institutions would change the admission process, reward structures, and resource 
allocation decisions on campus.  Recruiting both quality faculty and students is important 
for institutions to increase the quality of instruction, research, and scholarship, and 
therefore prestige (Blau, 1994).  Furthermore, increased prestige yields increased 
selectivity of students and the quality of faculty, and the feedback loop perpetuates 
(Geiger, 2004; Szelest, 2004).   
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As a part of striving behaviors, institutions change their admission related process 
to enhance student selectivity.  Admitting academically best-prepared students, often 
characterized by their SAT/ACT scores or high school rank percentile, will lead to better 
outcomes, such as graduation rates and time-to-degree (Goenner & Snaith, 2003).  The 
most fundamental element of this strategy is to provide a significant price discount to 
some of the best students through grants and generous financial aid packages (Leeds & 
DesJardins, 2014; McPherson & Schapiro, 1991; 1997; Winston, 1997).  Other admission 
policies such as the early admission process (Chaker, 2004) or the offering of an Honors 
College are often used to attract students with high admissions credentials. 
In addition to student selectivity, institutions adjust admissions policies to 
increase applications and matriculation.  Some institutions relax admission standards by 
dropping SAT/ACT requirements (Kirp, 2003), potentially to attract students who are 
willing and able to pay the full-price (Brewer et al., 2002; Stecklow, 1995).  Avery et al., 
(2005) insisted that institutions reject some of the top applicants, knowing that they will 
likely be accepted to other institutions that will be more attractive to the applicant, and 
the applicant will decide to go to the higher prestige institution.  Institutions have 
increased their spending on consumption amenities (Newman, Couturier, & Scurry, 2004; 
Kirp, 2005) particularly to respond to wealthy students who are willing to pay more 
(Jacob, McCall, & Stange, 2013). 
Institutions perceive that prominent faculty can boost their prestige (Grunig, 
1997; Massy & Zemsky, 1994; Melguizo & Strober, 2007).  Thus, schools make efforts 
to recruit and retain faculty.  A big part of this effort involves increasing faculty salaries, 
especially to recruit, or steal star faculty from other prestigious institutions (Clotfelter, 
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1996; O’Meara, 2007).  Using the case of a small liberal art college with lower prestige in 
the Middle Atlantic States, where their strategic document called for raising faculty 
salary, Ehrenberg (2003) showed that competition for faculty incentivized universities to 
increase salary outside of market conditions in spite of any internal desire to do so.  
Attracting faculty is also associated with other costs, such as costs for laboratories and 
facilities or indirect research expenses (Brewer et al., 2002).  
Seeking prestige, institutions emphasize research and publication (Massy & 
Zemsky, 1994) and move faculty away from undergraduates (Bennett, 1986) and 
teaching (Sowell, 1993).  Clotfelter (1996) compared the arrangement of faculty work at 
four elite institutions from 1976 to 1992, and found a teaching-research trade-off over the 
fifteen years.  He pointed out that this phenomenon occurred at the same time that 
schools were under pressure to be comprehensive by offering full-service—offering 
degrees, conducting research in all or virtually all of the recognized academic fields, and 
performing many other services.  This academic ratchet makes institutions hire more 
part-time or adjunct faculty to both teach courses (Callan, 1997; Massy & Zemsky, 1994) 
and reduce the faculty-student ratio (Volkwein & Sweitzer, 2006).  
These striving behaviors have resulted in reduction of faculty teaching loads and 
the transfer of some traditional academic duties, such as advising, to administrative 
positions.  This formation of an administrative lattice (Massy & Wilger, 1992) further 
increases expenditure on non-instructional administrative support (Leslie & Rhoades, 
1995; Zemsky & Massy, 1990).  The size and sophistication of administration has 
increased (Collis, 2004) as administrators need to support non-instructional activities, 
such as fundraising and communications with external agencies (Ehrenberg, 2000).  
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Comparing the rising Research I universities and Research II universities in the Carnegie 
classification, Morphew and Baker (2004) explained that rising to the next level incurs 
higher administrative costs, as schools make efforts to mimic the spending behavior of 
other comprehensive, prestigious universities, and to increase the amount of federal 
funding received. 
Several frameworks presented explanations for why institutions are compelled to 
engage in striving behaviors (O’Meara, 2007).  For the most part, the theories explain 
that universities pursue prestige because it leads to both material (e.g., financial 
resources, selective students and faculty) and virtual resources (e.g., legitimacy), which in 
turn lead to increases in prestige, and the cycle continues (Toma, 2012).   
From an economic perspective, striving behaviors emerge as the market structure 
of higher education changes.  In particular, the expansion of higher education through 
telecommunications, travel costs, use of standardized admissions tests, and tuition 
reciprocity agreements has promoted vertical differentiation among the institutions and 
students (Hoxby, 1997).  Once enrollment thresholds are met, schools try to increase in 
student quality in consideration of peer effects on learning, positive outcomes such as 
retaining students, career placement, student satisfaction, and alumni giving (Winston, 
2000).  Yet, there are only limited numbers of high ability students (e.g., high GPA, 
SAT/ACT scores) and access to these students is dependent on an institution’s relative 
position compared to other schools (Winston, 2000).  Therefore, schools engage in 
striving behaviors by increasing subsidies to students whose input quality is high (Hoxby, 
1997).  In addition, competition over faculty with outstanding qualifications as well as 
disciplines with an undersupply of prospective faculty contributes to striving through 
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amenities and research support to attract these faculty (Clotfelter, 1996; O’Meara, 2007).  
The economic theory explains striving behavior as a way of leveraging input quality and 
resources.  Yet, this perspective cannot explain why schools engage in irrational 
behaviors that entail significant costs when prestige is not tangible and the relationship 
between prestige and access to student, faculty, and other resources is unclear.   
Meanwhile, the ecological and sociological perspectives explain striving behavior 
as a process of institutions becoming more homogeneous.  The population ecology theory 
posits that environments choose organizations most suitable for survival (Kast & 
Rosenzweig, 1973).  From this perspective, higher education institutions at a particular 
period would strive for survival by competing over similar scarce resources, similar 
supply and demand of faculty and students, and similar government regulation 
(Birnbaum, 1983).  Yet, how institutions perceive prestige and develop strategic 
behaviors remains unexplained. 
On the other hand, institutional theory explains that universities pursue prestige in 
order to enhance the organization’s perceived legitimacy.  As universities lack clear goals 
and technologies that suggest a more distinctive path (Morphew & Huisman 2002) for 
success, prestigious institutions provide a model of legitimate institutional practice. 
Prestige shapes an isomorphic pressure, and institutions are susceptible to prestige 
regardless traditional measures of environmental change such as revenue streams 
(Morphew, 2009).   The detailed process of striving was explained by mimicking 
behavior, modeling the most prestigious organizations.  Using the concept of academic 
procession, Riesman (1956) explained that most prestigious institutions in the hierarchy 
are at the head, followed by a middle group, and then less prestigious schools at the tail 
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of the snake.  Institutions in the middle group mimic the practice of prestigious 
universities, and the less prestigious schools follow the middle group.  
More recent studies recognize that the same theory is useful in explaining how 
universities balance the demands of institutional pressures and institutional core.  From 
this perspective, schools take tactical responses to institutional processes, and striving 
behaviors include both rational and institutional components (Oliver, 1991).  Some 
studies argue that schools with different characteristics may use different prestige-seeking 
behaviors, as they face different contingencies.  Decisions on campus are inextricably 
linked to a specific history, market, competitors, institutional identity, and leadership at a 
given time.  While financially solvent universities are at the higher end of the academic 
hierarchy (Winston, 1997), it is smaller colleges (Schultz & Stickler, 1965), public 
schools with flagship (Morphew & Huisman, 2002) and land-grant status (Finnegan, 
1993; Wolf-Wendel & Ward, 2005), and research universities (Geiger, 2004; Massy & 
Zemsky, 1994; Sweitzer & Volkwein, 2005) that are more likely to engage in striving 
behaviors.  
Yet, the institutional theory explanation of striving behavior is limited, as it does 
not explain how institutions of different prestige might engage in striving behavior 
differently.  Schools primarily compete with schools in their band or region of the 
hierarchy (Zemsky, Shaman, & Iannozzi, 1997).  Distinguishing between reputation and 
prestige, Brewer et al., (2002) argued that reputation-seeking, prestige-seeking, and 
hybrid institutions display distinct practices.  In their study, reputation refers to how well 
an institution meets the needs of its clientele.  Institutions concerned about reputation 
focus more attention on student services, graduate placement, and curriculum offerings to 
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meet the needs of changing markets, whereas prestige-seeking institutions focus on 
expenditures on student quality, research, and sports.  Hybrid institutions tend to employ 
different resource allocation strategies for different segments of institutions (e.g., 
undergraduate vs. graduate programs).  While the distinction of different levels of 
prestige is arbitrary, what defines the status hierarchy should be explored in relation to 
the definition of prestige.    
The overview of research on rankings and prestige seeking behaviors suggests 
that institutions have been engaging in a positional arms race (Frank, 2001; Mause, 
2008), and the practice of rankings might have intensified the striving behavior of 
institutions.  Yet, previous research leaves some important questions unanswered.  
Although existing research suggests changes in institutional practices around rankings, 
there has been limited empirical research that explains specific areas of resource change 
in relation to the attributes of ranking systems.  While rankings place a numerical order 
on institutions, they create an arbitrary grouping of universities based on the ranking 
positions as well as changes in each institution’s position every year (volatility).  The 
arbitrary grouping of universities and volatility may create a mechanism that 
differentiates institutional responses to rankings.  If being ranked at or within the top 1, 
25, 50, or 120 is associated with critical benefits, institutions that are at the margins of 
those ranking groups might be most intensively engaged in strategic behaviors either to 
maintain their membership within their current group or to move into the next most 
prestigious group.  Also, we do not know how year-to-year changes in the numerical 
order induce colleges to change their resource allocations.  
  41 
It is worth mentioning, finally, some methodological concerns with the previous 
research.  The cross-sectional design of previous studies does not capture the temporal 
dimension of the influence of rankings on institutional behavior.  Therefore, we are 
limited in understanding whether and how the influence of rankings on higher education 
has changed over time.  When institutions learn the consequences of rankings over time 
and incorporate changes in their practice, universities may increase expenditures to 
improve their standing over time.  Although some quantitative studies imply that 
rankings affect higher education institutions, these studies did not account for other 
external factors that influence institutions’ rankings as well as resource management.  
Only a few studies attempted to remedy this issue by employing a quasi-experimental 
approach (e.g., Jin & Whalley, 2007; Luca & Smith, 2011).  Therefore, drawing causal 
conclusions about the influence of rankings on spending behaviors requires caution. 
Filling these gaps in the literature is the purpose of this dissertation.  
I employ the institutional theory, as this theory has provided useful perspectives 
in explaining the motivation of institutions engaging in strategic behaviors in response to 
the vague concept of prestige or rankings as institutional forces.  While previous research 
focused on homogenization and isomorphism, I emphasize the specific link between 
institutional behaviors and the unique characteristics of rankings—a numeric order, 
arbitrary grouping of universities, and volatility in the positions generated based on a set 
of evaluation criteria determined by the ranking producers.  How schools with different 
contingencies employ different behaviors is also considered.  Furthermore, I expand the 
framework provided by the institutional theory by adding the status-based model.  The 
status-based model explains how an important but less explored nature of rankings—
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arbitrary grouping of universities—creates bands or regions of hierarchy and develops 
different behaviors of schools in relation to their respective rankings.  In the next section, 
I provide the underlying assumptions of the theories and their implications for explaining 
institutional behaviors in relation to the college rankings.  
Theoretical Framework 
Taken together, institutional theory and the status-based model can help us better 
conceptualize why and how institutions are inspired to change resource allocations in 
response to rankings, by increasing expenses that are evaluated by USNWR. In 
particular, how the unique characteristics of the rankings system—numeric order, 
arbitrary grouping of schools, and volatility (year-to-year changes in the position)—may 
lead to different strategies of institutions will be explained.   
Institutional theory  
Institutional theory, drawn from sociology, emphasizes the tendency for 
organizations to succeed and persist as a result of conformity to institutionalized rules 
and procedures as opposed to technical efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  The old institutionalism proposed by Selznick and others (Clark, 1956; 
Perrow, 1961; Selznick, 1948, 1949, 1957) posited that organizations are social systems 
that are embedded in environments and change over time.  The goals, structures, and 
processes of organizations are developed in response to the interplay of interests among 
the internal and external constituents of organizations and the changing social 
environments in which organizations are located.  Parsons (1960) highlighted the 
importance of legitimacy and organizational conformity to institutions that exist at a 
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societal level.  Organizations gain legitimacy and resources by conforming to norms, 
values, and technology that are institutionalized in society.  Thus, administrators align 
organizations’ aims and missions with society’s norms and values.  Yet, as social values 
conflict with actions directed toward goal attainment, organizations develop separate 
subsystems to secure legitimacy and to enhance efficiency. 
More specific elaboration about the nature and variety of institutional processes 
and the range of influences that these processes exert on structural characteristics of 
organizations started in the late 1970s, as a number of works (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983) provided the 
initial formulation of new institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) argued that the formal structure of an organization is the outcome of 
conformity to institutionalized myths.  Innovative structures that improve technical 
efficiency in early adopting organizations become legitimized in the environment, and 
reach a level of legitimization where failure to adopt them is seen as irrational and 
negligent or the structures become legal mandates.  In a highly institutionalized context, 
new and existing organizations will adopt products, services, techniques, policies, and 
programs that function as powerful myths, even if the form does not improve efficiency 
(Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  The myths originate from complex relational networks (i.e. 
interconnections among organizations that facilitate the spread of ideas and 
understandings), collective organization of the environment (i.e. the rise of powerful 
states that can pass and enforce mandates that affect organizations), and the leadership of 
local organizations (i.e. non-governmental organizations that have power and/or 
legitimacy to promote prescribed organizational arrangements).  
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Organizations conform to institutions by incorporating elements that are 
legitimated externally rather than in terms of efficiency and employing external or 
ceremonial assessment criteria to define the value of structural elements.  Dependence on 
externally fixed institutions reduces turbulence and maintains stability.  This dependence 
increases the commitment of internal participants and external constituents (Jepperson, 
1991) and ensures organizational success and survival. 
Yet, organizations must also attend to practical activity.  Meyer and Rowan 
assumed that technical activities and demands for efficiency may conflict and be 
inconsistent with organizations’ efforts to conform to the ceremonial rules.  They 
conceptualized that organizations find a stable solution by maintaining a loosely coupled 
state.  Organizations decouple their technical core from these legitimizing structures and 
maintain displays of confidence, satisfaction and good faith internally and externally, and 
minimize and ceremonialize inspection and evaluation (Meyer, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 
1978; Rowan, 1981, 1982).  
 Isomorphic adaptation by organizations to their institutional environments results 
in an increased homogeneity of organizational structures over time.  DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) distinguished that such isomorphism is driven by both responding to 
technical demands of markets (i.e. competitive isomorphism) and competition for 
legitimacy (i.e. institutional isomorphism).  Especially, in a weak technical environment 
where means-ends uncertainty is high and clear economic fitness measures are absent, 
organizations are more likely to compete for social fitness.  
DiMaggio and Powell further specified three mechanisms of institutional 
isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative.  In coercive isomorphism, organizations 
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follow the formal rules and regulations laid by the state and its agencies and thereby end 
up with similar structures and procedures (Rowan & Miskel, 1999).  Rules about 
appropriate goals, operating procedures, and output measures require organizations to 
follow standard operating procedures of powerful exchange partners.  If organizations fail 
to comply with these rules, they lose social and financial sanctions. 
 Normative isomorphism is the process by which professions commonly impose 
order on organizations.  Normative expectations and moral obligations generated by a 
society of professional communities reinforce certain structures and practices. 
Certifications in the professional occupations and accreditations for organizations that are 
mainly led by field professions are good examples of normative isomorphism.  Finally, 
mimetic isomorphism is similar to the notion of conformity to rationalized myths (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977).  Facing uncertainty, organizations mimic goals, structures and practices 
of successful or prestigious organizations.  By diffusing information, common personnel, 
and taken-for-granted scripts, less successful organizations seek to gain prestige and to 
assure the public that they are acting in modern and rational ways.  In the end, this 
increases homogeneity of organizations in the same institutional sector as they adopt 
similar structures. 
A more recent development in institutional theory has pointed out that 
organizations are not unitary entities, and their responses to institutional processes may 
be divergent (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), less homogeneous, and less automatic than 
originally envisaged (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).  From these neo-institutional 
perspectives, researchers claimed that some organizations persist or change templates for 
organizing, given the institutionalized organizational field.  Organizations employ 
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strategic behaviors in direct response to the institutional processes that affect them. 
Oliver (1991) specified various types of strategic behaviors by integrating insights from 
institutional and resource dependence perspectives.  He hypothesized that some 
organizations acquiesce by habituating, imitating, and complying with institutions; others 
take compromising behaviors such as balancing, pacifying, and bargaining with different 
constituencies’ expectations; moreover, some organizations avoid institutional influence 
by concealing, buffering, and escaping from the norms or defy by dismissing, challenging, 
and attacking the institutional structures, and even manipulate them by incorporating 
behaviors such as co-opting, influencing, and controlling.  In addition, he suggested that 
whether institutional pressure comes from efficiency or legitimacy, whether an 
organization has multiple or single constituencies, what content and means of control the 
institutions have, and the level of uncertainty and interconnectedness of the organizations 
predict different patterns of strategic behaviors that organizations take toward 
institutional pressures that are exerted on organizations.  
From the institutional theory perspective, rankings become a powerful 
institutional force in the field of higher education as they decide a) the scope of 
institutions to be evaluated and ranked, b) measurement criteria and their weights, and c) 
the hierarchical numeric order of colleges (Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 2010).  
Numerical rankings provide an external assessment of organizational reputation and 
worth, generate influential images of the positional status of schools to field experts (e.g., 
admins, faculty, regulating organizations) and external audiences (e.g., students, 
governments, employers, funding providers, and alumni), which leads to an institution’s 
virtual and material resource attainment (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011).  
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Then, rankings, an institution’s numeric order becomes important for universities 
to gain legitimacy and access to resources (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Thus, compliance to 
a ranking system occurs and persists, even in the absence of any ostensible indication that 
these behaviors serve the organization’s own interests or contribute to organizational 
efficiency or control (Oliver, 1991; Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Zucker, 
1983).  Being reactive, colleges monitor and interpret rankings and adjust their actions 
accordingly.  Top managers at universities monitor their respective institutions’ ranking 
positions in each year (relative to competing peers) and year-to-year changes in the 
positions.  Furthermore, they attend to what rankings measure and quantitative data in 
institutional management.  Thus, when universities are included in the rankings, schools 
would adjust institutional policies and practices in ways that conform to visible criteria of 
performance evaluated by the rankings (Rao, 1994; Zimmerman, 2001).  As 
measurements of USNWR are composed of inputs of resources (Brooks, 2005; Dill & 
Soo, 2005) including student selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources, 
institutions will consider increasing resources in these areas in order to organize strategic 
practices for improving quality of inputs in those areas or simply to report a higher data 
values.  Pursuing higher ranking positions, schools might raise revenue as much as 
possible, spend all the money they raise, and continue the spending over time as there is 
no clear standard of achievement (Bowen, 1980; Leslie, Slaughter, Taylor, & Zhang, 
2011).  
Schools might be able to strategically act to decouple their technical core from 
organizational forces (Rowan, 1981, 1982; Meyer, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 1978).  If 
teaching and research are the technical core of universities, changes in the resources that 
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have immediate impact on these areas (e.g., composition of faculty, expenses on 
instruction, research expenditure) would happen slower than changes in the areas loosely 
related with the core (e.g., non-educational services, student support).  However, Sauder 
and Espeland (2009) argued that universities cannot decouple themselves from rankings. 
Universities internalize rankings due to managerial anxiety about rankings and 
competition with other universities.  Thus, the discipline of rankings makes universities 
fail to resist and game the rankings system even for their technical core.  We would 
expect to see changes in all expenses areas.   
The timing of expenditure changes might coincide with the budgeting process. 
Most ongoing and incremental expenses for day-to-day activities, which are directly 
related to academic activities and student enrollment, receive priority in budget 
adjustment according to the institutional needs (Lasher & Greene, 2001).  On the other 
hand, budgets that are related to faculty composition or quality might be hard to change 
in the short term because of the tenure system but can be accomplished over time through 
not filling permanent positions when senior faculty retire and using non-regular faculty to 
handle additional teaching load (Toutkoushian, 1999).  Increases in spending for non-
educational services such as constructing new buildings might require a long-term change 
as these facilities are expected to pay their own way without support from the tuition or 
appropriation revenues that support the core operating budget (Lasher & Greene, 2001; 
Meisinger & Dubeck, 1984).  It is possible that flexibility of budgeting might be affected 
by rankings over time, but it is beyond the scope of this study.  
The isomorphic perspective of institutional theory is limited in explaining the 
heterogeneous effect of rankings on colleges and different ways that universities respond 
  49 
to the environment, as the basic idea of institutional theory prioritizes similarities over 
differences in practice (Beckert, 2010; Mohr, 1982; Rowan & Miskel, 1999).  Recent 
studies in institutional theory acknowledged that not all organizations act in the same 
way.  Researchers posited that whether organizations can be more or less receptive to 
institutional forces is mediated by contingency factors, such as size and technology (Beck 
& Walgenbach, 2005), and by organizational identity (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; 
Labianca, Fairbank, Thomas, Gioia, & Umphress, 2001).  In particular, Liberal Arts 
Colleges might develop different tactical responses than National Universities as they try 
to balance between external pressures from the rankings and their mission (Oliver, 1991).  
For example, Liberal Arts Colleges might increase expenses for student support rather 
than research, even though ranking measures include research expenses.  Moreover, if the 
initial ranking set a bar for the level that the university ought to be, dropping from the 
previous year’s position might lead to a higher level of response to the rankings.  
Yet, this perspective is limited in explaining the unique characteristics of rankings 
as an institutional pressure: rankings place colleges in a hierarchy using a numerical order 
and arbitrary grouping of institutions.  Thus the position determined by rankings may 
have different consequences for universities and constrain their action to varying degrees.  
For example, the impact of rankings on a school’s legitimacy may differ across schools, 
depending on their ranking: in the case of schools at the borders of ranking group cut-off 
points (e.g., top 1, 25, 50, or 120), moving up (or dropping) a few positions can be a 
significant gain (or threat) to their legitimacy and identity, compared to the schools that 
are stable in the middle of the ranking groups (Espeland & Sauder, 2007).  The different 
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pressure perceived by institutions in different ranking positions may cause different 
motivation and behaviors of universities in their reactions to college rankings.  
The status-based model  
The status-based model provides a useful perspective in explaining why schools 
with different ranking positions, determined by an arbitrary grouping of USNWR, might 
have different responses to college rankings.  Based on the structural perspective, 
sociologists have theorized and empirically investigated the significance of networks in 
determining the probability that an actor would come into contact with some opportunity, 
resource, or information (Granovetter, 1985).  Extending the notion of network, the 
status-based model posits that the network ties translate to an actor’s status (Podolny, 
1993). 
Podolny and his colleagues defined status as accumulated acts of deference that 
take various forms such as conferral of awards, ordering or rankings of organizations, and 
imitation of practices by other organizations.  In this model, status has two 
characteristics. First, status functions as a signal that potential exchange partners use to 
make inferences about quality.  When quality of an organization is not directly 
observable, constituencies will look to status to reduce their uncertainty.  Thus, status 
generates privileges or discrimination, independent of their and others’ performance 
(Washington & Zajac, 2005). 
Second, status derives from the status of an actor’s exchange partners, and is 
contingent on its cooperative and competing affiliations (Washington & Zajac, 2005). 
When organizations affiliate with well-known, high-status organizations, they enjoy a 
significant advantage in contests for the recognition and acceptance of their products and 
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processes (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Rao, 1994; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999) and gain 
legitimacy from constituencies (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 1992; Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000; 
Zuckerman, 1999; 2000).  Linkages among peers of equal status do not cause either actor 
to gain or lose in status, and linkages between actors of unequal status benefit the lower-
status actor but damage the high-status actor (status contagion) (Stuart et al., 1999). 
Thus, to maintain and enhance status, organizations try to manage their relationships.  As 
a result, status homophily (Gould, 2001) or status segregation (Podolny, 1994) occurs: 
high-status organizations partner disproportionately with other high-status organizations, 
while low-status organizations are more likely to associate with low-status firms.  
The notion of homophilious affiliation is useful to explain variations in 
isomorphic changes depending on status hierarchy.  Status overrides organizations’ 
actions as a basis for establishing identity and practice.  Status confers security to top 
status organizations, the prospect of mobility to middle status organizations, and renders 
the lowest status organizations observable to outsiders.  Therefore, at the middle tier, 
organizations are motivated to conform to institutional norms or imitate others’ practice. 
On the other hand, top tier institutions strive to differentiate their organizations from 
others, whereas low tier organizations are not concerned as they lack resources or are 
indifferent about the influence of institutional pressure (Han, 1994; Philips & Zuckerman, 
2001) .8  
From the status-based model perspective, rankings define an institution’s status 
by numerical order, and also by the categories or groups of the institutions labeled as the 
                                                 
8 The Strategic balance model (Deephouse, 1999) provides similar explanation. The model 
explains that organizations try to conform to the institution and differentiate their practice from 
others. This strategic behavior is mostly available for organizations with high status, while their 
counterparts with lower status are more likely to conform to the norms.   
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top 1, 25, 50, and 120 for each college type.  From Podolny’s notion of status, institutions 
placed in the same ranking group consist of competing networks, and belonging to a 
group indicates affiliations of institutions that compete at similar levels of quality. 
(Wedlin, 2007; 2011).  Thus, mere inclusion in the high status group benefits colleges in 
terms of the quality of students, quality of junior faculty, job placement of graduates, and 
financial resource attainment such as research funding or patents (Burris, 2004; D’Aveni, 
1996; Rindova et al., 2005; Sine et al., 2003).  Also, an institution’s previous 
performance and accumulated status in rankings, taken together, affect the institution’s 
future status (Washington & Zajac, 2005).  This Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968) 
intensifies stratification as schools in high status gain greater resources and influence 
over time.  
Based on the concept of status homophily, it is arguable that schools try to move 
up to the next ranking group or at least maintain positions in the current ranking group. 
Thus, the proximity of an institution to the arbitrary cut of each ranking group might 
determine the level of motivation and responses of colleges to conform to institutional 
norms set by USNWR. In particular, schools that aspire to upward movement or fear a 
downward movement across the ranking groups are most likely to conform to what 
rankings measure and what well performing institutions do.  Nonetheless, institutions far 
from the cut-offs may tend to show a lower level of conformity and fewer strategic 
behaviors as they lack resources or are indifferent to the influence of rankings (Gardener, 
2010; Han, 1994; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). 
The two theories suggest that higher education institutions are reactive to 
rankings, attending to the ranking attributes.  Once ranked, institutions monitor numeric 
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position and year-to-year changes in the position, as well as criteria that rankings 
evaluate.  Complying with rankings’ evaluation criteria, institutions would increase 
expenditures that are related with student selectivity, financial resources, and faculty 
resources.  The effect of rankings on institutional management would be more significant 
over time, as rankings are fully institutionalized.  Schools might increase responses when 
the institutions observe a negative change in their rankings.  Yet, the behavior will vary 
between National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  Furthermore, the 
arbitrary grouping of schools translates into an institution’s legitimacy, schools near at 
the margin of each ranking group (Top 1, 25, 50, and 120) would have a higher 
motivation and active engagement in complying to rankings, from their expectation for 
moving up to the next level or fear for slipping from the current group.  In the next 
chapter, I will explain the research method to test these hypotheses.  
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Chapter 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this section, I introduce the empirical approach employed in this study in order 
to examine the influence of rankings on institutional behavior.  I first explain the sources 
of the data, sample and time periods included in the analyses as well as variables that 
were used in this study.  Then, I turn to the analytic strategies to examine the causal 
effect of rankings, accounting for factors other than rankings that influence resource 
allocation.  
Data  
To test the hypotheses proposed in the previous section, this study requires 
information about institutional characters and practices as well as rankings over time.  I 
first constructed a panel dataset using the Higher Education General Information Survey 
(HEGIS) for the years 1980 to 1986, prior to its replacement the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS) for the years 1987 to 2011.  
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) supervised the two surveys. 
The HEGIS survey was conducted between 1966 and 1986, for institutions that are 
accredited at the college level.  In 1985, IPEDS phased in and replaced HEGIS since 
1987,9 collecting information from every postsecondary institution in the United States 
                                                 
9 The replacement was completed in 1988, but this was only for the library survey.  All other 
institutional survey components were migrated to IPEDS by 1987.  
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that participates in the federal aid programs (Title IV institutions).10  The two surveys 
have been the primary data source for describing and analyzing trends in postsecondary 
education in the U.S.  The HEGIS survey included 7 components: Finance, Fall 
Enrollment, Institutional Characteristics, Completions, State Migration, Libraries, and 
Faculty/Staff.  Along with these components, other components have been added to the 
survey over time.  The current IPEDS includes 9 components: Institutional 
characteristics, completions, 12-Month enrollment, student financial aid, graduation rates, 
200% graduation rates, Fall Enrollment, finance, and Human Resources.  
The major source of the data for this study was from the Finance component, as it 
includes expenses by function (e.g., scholarships and fellowships, auxiliary enterprises, 
student services, instruction, academic and student support, and research).  The Student 
Financial Aid survey also provides data regarding undergraduate students, in terms of 
number of students receiving different types of financial assistance as well as the average 
amount received for each type of financial aid.  Finally, I used Human Resources data for 
the number of faculty by primary activity, tenure status, academic rank, as well as 
salaries and benefits for full-time instructional staff.  Other information about the 
institution was drawn from Institutional Characteristics (control, affiliations), Fall 
enrollment (total number of enrollment) as well as Finance (total revenue, endowment 
asset).11 
Creating a panel data with HEGIS and IPEDS involves a number of issues.  First, 
each survey component is administered in different cycles and covers different time 
                                                 
10 For the last year of the HEGIS survey (1986), 3,714 institutions (2,029 four-year) were 
included, where as 12,052 institutions (2,652 four-year) were included in the first IPEDS survey 
(1987).  Institutions included in HEGIS are included in IPEDS (Fuller, 2011). 
11 Endowment asset (market value) was not available in 1987-1990 and 1997-2002 financial year.  
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spans.  Therefore, merging the separate parts for one academic year requires caution. 
Specifically, Institutional Characteristics survey is collected in fall (early September to 
mid-October), whereas Finance, Fall Enrollment, and Human Resources are collected in 
spring (early December to mid-April), and Student Financial Aid is collected in winter 
(early December to mid-February).  Furthermore, the Finance and Student Financial Aid 
survey focuses on the data one year before the particular academic year.  For example, in 
order to create data for the academic year of 2011, I used data released in 2012 for 
Finance and Student Financial Aid, and 2011 data for the rest of the survey components.  
As some survey components have been changed, data harmonization—assuring 
consistency of definitions for variables—is also an important dimension of the panel data.  
The changes in the Finance survey raise the issue of keeping consistency in the variables.  
Due to the changes in accounting standards adopted by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board in the fiscal year 1997 and the Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board in 2004, public and private institutions begin to use different formats (GASB and 
FASB) for reporting their financial information.  This amendment changed the expense 
reporting for private institutions.  The operation and maintenance of plants and interest 
are included in expenses to each function, but these are not included in the old format or 
GASB.  Therefore, I adjusted expense related variables by subtracting those amounts for 
the comparability.  
Finally, the parent-child reporting is particularly problematic for finance related 
variables.  Institutions that have multiple affiliated campuses have different reporting 
choices.  Some universities report financial information only under the name of their 
main campus or the systems office, while others maintain individual reporting.  This 
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issue is more complex as the reporting choice of an institution is not consistent across 
different years.  To account for this issue, I employed the collapsing solution (Jaquette & 
Parra, 2014).  If institutions reported financial information along with other campuses or 
at the system level for any year, I aggregated those schools and assigned the value to the 
main campus.  Yet, the number of schools that are affected by this was very small in the 
sample: 36 universities among the 199 National Universities sample, 3 universities 
among the 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges sample.  Also, the schools evaluated by the 
USNWR were mostly main campuses, and only one case included both main and another 
campus in the same ranking category: Rutgers-New Brunswick and Newark.  As I 
aggregated variables for all Rutgers campuses to New Brunswick campus, I dropped the 
Newark campus from the sample.  
Although IPEDS provides useful information about the organization and 
management of universities, detailed information is limited on some dimensions.  
Financial aid practice is a good example.  Although IPEDS started to include the 
financial aid component from the academic year of 1998-99, the survey does not 
distinguish the number of students and average amount per recipient for detailed financial 
aid types.  To better understand institutional aid behavior, I employed the National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) 92-93, 95-96, 99-00, and 07-08.  NPSAS 
compiles a dataset based on student-level records and on financial aid provided by 
multiple agencies, including a student’s respective postsecondary institution.  Detailed 
information about student financial aid programs—amount, types of aid—were extracted 
from institutional records.  Based on the nationally representative sample of institutions 
and students for multiple cohorts, NPSAS has been the primary source of information 
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used by the federal government, researchers, and higher education associations to analyze 
student financial aid (National Center for Educational Statistics, n.d.). 
Because IPEDS forms the institutional sampling frame for NPSAS, I aggregated 
observations for undergraduate students at the institutional level, using the IPEDS ID 
(UNITID) associated with each university.  The data was then added to the IPEDS panel 
for the subsequent years in order to examine how institutions allocate institutional aid for 
different cohorts of students (e.g., need-based and merit-based aid) in relation to the 
changes in their rankings status.   
Finally, the America’s Best Colleges rankings published by the U.S. News and 
World Report was added to the IPEDS panel data for the years 1987 to 2009.  The data 
includes an institution’s Carnegie classification (in 1987, 1994, 2000, and 2005), which 
determines whether the institution is one of the National Universities or National Liberal 
Arts Colleges.  For each year, the data lists all National Universities and Liberal Arts 
Colleges evaluated by USNWR.  If the institution is numerically ranked, a specific 
number is provided; for tiered institutions, their respective tier group information is 
recorded.  Using this information, I identified the year an institution is numerically 
ranked for the first time.  Also, the institution’s ranking position in its respective ranking 
group and year-to-year changes in the rankings were retrieved from the data.   
Sample and Analysis Period 
Employing IPEDS, I first created data that includes Title IV colleges and 
universities that offer at least a BA degree and have not experienced merger or closure 
during the analytic periods (1980-2011).  Schools that offer only graduate degrees in 
specialized majors (e.g., law, business) were excluded.  I then limited samples based on 
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the USNWR categories.  USNWR ranks about 1,800 colleges and universities in the 
United States.  Based on the Carnegie classification, USNWR divides institutions mainly 
into four categories: National Universities, National Liberal Arts Colleges, Regional 
Universities, and Regional Colleges.12  This study focuses on the colleges and 
universities that belong to the National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges 
categories because institutions ranked at the top of these rankings receive a 
disproportionate share of public attention (Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999).  
The number of schools that are ranked has changed over time, due to the changes 
in the Carnegie classification in 1994, 2000, and 2005.  These changes resulted in the 
inclusion of new schools to the ranking for the first time, and exclusion of some schools 
that used to be included in National Universities or National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
Disregarding the changes in the Carnegie classification, there were 264 National 
Universities and 548 National Liberal Arts Colleges that are part of National Universities 
or National Liberal Arts Colleges rankings in any years during the analytic periods.  To 
avoid possible exogenous impact from the change in the classification, I restricted the 
initial sample to the schools that were consistently categorized as National Universities or 
National Liberal Arts Colleges throughout the analytic period.  This resulted in the 
sample of 199 schools in National Universities and 134 schools in National Liberal Arts 
Colleges rankings.  
Finally, the study examined the influence of rankings on universities over time.  
In order to consider trends in the outcomes, the data covered observations in 1980 
through 2011.  Since 1987, USNWR compared schools in each category using criteria, 
                                                 
12 Also includes unranked specialty schools for colleges that offer most or all of their degrees in 
fine arts, performing arts, business, or engineering.   
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consisting of sixteen indicators, all weighted differently.  The colleges and universities in 
each category are ranked against their peers, based on their composite weighted score.  
Then, a group of schools are placed in numerical order; the rest of the institutions are 
grouped into quartiles, and placed in alphabetical order.  The number of schools that are 
numerically ranked has changed over time.  Prior to 1995, only 25 universities were 
numerically ranked; since 1995, the top 25% institutions (the top 50) received the 
numerical rankings, and the rest of the 75% were categorized into Tiers 2, 3, and 4.  In 
2003, USNWR expanded the scope of numerical rankings. The top 50% institutions (the 
top 120) were given numerical rankings (top schools), and the remaining 50% were 
categorized as Tier 3 and 4.  Also, I limited data to the 2009 rankings as there was 
another methodological change,13 and the current data do not provide sufficient data 
points for the post-change periods.  
Research variables 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables for this study are institutional expenditures that are 
related to the three areas that USNWR highly emphasizes—student selectivity, financial 
resources, and faculty resources.  
Expenditures related to student selectivity.  In USNWR, student selectivity is 
measured using admission test scores for all enrollees who took the SAT/ACT, the 
proportion of freshmen who graduated in the top 10% of their high school class, and 
acceptance rate.  Possible efforts to improve rankings include attracting more 
                                                 
13 USNWR expanded the numerical rankings from the top 50% (top 121) to top 75% (top 199) in 
the 2011 edition.  
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academically selective students and more applicants.  Admissions outcomes might carry 
more importance beyond the original weight given to this category.  Retention and 
graduation rates are also evaluated by the rankings and student selectivity is potentially 
related to these outcomes.  Thus, dependent variables in this category included 
expenditures on institutional grants and fellowships, as well as expenditures on non-
educational services.  The list of the variables and their definition are following (Table 
3.1).  
Expenditures related to financial resources.  USNWR argues that generous per-
student spending indicates that a college can offer a wide variety of programs and 
services (USNWR, n.d.). From this perspective, the ranking includes measures such as 
average spending per student on instruction, research, student services, and other 
educational expenditures.  Detailed information for each variable is in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.1 Dependent variables: expenditures related to student selectivity 
Name Definition Years covered 
Institutional Grants and Fellowships 
Sum of institutional financial aid from restricted/private sources (e.g., 
business, foundations, individuals, foreign governments) and 
unrestricted resources (net assets) of the institution.  The institutional 
matching portion of federal, state, or local grants is reported here; 
athletic scholarships are also included here. 
Since 1986 
Missing for the years of 
1996-1998 (no reporting 
for GASB institutions) 
Institutional Aid: % receiving 
Proportion of full-time, first-time degree seeking undergraduate 
students who received institutional grants.  Includes scholarships and 
fellowships funded by institution and/or individual departments. 
1998-2011 
Institutional Aid: Average amount 
Average amount of institutional fellowships and scholarships 
conferred to each recipient. 
1998-2011 
Merit-based aid: % receiving 
Proportion of students who received institutional grants that were 
based entirely on merit, excluding athletic scholarships, and non-
need tuition waivers. 
1992, 1995, 1999, 2007 
Merit-based aid: Average amount 
Average amount of merit based grant per recipient at each institution 
(excluding athletic scholarships). 
1992, 1995, 1999, 2007 
Need-based aid: % receiving 
Proportion of students who received institutional grants that were 
based entirely on need or partly on need and partly on merit. 
1992, 1995, 1999, 2007 
Need-based aid: Average amount 
Average amount of need-based grant received by students at each 
institution. 
1992, 1995, 1999, 2007 
Expenditure for non-educational services 
Sum of all operating expenses associated with essentially self-
supporting operations of the institution that exist to furnish a service 
to students, faculty, or staff, and that charge a fee (e.g., residence 
halls, food services, student health services, intercollegiate athletics, 
college unions, college stores, faculty/staff parking, faculty housing). 
1980-2011 
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Expenditures related to faculty resources.  USNWR measures expenditures 
related to faculty, as a proxy for a school’s commitment to instruction.  In particular, the 
ranking perceives that more contact with professors results in students’ higher level of 
satisfaction, more learning, and increased probability of graduation. Measures include 
average faculty salary (pay and benefits), proportion of professors with highest degree in 
their fields, student-faculty ratio, and proportion of faculty who are full-time. The 
dependent variables related to this category focused on faculty compensation and 
composition (Table 3.3).  
For all expenditure variables, institutions are not consistent in reporting missing 
and zero data.  Among institutions in a given year, some schools reported zero while 
other institutions left zero as blank; or in one year, a school reported zero, but indicated 
no expenditure as blank in another year.  To provide consistency across institutions and 
years, all reported zeroes on finance variables were turned to missing (Delta Cost Project, 
2011).  All expenditure variables were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index, and the dollar values were expressed in terms of 2011 dollars.  Most dollar 
denominated variables were skewed to the left, and thus transformed by taking a natural 
logarithm.  Finally, I divided expenditure variables by the number of all full-time 
equivalent (FTE) students14 in order to account for heterogeneity of institutional size 
across institutions and over years (McPherson & Schapiro, 1991). 
                                                 
14 Based on the fall student headcounts for the years 1980-2011. 
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Table 3.2 Dependent variables: expenditures related to financial resources 
Name Definition Years covered 
Total Education and General 
Expenditure 
Sum of total expenses on instruction, research, public service, academic 
support, institutional support, and student services. 
1980-2011 
Expenditure for instruction 
Sum of all operating expenses associated with the colleges, schools, 
departments, and other instructional divisions of the institution and for 
departmental research and public service that are not separately budgeted.  
This includes compensation for academic instruction, occupational and 
vocational instruction, community education, preparatory and adult basic 
education, and remedial and tutorial instruction conducted by the teaching 
faculty for the institution's students. 
1980-2011 
Expenditure for academic support 
Sum of all operating expenses associated with activities and services that 
support the institution's primary missions of instruction, research, and public 
service. 
1980-2011 
Expenditure for student services 
Sum of all operating expenses associated with admissions, registrar activities, 
and activities whose primary purpose is to contribute to students' emotional 
and physical well-being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social 
development outside the context of the formal instructional program.  
Examples include student activities, cultural events, student newspapers, 
intramural athletics, student organizations, supplemental instruction outside the 
normal academic program (remedial instruction), career guidance, counseling, 
financial aid administration, and student records. 
1980-2011 
Expenditure for research 
Sum of all operating expenses associated with activities specifically organized 
to produce research outcomes and commissioned by an agency either external 
to the institution or separately budgeted by an organizational unit within the 
institution.  The category includes institutes, research centers, and individual 
and project research. 
1980-2011 
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Table 3.3 Dependent variables: expenditures related to faculty resources 
Name Definition Years covered 
Average salaries and benefits 
Average salary and fringe benefits for instructional faculty (all 
academic rank), 9 month equated. 
Missing in the 
years of 1983, 
1986, 1988, 
and 2000. 
Total number of faculty 
Total number of full- and part-time faculty who are responsible 
for instruction, research, and/or public service. 
Measured 
after 1987 and 
every odd year 
thereafter. 
Student-faculty ratio 
Total full-time undergraduate students divided by total number of 
faculty. 
Measured 
after 1987 and 
every odd year 
thereafter. 
Proportion of full-time faculty 
% full-time faculty among all faculty whose major regular 
assignment is instruction, research, and/or public service. 
Measured 
after 1987 and 
every odd year 
thereafter. 
Proportion of tenured/tenure track faculty 
% of faculty who are tenured or in positions that lead to 
consideration for tenure among total faculty. 
Since 1993 
and every odd 
year 
thereafter. 
Proportion of professors 
% of faculty whose academic rank is professor, associate 
professor, or assistant professor among total instructional faculty. 
Missing in 
1983, 1986, 
1988, and 
2000. 
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Explanatory variables 
Numerically Ranked.  The annual publication of USNWR started in 1987, and 
the expansion of numerical rankings from top 25 to top 50, and to top 120 occurred in 
1995 and 2003, respectively.  Along with this external change, some institutions were 
numerically ranked for the first time during different years throughout the analytic 
periods.  Using the inclusion to the numerical rankings, I created a binary variable that 
indicates whether an institution was numerically ranked for the first time (Research 
Question 1).  This variable is 0 if the institution was not numerically ranked at any time, 
0 for the years leading up to the first year that the institution was numerically ranked. The 
code was 1 for years when the institution was numerically ranked.   
Ranked at the margin.  For Research Question 2, I created a set of indicators that 
specifies whether an institution was located at the upper or lower margins of a ranking 
group, if an institution was numerically ranked.  USNWR distinguishes universities that 
are ranked at Top 1 from other universities which are grouped into the categories of top 
1-25, 26-50 and 51-120.  Taking the cut-off points (Top 1, 25, 50, and 120), I calculated 
the average distance from the cut for each institution.  Then, a set of dummy variables 
was generated indicating whether an institution is ranked at the margin of ranking group 
cut-offs.  I specified whether an institution is ranked at the upper margin (0 to 4 points 
from the cut) or lower margin (-1 to -4 points from the cut).  I chose the 4-point interval 
because changes in the rankings mostly happen around the cut-offs (Dichev, 2001), and 
movements within 0-4 intervals from the cut-off points are due to statistical noise 
(Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 2008).  The descriptive statistics results also provided 
supports for this choice: the distance of an institution’s ranking from the respective 
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ranking group cut-off point changed by about 2 to 6 standard deviations across the years 
(see Table 4.2).  For each ranking group, changes in the ranking positions happened 
mostly within 4 points (Figure 4.2).  Institutions that were ranked but not located at either 
the upper or lower margins served as the reference group. 
Dropped vs. Maintained or Improved.  The year-to-year changes in the rankings 
were captured by comparing an institution’s ranking in year t+1 with that of year t.  This 
information was transformed into dummy variables that indicate dropping or improving 
from the previous year versus maintaining the same position, for all National Universities 
and National Liberal Arts Colleges (Research Question 3).  
Control variables  
According to the revenue theory of costs (Bowen, 1980), schools spend all the 
money they raise to maximize excellence, prestige, and quality, and the spending 
continues over time as there is no clear standard of achievement (Bowen, 1980; Leslie et 
al., 2011).  Thus, my preferred specification allowed the revenue of schools for each year 
to vary.15  
I included university fixed effects as well as year-by-public/private fixed effects.  
As such, I controlled directly for all time-invariant characteristics that might be unique to 
a given university, as well as accounted for any factors that are specific to a given year.  
Differences between public and private universities, as well as conditions for 
private/public universities that may vary over time were held constant.  This is essential 
as administrative function and financial restriction might differ by institutional control.  
                                                 
15 Since the scale and overall availability of resources might influence resource allocation (Baker, 
2003), I also estimated models controlling for the total revenue of schools and endowment size 
(market value) for each year. The results from these models are reported in appendix Table A1-
A6. 
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For example, public universities would have a greater reliance upon state and would 
spend a greater share of revenues on administrative offices that interface with the state 
office providing these revenue streams (Leslie & Rhoades, 1995).   
Identification Strategy 
I employed a differences-in-differences (DD) and differences-in-differences-in-
differences (DDD) approach to examine the causal impact of rankings on institutional 
expenditure.  I used the changes in the ranking methodology to guide the analysis 
(Research Question1).  First, USNWR began the annual publication of college rankings 
in 1987, ranking the 25 schools in the National University and National Liberal Arts 
Colleges categories; also, it was the first year that the objective measures of input and 
output were introduced, reducing the weight for the reputation survey.  Second, in 1995 
and 2003, USNWR expanded the scope of numerical rankings by adding the top 26 to 50 
to the top 25, and the top 51 to 120 in addition to the top 50.  Along with this external 
change, some institutions were numerically ranked for the first time in different years. 
The unexpected implementation of the new methodologies allowed me to identify 
the causal effect of the numerical rankings on institutional expenditure in the subsequent 
years, eliminating other confounding factors that also impact expenditures.  The 
introduction of the annual ranking and measurement criteria distinguished the top 25 
institutions from other institutions of a similar kind; the expansion of numerical rankings 
allowed the inclusion of some institutions that were alphabetically ordered but not 
numerically ranked (tiered).   
The credibility of DD analysis depends on two assumptions.  First, the 
experimental assignments are exogeneous, and beyond any possible manipulation by the 
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participants themselves (Angrist & Pischke, 2008).  I argue that the first implementation 
of annual rankings and the expansion of numerical rankings meet this assumption. 
Although the schools have provided data to USNWR, they do not have authority to 
change the ranking methodology.  Prior to 1987, the ranking was published only twice as 
a special issue, and schools did not anticipate its annual publication; also, the prior 
publications were based purely on a reputation survey, and schools did not know what 
organizational actions could help them to be included in the rankings.  Therefore, schools 
were less likely to take strategic behaviors in relation to rankings.  With regard to the 
expansion in 1995 and 2003, schools did not anticipate the numerical rankings to be 
changed from the top 25 to top 50, and top 50 to top 120.  Therefore, the newly added 
schools could not have aimed at or taken action to claim specific positions in the 
rankings.  Furthermore, because an institution’s position is relative to other institutions, 
and institutional strategies do not guarantee certain ranking positions, institutions would 
have difficulty manipulating the probability of inclusion in the numerical ranking 
(treatment).  
Another core assumption to identify the treatment effect in DD estimators is the 
parallel path assumption which states that the average change in outcome for the treated 
in the absence of treatment should be equal to the average change in outcome for the non-
treated (Mora & Reggio, 2012).  Using an event-study specification (equation (2)), I test 
whether treatment and control schools are trending similarly in the years leading up to the 
changes in the ranking methodology by adding flexible time dummy variables for the 
control group.  This suggestive test of the common trends assumption expects all the pre-
treatment coefficients to be equal to zero.  In other words, ranked schools and tiered 
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schools would have been trended similarly if not ranking status was changed.  The results 
of the event-study specification suggested that ranking methodology was not changed 
when institutional expenditures were trending differently at ranked and tiered schools, as 
the point estimates on the pre-treatment years are close to zero and insignificant (see 
Figures 4.5 - 4.10).  This finding gives credibility to the parallel path assumption, and the 
coefficients from the DD analyses present the shifts in the expenditure due to the changes 
in the rankings.  
The basic empirical strategy was to compare changes in institutional expenditures 
at colleges that were included in the numerical rankings to changes at colleges that were 
unranked but were grouped into tiers.  For the purpose of a robustness check, I employed 
a different control group.  Colleges that had been ranked prior to 2003 were compared to 
the schools that have been ranked since 2003.  To implement this difference-in-
differences strategy, I estimated regressions of the form:  
𝐸𝑃it+1 = 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑it + δi  +λprivate*t+ εit (1) 
where EPit+1 is per FTE expenditure outcomes at university i during the year t+1; 
Rankedit is whether the institution i, is ranked in the annual rankings or received a 
specific numerical order during the year t; δi denotes college fixed effects, which controls 
for any differences in the dependent variable driven by time-invariant characteristics of a 
university (e.g., age); λprivate*t is private-by-year fixed effects.  Year specific conditions 
such as changes in federal expenditure on higher education or cost of living are controlled 
through the fixed effect.  Differences between public and private universities such as in 
their source of funding, administrative models, or political pressures, as well as all 
interactions between year and institutional control are also differenced out of the 
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specification.  Because most of the National Liberal Arts colleges are private (about 98% 
of the sample), only institution and year fixed effects were included for all specifications. 
εit is the residual error.  The coefficient of interest (β) is the changes in the expenditure 
following the inclusion in the numerical rankings (Research Question 1).  The statistical 
model was estimated separately for National Universities and National Liberal Arts 
Colleges, to compare the heterogeneous effect of rankings on different types of 
institutions.  Standard errors were clustered by institutions to address the possibility that 
inclusion in the USNWR is a permanent shock and the outcomes I study are likely to be 
autocorrelated within the same college (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).   
Meanwhile, how quickly institutions respond to rankings by changing their 
resource allocation is not yet clear.  If the proximal effect of rankings on financial 
resource attainment is weaker during shorter periods (e.g., 2-4 years) than longer periods 
(e.g., 8 or more years) (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011), institutions would learn the impact of 
USNWR on their resource attainment and take actions to improve their ranking positions 
over time.  Employing an event-study specification, I examined the impact of USNWR 
changes over time:  
 
𝐸𝑃it+1 =  ∑ 𝛽k𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑it+k + αXit + δi + λprivate*t + εit
𝑘=+10
𝑘=−4
 (2) 
 
𝛽k𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑it+k  indicates that institution i was included in the annual ranking or numerical 
ranking k years before year t; the parameter 𝛽k is the change in expenditure in university k 
years after the inclusion in the numerical rankings relative to the omitted category (k=-5 
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or earlier).  For instance, 𝛽-4 is the changes in expenditure four years before the inclusion, 
𝛽0 is the change in the year of inclusion and 𝛽10 is the change in expenditure ten or more 
years after the inclusion in the numerical rankings (all relative to five or more years 
before the inclusion).  Thus, I estimated the change in expenditure in a university -4 to 10 
or more years after the inclusion in the numerical rankings relative to five or more years 
before the inclusion.  The event study specification also allowed me to test whether 
treatment and control schools are trending similarly in the years leading up to the changes 
in the ranking methodology. 
The status-based model implies that differently ranked institutions may have 
different levels of motivation and engagement in improving their rankings.  Particularly, 
the response to USNWR should be larger when institutions are at the cusp of the ranking 
groups, as they are either scared of slipping from the current rankings or are motivated to 
rise up higher in the rankings.  Also, when institutions observe drops in the rankings, they 
would engage in more actions to reclaim the original position in the next year.  Therefore, 
I tested for heterogeneous responses along these lines.  Using Differences-in-Differences-
in-Differences (DDD), I analyzed whether the effect of being exposed to the numerical 
orders differs by an institution’s a) proximity to the ranking groups (i.e. the distance of an 
institution from the ranking group cut-offs) (Research Question 2), and b) year-to-year 
changes in the ranking positions (declined or improved vs. maintained the previous year’s 
position) (Research Question 3).  Denoting these variables as Margin and Change, I 
extended the main specification above to  
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𝐸𝑃it+1 = 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑it + γ𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛+ δi +λprivate*t + εit (3) 
𝐸𝑃it+1 = γ𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒it +  δi +λprivate*t + εit  if 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 = 1  (4) 
 
where vector γ captures the heterogeneous effect of the USNWR on expenditures by 
Margin.  Whether rankings have a bigger impact on the institutions at the upper or lower 
margins, defined as being ranked 0 to 4 and -1 to -4 points away from cut-off, 
respectively, compared to their counterparts that are further away from the ranking group 
cut-offs (+/- 5 or more points) was estimated (Research Question 2).  I chose the 4 point 
interval based on previous studies showing that changes in the rankings across different 
cut-off points are less likely occur (Dichev, 2001), and movement within 0-4 intervals 
from the cut-off points are due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 
2008).  How schools interpret the arbitrary grouping of the rankings in relation to their 
respective rankings would be examined through this model.  
Second, the effect of year-to-year changes in the rankings (Change) was estimated 
using a fixed effect model.  I compared the changes in the expenditure (γ) among the 
numerically ordered institutions that experienced drops or improvements in their 
numerical rankings in year t+1 compared to year t and their counterparts that maintained 
their ranking positions (Research Question 3).  
Limitations 
This study is subject to several limitations.  First, the expenditures are only 
measured at the aggregate level.  The lack of information on detailed spending limits this 
study in explaining specific strategies and motivations of colleges and universities 
responding to rankings.  For example, each expenditure category includes all 
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administrative costs (e.g., salaries/wages and benefits, depreciation) as well as money 
distributed to related activities.16  Without breaking down specific components of 
expenditures, it is difficult to conclude whether rankings encourage institutional spending 
on particular activities or administrative costs to manage the activities.  In addition, some 
reporting only focuses on a limited scope of expenditures, not all related expenses.  
Faculty salaries and benefits are a good example of this.  Only full-time faculty 
information is captured by the data, and salaries of part-time or adjunct faculty are 
unknown.  
Second, this study is limited in its scope, as the study only focuses on institutions 
that are ranked by one particular organization−USNWR.  Also, the schools that are 
addressed in this study are the National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
Therefore, findings from this study may not be applicable for the schools outside these 
categories.  Because there are multiple rankings that compare higher education 
institutions of different foci (e.g., specialty programs, community colleges, for-profit 
universities, and online programs) and locations (e.g., global rankings), future studies will 
need to investigate the dynamics among multiple rankings and institutions with different 
characteristics.  
Third, this study does not address all the indicators that are employed by 
USNWR.  The lack of data on institutional practices often prevents the investigation of 
several expenditures.  For example, reputations and alumni donations account for 22.5% 
and 5% of the ranking criteria, respectively.  Many institutions make significant 
investment to better market the institution by sending print materials to peer institutions, 
                                                 
16 This is in part due to the changes in the IPDES reporting (accounting) standards.  Although not 
exhaustive, the detailed items are provided in recent years.    
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advertising, or hiring outside consultants (Collis, 2004; Cunningham, 2012; Lipman 
Hearne, 2010).  However, lack of data on marketing related expenditures did not allow 
investigating those outcomes.  The efforts of higher education institutions and 
associations to collect information on those behaviors are new and incomplete.  It is also 
important to mention that the ranking measurements have changed over time (Table 2.1).  
For example, USNWR started employing a value-added graduation rate measure in 1996, 
and reduced the weight of financial resources in some years.  How institutions respond to 
the changes in particular measures needs to be investigated in the future.    
Although expenditures are one of the ways to examine institutional behavior, this 
study is limited in capturing intra-organizational behaviors.  For example, some 
institutions game the ranking system by distorting or falsifying the data reporting (Bialik, 
2009; Crabbe, 2009; Sauder & Espeland, 2009).  USNWR started to crosscheck the data 
provided by institutions with data from other sources in 1999.  However, some criteria 
such as class-size are not verifiable as there is no available source of information.  
Whether this gaming behavior may have diminished or strengthened over time is also not 
clear.  Responses to rankings may include changes in leadership (Fee, Hadlock, & Pierce, 
2005), communication styles (Coley & Gioia, 2000), and division of labor (Espeland & 
Sauder, 2007; Hazelkorn, 2008).  Departmental rankings may also generate political 
dynamics over resource allocation or authority for management within an institution (e.g., 
Barrow, 1996; Gumport & Snydman, 2002; Lebo, 2011).  Analyzing the relationship 
between institutional emphasis on Engineering and Science, Cantwell and Taylor (2013) 
found that a greater number of Ph.D. degrees in Science and Engineering was a 
significant predictor for the Academic Ranking of World Universities rankings.  The 
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authors argued that this relationship might motivate institutions to increase stratification 
within an institution.  Future studies need to investigate how rankings affect the status of 
disciplines within an institution, and how the striving departments organize their 
academic and managerial practices (Massy & Zemsky, 1994).  
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Chapter 4  
RESULTS: EFFECT OF RANKINGS ON INSTITUTIONAL EXPENDITURES 
Chapters 4 and 5 will present results for the three research questions that examine 
how college rankings affect institutional expenditures.  The first research question 
addresses the extent to which rankings affect expenditures in specified areas.  The second 
research question focuses on the heterogeneous effect of rankings by institutional ranking 
positions.  Finally, I examine how year-to-year changes in the ranking position leads to 
changes in expenditure behavior of colleges and universities.  This chapter focuses on the 
first research question.  
The main specification was inspired by unexpected changes to the number of 
schools ranked: the first implementation of annual rankings in 1987, and the expansion of 
numerical rankings from the top 25 to the top 50 in 1995, and to the top 120 in 2003. 
Using the time of first inclusion to the numerical rankings, I compared changes in 
expenditure at universities that were ranked to changes at universities that were grouped 
into tiers.  In order to capture how institutional responses develop over time, an event 
specification analysis was followed.  The robustness of the results was tested using 
alternative control groups.  
The second and third research questions address how both the location of an 
institution in the rankings as well as year-to-year changes in the numerical positions 
differentiate expenditure behavior.  In particular, how being ranked at the margin of a 
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ranking group cut-off as well as positive or negative movement in ranked positions 
affects institutional expenditures was analyzed.  
This chapter begins by reporting descriptive statistics on independent and 
dependent variables used in this study.  The effect of rankings on institutional 
expenditures is addressed by outcome categories, in the order of student selectivity, 
financial resources, and faculty resources.  Each outcome is reported separately for 
National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Descriptive Statistics  
Independent variables 
Explanatory Variables.  The ranking variables were constructed based on the 
USNWR.  This publication first defines the four comparison groups based on the 
Carnegie classification—National Universities, National Liberal Arts Colleges, Regional 
Universities, and Regional Liberal Arts Colleges.  For National Universities and National 
Liberal Arts Colleges, the top 25, 50, and 120 schools are assigned at a specific number 
position, and the rest of the schools are categorized into tiers.  Also, schools are included 
in the top 25, 50, and 120 for the first time in different years.  Based on these two factors, 
the main explanatory variable for this study was the combination of whether an 
institution is ranked and when a university or college is numerically ordered for the first 
time. 
Table 4.1 reports the number of institutions by the institutional type (National 
Universities/National Liberal Arts Colleges) and ranking status (Ranked/Tiered).  Among 
the total 1,304 universities and colleges that offer at least a BA degree, there were 199 
National Universities and 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.  Between 1987 and 2009, 
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63.32% of the National Universities and 79.85% of the National Liberal Arts Colleges 
were numerically ranked.  Changes from being grouped as a tier to being placed at a 
specific number occurred most frequently in 2003, when the numerical ranking was 
expanded from the top 50 to the top 120 (Figure 4.1).  Among the ranked schools, 
55.66% and 47.66% of National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges 
respectively were ranked for the first time after 2003.  
An institution’s distance from the ranking group cut-offs (e.g., Top 1, 25, 50, and 
120) was measured in order to identify the margins.  In this study, I defined margin as +/-
4 points from each cut-off, based on findings of previous research.  Changes in the 
rankings often occur at +/- 4 points from the cut-offs (Dichev, 2001) and movements 
within 0-4 intervals from the cut-off points are due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 
2014; Grewal et al., 2008).  The descriptive statistics findings also provided support for 
this choice.  Table 4.2 shows the average distance of an institution’s ranking from each 
respective ranking group cut-off point.  In particular, the within institution standard 
deviation indicates that an institution’s ranking position relative to its ranking group only 
change within 1.45 to 5.13 points and 1.59 to 5.96 points at National Universities and 
National Liberal Arts Colleges, respectively.  Furthermore, Figure 4.2 captures the 
average changes in the ranking position at different ranking groups.  The mean and 
standard deviation presented in the graph indicate that an institution’s ranking mostly 
changed by +/- 3 to 5 points at the ranking groups of Top 1-25 and 26-50; the ranges 
were bigger for the ranking groups of Top 51-120.17  
                                                 
17 For some years, the maximum ranking exceeds 120.  This is due to the USNWR approach to 
dealing with tied ranks.  Schools that have the same total score are ranked at the same number, 
and the next ranking starts at the number that accounts for the number of tied schools.  For 
example, if three schools were ranked at the top 118, the next rank would be 121, instead of 119. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics: Independent and control variables 
Variables All 4-year  
National Universities Liberal Arts Colleges 
Ranked Tiered Ranked Tiered 
Number of 
Institutions 
1,304 126 (63.32%) 73 (36.68%) 107 (79.85%) 27 (20.15%) 
Private 
815 
(62.50%) 
60 (47.62%) 12 (16.44%) 105 (98.13%) 26 (96.30%) 
Year First 
Numerically 
Ranked:  
1987-1994 
 32 (25.40%)  35 (32.71%)  
1995-2002  24 (19.05%)  21 (19.63%)  
2003-   70 (55.66%)  51 (47.66%)  
Total FTE 
4706.52 
(6530.10) 
16532.32 
(11194.88) 
11450.71 
(6261.41) 
1688.02 
(727.49) 
1034.69 
(514.18) 
Observations 41,628 4,030 2,336 3,424 864 
Total (N) 1,304 199 134 
 
 
 
Note. The number of ranked institutions includes 
      both National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
 
Figure 4.1 Expansion of numerical rankings
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Table 4.2 Average changes in the ranking at different ranking group cut-off points 
 National Universities National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 All ranked Top 1 Top 25 Top 50 Top 120 All ranked Top 1 Top 25 Top 50 Top 120 
Mean 
Distance 
(overall SD) 
-.94 
(13.66) 
-5.34 
(3.48) 
1.18 
(7.14) 
-8.76 
(15.44) 
18.32 
(10.08) 
-.87 
(13.59) 
-5.41 
(3.44) 
1.29 
(7.03) 
-8.78 
(14.84) 
23.91 
(7.90) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Between 
Institutions 
12.63 3.17 7.76 16.81 10.26 12.90 3.22 7.62 16.86 6.65 
Standard 
Deviation 
Within 
Institution 
9.37 1.45 2.38 3.55 5.13 9.40 1.59 2.98 4.12 5.96 
Observations 1,397 286 470 446 195 1,246 285 451 377 133 
Number of 
institutions 
123 21 37 65 45 107 19 40 63 30 
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National Universities National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 
Figure 4.2 Average changes in positions by rank
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Table 4.3 Ranking positions: Year-to-year changes 
 National Universities: Ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges: Ranked 
Year Dropped Maintained Improved Dropped Maintained Improved 
1987 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1988 11 (50.00) 0 (0.00) 11 (50.00) 7 (33.33) 2 (9.52) 12 (57.14) 
1989 13 (54.17) 3 (12.50) 8 (33.33) 10 (41.67) 7 (29.17) 7 (29.17) 
1990 14 (56.00) 2 (8.00) 9 (36.00) 9 (36.00) 4 (16.00) 12 (48.00) 
1991 10 (31.25) 12 (37.50) 10 (31.25) 15 (46.88) 11 (34.38) 6 (18.75) 
1992 12 (37.50) 10 (31.25) 10 (31.25) 9 (27.27) 13 (39.39) 11 (33.33)  
1993 8 (25.00) 15 (46.88) 9 (28.12) 12 (35.29) 14 (41.18) 8 (23.53) 
1994 9 (28.12) 12 (37.50) 11 (34.38) 10 (29.41) 13 (38.24) 11 (32.35) 
1995 10 (31.25) 5 (15.62) 17 (53.12) 13 (37.14) 6 (17.14) 16 (45.71) 
1996 23 (46.00) 7 (14.00) 20 (40.00) 21 (47.73) 6 (13.64) 17 (38.64) 
1997 17 (30.91) 11 (20.00) 27 (49.09) 10 (22.22) 15 (33.33) 20 (44.44) 
1998 22 (40.00) 13 (23.64) 20 (36.36) 18 (38.30) 12 (25.53) 17 (36.17) 
1999 24 (43.64) 10 (18.18) 21 (38.18) 19 (40.43) 14 (29.79) 14 (29.79) 
2000 19 (34.55) 17 (30.91) 19 (34.55) 18 (38.30) 11 (23.40) 18 (38.30) 
2001 12 (21.43) 26 (46.43) 18 (32.14) 26 (47.27) 8 (14.55) 21 (38.18) 
2002 14 (25.00) 20 (35.71) 22 (39.29) 20 (35.71) 16 (28.57) 20 (35.71) 
2003 25 (44.64) 12 (21.43) 19 (33.93) 25 (44.64) 4 (7.14) 27 (48.21) 
2004 45 (38.14) 17 (14.41) 56 (47.46) 44 (43.14) 17 (16.67) 41 (40.20) 
2005 46 (37.70) 28 (22.95) 48 (39.34) 56 (53.85) 9 (8.65) 39 (37.50) 
2006 49 (40.16) 21 (17.21) 52 (42.62) 44 (42.31) 22 (21.15) 38 (36.54) 
2007 52 (42.28) 30 (24.39) 41 (33.33) 59 (57.84) 15 (14.71) 28 (27.45) 
2008 42 (33.87) 30 (24.19) 52 (41.94) 42 (40.78) 24 (23.30) 37 (35.92) 
2009 42 (33.33) 41 (32.54) 43 (34.13) 41 (39.05) 25 (23.81) 39 (37.14) 
Notes. % in parentheses. The denominator is the total number of National Universities and 
National Liberal Arts Colleges that are ranked in the previous year and the respective year. 
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Finally, year-to-year changes in ranking positions were measured for ranked 
schools for all years following their first inclusion (Table 4.3).  Across the analytic 
periods, the proportion of institutions that maintained and changed from the previous 
year’s ranking varies.  On average, 21.73% (ranged from 0 to 46%) of National 
Universities and 23.15% (ranged from 7 to 41%) of National Liberal Arts Colleges 
maintained the same rank; 37.50% (ranges from 21 to 56%) of National Universities and 
39.93% (ranges from 22 to 48%) of National Liberal Arts Colleges observed a drop in 
their positions.  36.44% (ranges from 31 to 50%) of National Universities and 36.91% 
(ranges from 19 to 57%) of National Liberal Arts Colleges experienced an increase in the 
ranking position, compared to the previous year.  In most recent years, the number of 
schools across the three categories became more balanced.  For example, in 2009, the 
number of National Universities that maintained, dropped, and improved relative to their 
2008 year’s ranking was 41, 42, and 43, respectively (N=126); similarly, the numbers for 
National Liberal Arts Colleges that maintained, dropped, and improved relative to their 
2008 year’s ranking was 25, 41, and 39, respectively (N=105).  
Control Variables.  A number of school characteristics were controlled in the 
model.  Private institutions comprised of about 47.62% of ranked National Universities, 
whereas almost all schools (98%) ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges were private.  
Ranked schools tended to be bigger in size than their tiered counterparts in the same 
category.  For example, ranked National Universities had 16,532 FTE students on 
average, which was bigger than 11,451 FTE of tiered National Universities; FTE was 
larger for the ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges (1,688) compared to their tiered 
counterparts (1,035) (Table 4.1).  
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Dependent variables  
Means and standard deviations of the dependent variables are summarized by 
ranking status in Table 4.4.  For a better comparison, I calculated and reported the per 
FTE student expenses.  Figures 4.2 – 4.4 capture the trends for each outcome throughout 
the analytic period by ranking status.  I compared the trends between ranked and tiered 
institutions for National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges, respectively.   
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics: Dependent variables 
 
 
National Universities 
(N=199) 
National Liberal Arts Colleges 
(N=134) 
 All 4-year 
Universities/
Colleges 
Ranked Tiered Ranked Tiered 
Student selectivity 
Institutional 
grants and 
fellowships  
4060.14 
(4406.83) 
4851.24 
(4825.61) 
1668.22 
(1982.72) 
9270.23 
(4660.27) 
7442.12 
(4000.31) 
Institutional 
aid: % 
receiving  
63.33 
(30.67) 
52.37 
(21.06) 
44.93 
(23.10) 
72.37 
(21.93) 
90.43 
(12.39) 
Institutional 
aid: Average 
amount 
8329.28 
(6371.88) 
11863.90 
(8633.01) 
4547.46 
(2968.79) 
18714.97 
(6648.16) 
11821.48 
(4317.56) 
Merit-based 
aid: % 
receiving 
.16 (.20) .13 (.16) .12 (.13) N/A N/A 
Merit-based 
aid: Average 
amount 
1082.31 
(1731.38) 
1027.24 
(1552.13) 
456.97 
(731.83) 
N/A N/A 
Need-based 
aid: % 
receiving 
.25 (.21) .28 (.21) .14 (.14) N/A N/A 
Need-based 
aid: Average 
amount 
1613.47 
(2401.12) 
2009.85 
(2572.11) 
323.75 
(649.78) 
N/A N/A 
Non-
educational 
services 
3892.85 
(7026.03) 
5842.19 
(3896.07) 
3401.88 
(1780.81) 
6818.33 
(2672.99) 
4834.85 
(1810.76) 
Financial Resources 
Total 
Education 
and General 
27182.45 
(78553.84) 
49442.29 
(39316.24) 
26665.80 
(13119.72) 
36932.06 
(14570.09) 
27059.89 
(9739.40) 
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Instruction 
9463.75 
(18106.12) 
17514.64 
(14586.26) 
10447.33 
(4909.02) 
12171.2 
(4936.37) 
8130.52 
(2791.94) 
Academic 
Support 
2341.93 
(8896.26) 
4290.52 
(3935.41) 
2534.26 
(1897.80) 
3059.39 
(1709.68) 
1885.75 
(1115.13) 
Student 
Services 
2563.41 
(20471.45) 
2161.33 
(1911.73) 
1413.66 
(809.99) 
4167.40 
(2053.82) 
3629.17 
(1628.06) 
Research 
2934.50 
(17979.29) 
10783.68 
(14239.25) 
3701.61 
(4026.37) 
747.99 
(1067.79) 
186.90 
(321.70) 
Faculty Resources 
Average 
faculty 
salaries and 
benefits 
77433.09 
(22955.31) 
108872.4 
(21285.11) 
89054.98 
(16974.38) 
90346.54 
(17817.52) 
69507.2 
(13458.5) 
Total faculty 
490.62 
(745.77) 
1930.53 
(1385.66) 
1104.62 
(721.53) 
182.94 
(78.33) 
108.03 
(54.01) 
Student-
faculty ratio 
.11 
(.13) 
.12 
(.07) 
.10 
(.04) 
.11 
(.03) 
.11 
(.04) 
% Full-time .68 (.22) .78 (.15) .74 (.17) .78 (.12) .70 (.16) 
% Tenured/ 
tenure track 
.53 (.20) .53 (.16) .53 (.16) .66 (.12) .60 (.16) 
% Professor .30 (.12) .40 (.09) .33 (.10) .37 (.09) .36 (.13) 
 
Student selectivity related expenditures.  While National Liberal Arts Colleges 
tended to spend a more generous level of institutional fellowships and scholarships than 
National Universities, numerically ranked schools spent more on this area than non-
numeric schools in the same ranking category.  The per FTE student institutional grant 
was $ 4,851 and $ 1,668 for ranked and tiered National Universities, and $ 9,270 and 
$7,442 for ranked and tiered National Liberal Arts Colleges.  Within all ranking 
categories, institutions increased expenditures on institutional fellowships over time, at a 
similar rate.  Yet, the tiered National Universities observed an increase at a higher rate at 
the end of the 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 4.2, panel A).  
How institutions distribute institutional scholarships within an institution also 
differed across the ranked and tiered National Universities and National Liberal Arts.  In 
terms of the National Universities, ranked schools distributed fellowships to a relatively 
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greater number of students, and also gave away greater average amounts to each 
fellowship recipient.  For National Liberal Arts Colleges, ranked colleges tended to 
distribute more fellowship money but to fewer students.  All schools maintained a similar 
percent level of students receiving institutional aid, and tiered National Universities 
increased the number of students receiving institutional fellowships, yet maintained a 
stable trend in terms of the average amount granted to students.  About 13% of students 
received merit-based aid both at ranked and tiered National Universities.  However, the 
average amount of merit aid per recipient was higher at the ranked National Universities 
by $ 570.  In case of need-based aid, both the percent of recipients and average amount 
received were higher at the ranked National Universities, compared to the tiered National 
Universities.18 
                                                 
18 The same information is not available for National Liberal Arts Colleges due to the insufficient 
sample size.   
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Panel (A) Institutional grant ($ 10,000) Panel (B) Institutional fellowship: % received  
  
Panel (C) Institutional fellowship: average amount ($) Panel (D) Non-educational Services ($ 10,000) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Trends in student selectivity related expenditures and outcomes
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Finally, institutions that are ranked at the top 25, 50, and 120 tended to spend 
more on non-educational services, which include residential halls, food services, student 
health services, intercollegiate athletics, college unions and stores.  This trend was stable, 
with a slight increase over the 32 years.  
Financial resources related expenditures.  On average, ranked schools had a 
higher level of total expenses that are related to the functions of education and research.  
While ranked National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges spent about 
$49,442 and $36,932 for each full-time equivalent student, tiered National Universities 
and National Liberal Arts Colleges spent about $27,000, which was close to the average 
educational and general expenses of all four-year colleges and universities.  Among 
various activities, instructional expenses were mostly incurred.  For National 
Universities, research, academic support, and student services followed the expenses on 
instruction in rank order. After instruction, National Liberal Arts Colleges spent more on 
student services, academic support, and research.  The biggest difference between ranked 
and tiered schools were found in the category of research expenses.  Tiered National 
Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges had 34% and 25% of the research 
expenses of ranked National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  All 
expenses showed an upward movement between 1980 and 2011, for all institutional 
groups (Figure 4.3).  
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Panel (A) Total education and general ($ 10,000) Panel (B) Instruction ($ 10,000) 
  
Panel (C) Academic support ($ 10,000) Panel (D) Student services ($ 10,000) 
  
 
  91 
Panel (E) Research ($ 10,000) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Trends in financial resources related expenditures 
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Panel (A) Average faculty salaries and benefits Panel (B) Total number of faculty 
  
Panel (C) Student-faculty ratio Panel (D) % of full-time faculty 
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Figure 4.5 Trends in faculty resources related expenditure and outcome
Panel (E) % of tenured/tenure track faculty Panel (F) % of professors 
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Faculty resources related expenditures.  Average salaries and benefits for faculty 
were higher at ranked institutions, and the gap between the ranked and tiered schools was 
bigger for National Liberal Arts Colleges than National Universities.  While the average 
salaries and benefits for ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges was $90,347, that of tiered 
National Liberal Arts Colleges was $69,507, which was smaller than the average of all 
four-year institutions ($71,202).  This, in part, might reflect different level of faculty 
compensation at private and public institutions.  Faculty compensation increased between 
1980 and 2000, and was flat afterwards (Figure 4.4).  
In terms of faculty composition, the number of faculty was larger for the ranked 
institutions, reflecting the size of the institutions.  The student-faculty ratio was similar 
across the different ranking categories, having 0.12 faculty per student.  The proportion 
of faculty by full-time and tenure status, as well as position rank (professor) was higher at 
ranked schools, compared to their unranked counterparts.  The share of full-time faculty 
among the total instructional staff has been maintained at ranked National Universities 
and National Liberal Arts Colleges, while the average for all four-year colleges and 
universities suggested a minor decrease over time.  Tenured or tenure track faculty also 
have decreased at a similar rate for ranked and tiered universities.  The proportion of 
professors among all academic staff increased until the end of 1990s, followed by a small 
decrease and a flat pattern in later 2000s.   
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Table 4.5 Effect of rankings on institutional expenditures: summary 
 
National Universities 
National Liberal Arts 
Colleges 
Dependent Variables Explanatory variable: Ranked 
Student selectivity 
Institutional grants and 
fellowships  
+  
Institutional aid: % receiving    
Institutional aid: Average 
amount   
Merit-based aid: % receiving +  
Merit-based aid: Average 
amount 
  
Need-based aid: % receiving   
Need-based aid: Average 
amount 
  
Non-educational services  + 
Financial resources 
Total Education and General + + 
Instruction + + 
Academic Support  + 
Student Services  + 
Research −  
Faculty resources 
Average faculty salaries and 
benefits 
+ + 
Total faculty  − 
Student-faculty ratio   
% Full-time + + 
% Tenured/tenure track  + 
% Professor   
Note. Indicates the sign of estimated coefficients. + and – present increases and 
decreases in the expenditures, respectively.  
Summary based on the event-study specification and DD results. 
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Effect of Rankings on Institutional Expenditures: National Universities 
Tables 4.6 through 4.8 present the differences-in-differences results for the 
national universities sample.  Each table includes the estimated effect of rankings from 
the event specification (0-2 years and 3 or more years after the first inclusion), main 
specification (ranked vs. tiered), and robustness check using a different comparison group 
(ranked for the first time prior to 2003 vs. since 2003).19  
Student selectivity related expenditures 
Figure 4.5 presents estimates of the event study model for student selectivity 
related expenditures using the restricted (-5 / +10 year window) sample.20  The figure 
presents the estimated effect of the numerical ranking (𝛽k in equation (2)) with 95% 
confidence interval.  The key assumption of the difference-in-differences approach is that 
the time trend in expenditures at tiered universities (schools that were not numerically 
ranked) is what ranked universities (schools that were numerically ranked due to the 
changes in the ranking methodology) would have experienced were they not ranked. 
Although this assumption is untestable, the event-study specification allows us to 
examine the credibility to this assumption.  Figure 4.5 indicates that changes in the 
ranking status (a movement from tiered to ranked) did not happen when expenditures 
were trending differently at ranked and tiered National Universities.  The point estimates 
on the pre-ranked years were close to zero and not statistically significant.  This finding 
gives some credibility to the key differences-in-differences assumption that both ranked 
                                                 
19 I also estimated models with different control variables and fixed effects. The results from 
different specification are reported in the Appendix Table A1-A6. 
20 Event-study estimates using the full balanced panel (all years) and +/- 5-year windows were 
similar, though less precise. The results are reported in Appendix Figure A1-A6.  
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and tiered schools would have similar trends in the expenditures if not for the inclusion of 
the numerical rankings. 
Second, Figure 4.6 shows how the impact of rankings on financial aid related 
variables develops over time.  Following the changes in the ranking status, institutional 
grants and fellowships per FTE increases, while there was no change in the proportion of 
students receiving institutional aid and the average amount distributed to each recipient. 
The event-study estimates also suggest that the increase in institutional fellowship would 
happen immediately after an institution is ranked, then the effect disappears after 3 to 4 
years.  The level of expenditure on non-educational services was not related with the 
rankings.  
To gain precision and to discuss the effect of rankings across many specifications, 
I present a differences-in-differences model that permits separate effects for the 
immediate (0, 1, and 2 years after ranked) and longer (3 to 10 years after ranked) time 
periods.  Consistent with the event-study estimates, Panel (A) of Table 4.6 indicates that 
that rankings significantly affect institutional expenses in admissions related areas, 
particularly in institutional fellowships.  After National Universities were ranked for the 
first time, schools increased expenditures in institutional aid in the subsequent years.  The 
effect of rankings on total institutional fellowship amount lasted up to two years after the 
first inclusion, increasing the spending up to 16.6% (about $ 280 per student) during 
these years.  The effect became insignificant three or more years after the first inclusion.  
Broken down to specific aid type, numeric rankings encouraged institutions to 
provide more students with merit-based financial aid (increased by 7.2%), without 
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significant changes in the average amount received by each student.  There was no 
statistically significant impact of rankings on need-based aid.  
This pattern in financial aid practice is profound when I compare schools that 
were ranked for the first time after 2003 with their counterparts that were ranked prior to 
the 2003 expansion (Panel (C)).  When the institution’s position changed from inclusion 
in a tier to a specific numeric rank, schools that were ranked after 2003 increased the 
proportion of students receiving institutional aid by 3.3%, compared to their counterparts 
that were ranked before 2003.  At the same time, the average amount distributed to 
institutional scholarship recipients decreased by 13.3%.  Specific changes in the aid 
behavior included an increase in the proportion of merit recipients (14.6%), but a 
decrease in need-based aid recipients (by 9.9%) and the average need-based aid per 
recipient. 
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Figure 4.6 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on admission related 
expenditures: National Universities 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities.  
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Table 4.6 Effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
Dependent Variables 
Institutional grants 
& fellowships 
Institutional 
aid: % 
receiving 
Institutional 
aid: 
Average 
amount  
Merit-based 
aid: % 
receiving 
Merit-based 
aid: 
Average 
amount 
Need-based 
aid: % 
receiving 
Need-based 
aid: 
Average 
amount 
Non-
educational 
services 
0-2 years after ranked 0.166** 0.002 -0.033     -0.010 
 
(0.068) (0.013) (0.032)     (0.023) 
3+ years after ranked 0.073 -0.008 -0.056     -0.021 
 (0.089) (0.021) (0.054)     (0.049) 
  
  
     
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked 0.103 -0.004 -0.052 0.072** -0.081 -0.020 -0.214 -0.018 
 
(0.083) (0.017) (0.041) (0.031) (0.222) (0.037) (0.266) (0.038) 
Observations 2,950 2,004 2,006 558 441 558 507 4,011 
Number of institutions 199 170 170 165 164 165 164 199 
         
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked 0.105 0.033** -0.133*** 0.146*** 0.270 -0.099** -0.587** 0.006 
 (0.089) (0.015) (0.045) (0.036) (0.252) (0.045) (0.259) (0.046) 
Observations 1,460 1,101 1,101 369 285 369 343 1,780 
Number of institutions 126 100 100 106 105 106 106 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 years after being 
ranked. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Financial resources related expenditures 
Figure 4.7 captures the event-study model estimates for financial resources related 
expenditures.  Consistent with the assumption that an institution’s ranking status was not 
altered when the expenses were trending differently, the point estimates on the pre-
ranked years were close to zero and insignificant.  Thus, the results provide some validity 
to the DD analyses, and the estimated effects in the post periods are induced by the 
numerical rankings.  
The event-study estimates suggest that institutions would have a notable change 
in the total educational and general expenses, mirroring the changes in the instructional 
expenses.  The changes in these expenditures started to emerge two years after a 
university was ranked, and the effect grew over time.  Panel (A) of Table 4.7 captures 
this trend: the effect of rankings was larger three years after being ranked than 
immediately following.  When National Universities were ranked for the first time, 
schools increased the total amount spent on educational and relevant activities by 4.9% in 
the following year (Panel (B)).  To contextualize, this change translates into about 
additional $ 1,643 per FTE spending for each school.  
For National Universities, most of this increase came from the increase in 
instruction (Column (2)), and the spending on instruction grew over time.  After being 
ranked at top 25, 50, or 120 for the first time, institutions increased instructional expenses 
by 3.1% within two years, and 8.9% for three years and thereafter.  Overall, this is about 
$ 851 per FTE increase every year.  No changes occurred in student services and 
academic services expenditures.  Being included in the numerical rankings lead to a 4.8% 
decrease in research, within a shorter period of time (0-2 years after ranked).   
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Yet, the results in Panel (C) indicate that rankings might not have a significant 
impact on expenditures on education, research, or other related activities for institutions 
that were ranked after 2003 (mostly ranked at the top 51-120), compared to their 
counterparts that were ranked before 2003 (mostly ranked at the top 50). 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on financial resources related 
expenditures: National Universities 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities. 
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Table 4.7 Effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
 
Total Education 
and General 
Instruction 
Academic 
support 
Student services Research 
0-2 years after ranked 0.007 0.031** 0.007 0.010 -0.048* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
3+ years after ranked 0.071** 0.089*** -0.009 0.043 -0.033 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.054) (0.043) (0.055) 
      
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked 0.049* 0.069*** -0.004 0.032 -0.038 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.042) (0.034) (0.042) 
Observations 4,044 4,043 4,043 4,029 3,990 
Number of institutions 199 199 199 199 198 
      
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked -0.016 -0.026 0.028 -0.021 -0.028 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.059) (0.041) (0.036) 
Observations 1,781 1,780 1,780 1,766 1,771 
Number of institutions 126 126 126 126 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 
years after being ranked. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Faculty resources related expenditures  
Figure 4.7 and Table 4.8 indicate how institutions change resource allocations in 
the areas that are related with faculty as defined by the USNWR.  The direct measures of 
faculty resources include faculty salaries and benefits, class-sizes, proportion of 
professors with the highest degree in their fields, student-faculty ratio, and full-time 
faculty.  Figure 4.7 reports the event-study estimates for these outcomes.  The graphs 
suggest that there was no pre-trend in faculty compensations and compositions between 
the ranked and tiered institutions.  This suggests that faculty related variables would have 
trended similarly if the implementation or expansion of the numerical ranking were not 
happened.  Thus, the DD estimated results would indicate the effect of rankings on the 
outcomes presented here.  
Furthermore, the figure shows that student-faculty ratio, the proportion of tenured 
or tenure-track faculty, and the proportion of professors were not changed by rankings.  
The average faculty salaries and benefits increased 2 years after National Universities 
were numerically ranked, followed by a notable increase over 8 or more years. 
Demonstrated in Panel (A) of Table 4.8, the average faculty salaries and benefits increase 
by $ 5,880 for 3 or more years after an institution is ranked for the first time.  On average, 
faculty salaries and benefits rose by $ 3,790 the year after an institution was numerically 
ranked.  Since the average number of full-time instructional faculty at the ranked 
National Universities was 938, the average total salaries and benefits outlay would 
increase by about $ 3.6 million at each institution.  
While rankings did not significantly change the total number of faculty and the 
student-faculty ratio, the proportion of full-time faculty across all institutions increased 
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by 3.1% for the two years after the first inclusion in USNWR, and by 7.8% over the 
period of three or more years (Panel (A), Column (4)).  The composition of the faculty, in 
terms of the proportion of professors and the proportion of faculty who are tenured or on 
tenure track, did not change significantly due to the rankings.   
 When comparing the National Universities that were ranked before 2003 and 
schools ranked in 2003 and thereafter, rankings seemed to affect the average faculty 
salary and the proportion of faculty who are tenured or on tenure track.  For the schools 
ranked after 2003, a change in the ranking status (tiered to ranked) was associated with a 
decrease in average salary by $ 4,160 and the proportion of tenured/tenure track faculty 
by nearly 8% (Panel (C)).
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Figure 4.8 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on faculty resources related 
expenditures: National Universities 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities.  
  107 
Table 4.8 Effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
 
Average faculty 
salaries & 
benefits 
Total faculty 
Student-faculty 
ratio 
% full-time 
% tenured/ 
tenure track 
% professor 
0-2 years after ranked -0.016 -0.012 -0.015 0.031** 0.007 0.002 
 (0.210) (0.031) (0.030) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) 
3+ years after ranked 0.588*** -0.038 -0.010 0.078*** -0.002 0.002 
 (0.202) (0.050) (0.052) (0.023) (0.017) (0.020) 
       
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked 0.379*** -0.016 -0.012 0.043*** 0.003 -0.000 
 
(0.183) (0.033) (0.032) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005) 
Observations 3,565 1,784 1,782 1,784 1,192 3,546 
Number of institutions 199 167 167 167 141 199 
 
      
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked -0.416* -0.007 -0.054 -0.022 -0.084*** -0.002 
 (0.237) (0.046) (0.045) (0.020) (0.023) (0.011) 
Observations 1,599 910 908 910 553 1,599 
Number of institutions 126 94 94 94 70 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 years after being 
ranked. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
 
  108 
Effect of Rankings on Institutional Expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
Figures and Tables 4.9 through 4.11 present differences-in-differences results on 
expenditures at National Liberal Arts colleges.  Each table includes the estimated effect 
of rankings from the event specification (0-2 years and 3 or more years after the first 
inclusion), main specification (ranked vs. tiered), and robustness check using a different 
comparison group (ranked before 2003 vs. ranked in 2003 and thereafter).  
Student selectivity related expenditures 
Figure 4.9 presents the event-study specification results for student selectivity 
related expenditures using the restricted (-5 / +10 year window) sample.  Each graph 
indicates that changes in the ranking status (a movement from tiered to ranked) did not 
happen when expenditures were trending differently at the ranked and tiered National 
Liberal Arts Colleges.  The point estimates on the pre-ranked years were close to zero 
and not statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.  Thus, it is assumable that the 
time path for the admission related outcomes experienced by tiered schools would be the 
time path of ranked schools if they were not numerically ranked.  
The event-study specification results also suggested that schools do not alter 
institutional fellowships in response to rankings.  Yet, the effect of rankings might take 
longer to emerge for specific aid behaviors.  In particular, the average institutional grant 
amount changed 7 or more years after a Liberal Arts College was ranked.  Moreover, the 
numerical rankings have a significant impact on the non-educational expenditure.  The 
effect started to emerge two years after institutions were ranked first time, and the effect 
lasted over time.  
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Table 4.9 summarizes how numerical rankings impact institutional financial aid 
and non-educational services expenditures at Liberal Arts Colleges.  Accounting for 
institutional and year related factors, institutional fellowship behavior did not change due 
to rankings at Liberal Arts Colleges.  This result was consistent when comparing schools 
that were ranked after 2003 and before 2003 (Panel C).  
Being assigned a numerical position in the ranking increased an institution’s 
expenses related to non-educational services (e.g., residential halls, gyms, cafeterias, 
union building, etc.) by 4.8% (Panel B).  Given that the average per FTE expenditure on 
this area is about $ 5,908, expenditures increase about $ 284 per student every year once 
a Liberal Arts College was ranked.  The increase develops beginning three or more years 
after being numerically ranked for the first time (6.4%) (Panel A, Column (4)).  When I 
employed a different counterfactual, no significant difference was found in non-
educational expenses between the schools ranked prior to 2003 and schools ranked after 
2003.  
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Figure 4.9 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on admission related 
expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
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Table 4.9 Effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
    
Dependent Variables 
Institutional grants & 
fellowships 
Institutional aid: 
% receiving 
Institutional aid: 
Average amount 
Non-educational 
services 
0-2 years after ranked -0.003 0.004 0.043 0.022 
 
(0.037) (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) 
3+ years after ranked 0.002 -0.005 0.056 0.064** 
 (0.061) (0.016) (0.043) (0.030) 
     
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked -0.000 0.001 0.057 0.048** 
 
(0.050) (0.014) (0.037) (0.024) 
Observations 1,786 1,233 1,235 2,350 
Number of institutions 134 107 108 134 
 
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked 0.046 0.012 0.039 -0.032 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.037) (0.032) 
Observations 1,222 885 887 1,517 
Number of institutions 107 80 81 107 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 years after being 
ranked. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Financial resource related expenditures  
Figure 4.9 and Table 4.10 indicate how rankings change institutions’ allocation to 
education and research related activities.  The estimates from the event-study 
specification suggest that the ranked and tiered Liberal Arts Colleges were trending 
similarly when they were not numerically ranked.  For the periods prior to the 
introduction of numerical rankings, the relationship between being ranked and all 
educational related expenses was zero and insignificant.  Thus, I argue that the changes in 
the ranking status were not happening when the expenditures were trending differently at 
the ranked and tiered schools.  
The figure also depicts that the numerical ranking increases all education and 
general expenses, except research spending. The impact seems to develop immediately 
after schools are ranked for the first time.  Table 4.10 reports the size of these changes.  A 
numeric ranking is associated with a 5.9% increase in the total expenses on educational 
and general activities at Liberal Arts Colleges (Panel B, Column (1)).  The average 
increase was about 4% within two years, and 7.2% after three or more years (Panel A, 
Column (1)).  The specific areas that institutions expanded were academic support 
(7.7%), followed by instruction (7.4%) and student services (5%) (Panel B).  Taken 
together, this would be an approximately $ 1,900 increase in overall educational and 
general expenses per FTE student, which includes an additional $ 770 in instruction, 
$182 in academic support, and $ 180 in student services per year.  
The increases started to emerge 0-2 years after being ranked, and continued after 
three or more years: academic support expenditure increased by 5.6% in the short term 
(0-2 years) and by 9% after three or more years.  Similarly, instructional expenditures 
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increased by 4.8% and 8.9% in 0-2 years and 3+ years after being ranked, respectively.  
The effect of numerical rankings on student services lasted only for the first two years 
(Panel A).  
Among the numerically ranked institutions, National Liberal Arts Colleges that 
were ranked before 2003 (mostly the top 50) and colleges that were ranked after 2003 
(mostly the top 51-120) were not different in terms of the total amount for education and 
general expenses.  However, schools that were ranked in 2003 and thereafter in the top 
51-120 decreased instructional expenses by 3.4% but increased student services expenses 
by 9.2% following the changes in the ranking status (Panel C, Columns (2) and (4)).  
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Figure 4.10 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on financial resources 
related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
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Table 4.10 Effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
 
Total Education 
and General 
Instruction 
Academic 
support 
Student services Research 
0-2 years after ranked 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.056** 0.057*** 0.089 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021) (0.130) 
3+ years after ranked 0.072*** 0.089*** 0.090** 0.045 0.178 
 (0.017) (0.023) (0.041) (0.032) (0.162) 
      
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked 0.059*** 0.074*** 0.077** 0.050** 0.137 
 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.034) (0.027) (0.135) 
Observations 2,378 2,378 2,365 2,375 1,503 
Number of institutions 134 134 134 134 99 
      
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked 0.001 -0.034* -0.062 0.092** 0.005 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.047) (0.044) (0.202) 
Observations 1,541 1,541 1,528 1,538 1,207 
Number of institutions 107 107 107 107 84 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 years after 
being ranked. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Faculty resources related expenditures  
Figure 4.10 captures the correlations between the numerical rankings and faculty 
resources outcomes at 5 years prior to and up to 10 or more years after being ranked. The 
estimated coefficients were not different from zero; this indicates that the trends in 
faculty compensations and compositions were parallel between the ranked and tiered 
Liberal Arts Colleges, and the time trend in the pre-ranked period might have continued 
if all colleges were not numerically ranked. This provides some evidence that the DD 
analyses employing ranked and tiered status as treated and counterfactual are fairly 
credible for estimating the effect of rankings on the faculty resources outcomes.   
 Moreover, the graphs suggest a constant increase in average salaries and benefits 
as well as increase in the proportion of full-time faculty and tenured/tenure track faculty 
following immediately after an institution’s inclusion in the rankings.  Panel A of Table 
4.11 reports this trend from the event study specification estimates. Following a 
numerical ranking, the average amount of salaries and benefits increased by $ 3,820 
within two years and by $ 6,060 after 3 or more years.  The average number of full-time 
instructional faculty at the ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges is about 133, this 
increase would require an extra $ 508,060 each year. 
While the total number of faculty slightly decreased for a short term (4%), 
student-faculty ratios did not change.  The proportion of full-time instructional faculty 
increased by about 4% within two years, and 7.9% after an institution was ranked 
numerically (Panel A, Column (3)).  The proportion of faculty who are tenured or on 
tenure track also increased by 4.8% within two years, and by 9.2% three or more years 
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after a campus was ranked.  Yet, faculty composition, measured through academic rank, 
was not affected by rankings.  
The comparison among the ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges suggested that 
the effect of numerical rankings on faculty compensation was not different for the 
National Liberal Arts Colleges that were ranked before and after 2003.  Yet, the schools 
ranked after 2003 tended to have a lower proportion of tenured/tenure track faculty 
(about 4.6%) but a higher proportion of professors (2.3%) after receiving a numerical 
order (Panel C, Columns (4) and (5)).   
 
 
Figure 4.11 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on faculty resources related 
expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-5/+10 
year window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
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Table 4.11 Effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel (A) Event-study analysis 
 
Average faculty 
salaries & 
benefits 
Total faculty 
Student-faculty 
ratio 
% full-time 
% tenured/ 
tenure track 
% professor 
0-2 years after ranked 0.382** -0.040* -0.022 0.040*** 0.048*** -0.006 
 (0.167) (0.024) (0.022) (0.014) (0.020) (0.019) 
3+ years after ranked 0.606*** -0.044 -0.030 0.079*** 0.092*** 0.000 
 (0.197) (0.040) (0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.031) 
       
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis 
Ranked 0.520*** -0.042* -0.028 0.048*** 0.073*** -0.002 
 
(0.162) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) 
Observations 2,099 1,018 1,018 1,018 619 2,022 
Number of institutions 134 99 99 99 75 132 
 
      
Panel (C) Robustness check analysis 
Ranked 0.248 -0.051 -0.032 -0.020 -0.046** 0.023** 
 (0.236) (0.046) (0.031) (0.023) (0.021) (0.012) 
Observations 1,372 694 694 694 385 1,334 
Number of institutions 107 72 72 72 49 105 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects, and are restricted to 5 years before and 10 years after being ranked. 
Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Summary 
This chapter addressed the first research question: How do rankings affect 
institutional expenditures in the areas that rankings emphasize, particularly student 
selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources over time?  Using the changes in 
the USNWR—the expansion of the numerical rankings—as a treatment, I estimated the 
causal impact of college rankings on institutional expenses that are related with the 
ranking measurements.  Particularly, expenditures associated with student selectivity, 
educational resources, and faculty resources were analyzed.  How National Universities 
and National Liberal Arts Colleges react to rankings differently were estimated.  
The results from this chapter supported the hypothesis based on the institutional 
theory.  The numerical positions allow colleges and universities to compare their relative 
positions to their peers and to the benchmarks.  To achieve a better position, institutions 
increased expenditures in the three areas that rankings measure.  In particular, increase in 
these expenditures cost National Universities an average of $ 27 million and National 
Liberal Arts Colleges about $ 4 million per year.21  Considering that there are other 
expenditures not captured in this study (e.g., marketing and outreach), the cost associated 
with ranking behavior might be even higher.  Institutions respond to some expenses 
immediately after the respective schools are ranked, while other changes in other 
expenditure develop after a longer period of time.  
The changes in the resource allocation due to rankings were different between the 
National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  While USNWR uses the same 
                                                 
21 Calculation based on the number of FTE undergraduate student and full-time instructional 
faculty at the ranked National Universities (12,364 and 938, respectively) and at National Liberal 
Arts Colleges (1,571 and 133, respectively).  
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criteria and weights for the National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges, 
particular expenses and the degree to which schools make changes differed between the 
two groups.  Once the institution was numerically ranked, National Universities increased 
institutional grant and fellowship expenditures, providing more students with merit-based 
aid.  Yet, the significant increase due to the ranking in student selectivity related 
expenditures continued only for a short time.  Meanwhile, National Liberal Arts Colleges 
increased expenditures in non-educational services when their respective institutions 
were ranked in the top 25, 50, and 120.  The effect of rankings on non-educational 
services took longer time to emerge (3 or more years after being ranked).       
In response to rankings, both National Universities and National Liberal Arts 
Colleges constantly increased what USNWR measures as resources for educational 
activities.  For National Universities, rankings constantly increased the total amount spent 
on educational activities, and the increased amount was mostly directed to costs of 
instruction.  It is also notable that research expenditures of National Universities 
decreased as the institution was numerically ranked.  On the other hand, the increase in 
the total educational and general expenses for National Liberal Arts Colleges was 
attributable to the escalated spending in academic support, instructions, and student 
services.  
The results for faculty resources suggested that rankings affect faculty 
compensations at both National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  In 
terms of faculty composition, the proportion of full-time faculty increased over time.  
National Liberal Arts Colleges also boosted the proportion of tenured or tenure track 
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faculty, and this change was bigger for three or more years after the initial numerical 
ranking.  
Previous research has argued that institutions would increase spending in research 
in pursuit of prestige (Brewer et al., 2002; Morphew & Baker, 2004).  Yet, the analysis 
from this study found a contradiction trend: National Universities decreased research 
expenditure immediately after the school was ranked for the first time (within 0-2 years), 
accounting for the time specific context such as decrease in federal and foundation 
funding priorities.  This finding might be related to the definition and operationalization 
of prestige in the existing research (e.g., Carnegie classification) and rankings.  Also, 
understanding how funding for research activities is acquired and distributed within an 
institution would help explain this finding.   
Overall, rankings affect colleges and universities through the hierarchical 
numerical order and a set of measurements.  Yet, institutional responses to rankings 
might be more complex as USNWR specifies ranking groups and the numerical positions 
change every year.  The arbitrary groupings might create different motivation and 
behaviors for the schools that try to maintain their membership within their current group 
or institutions that aim to move into the next most prestigious group.  The volatility in the 
rankings might serve as a feedback system that institutions attend to and alter their 
resource behaviors in the following year.  The next chapter will address the results of the 
second and third sub-questions and explain how these dimensions differentiate the effect 
of rankings on colleges and universities.  
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Chapter 5  
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS: LOCATIONS AND YEAR-TO-YEAR 
CHANGES IN THE RANKINGS  
In the previous chapter, I investigated the effect of numerical rankings on 
institutional expenses and faculty composition, in relation to the USNWR measurements.  
In particular, how resource allocation changes in the three major areas that USNWR 
emphasizes—student selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources—was 
analyzed.  National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges increased expenses 
that were related to these areas, and the growth in selectivity and financial resources 
related expenditures followed immediately after the first time that institutions were 
numerically ranked.  Faculty related strategies took a longer time to appear.  These 
findings support the hypothesis based on institutional theory.  That is, the numerical 
positions allow colleges and universities to compare their relative positions to their peers 
and to the benchmarks.  To achieve a better position, institutions change their resource 
allocations in a way that conforms to what rankings measure and weight heavily.  
Meanwhile, the status-based model explains that all institutions might not have 
the same level of motivation and capability for changing the resource allocation.  Thus, 
the level of institutional reactivity differs across the rankings.  As being in a particular 
ranking group (e.g., Top 1, 25, 50, and 120) signifies the preeminence of an institution in 
relation to its competitors, going up the ladder or maintaining its position in the ranking 
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groups becomes important.  From this perspective, schools near the margins of the 
ranking groups would conform to rankings more aggressively than institutions that are far 
from the margins.   
This chapter presents findings regarding how an institution’s position from the 
ranking group cut-offs influences the school’s resource allocations.  I identified whether 
an institution was located at the upper or lower margins of a ranking group (Top 1-25, 
26-50, and 50-120).  I examine how institutions that are trying to maintain their 
membership within their current group or institutions that are trying to move into the next 
most prestigious group would behave differently compared to other ranked institutions.  
While previous research showed that changes in the rankings across different cut-off 
points are difficult to achieve (Dichev, 2001), and movements within 0-4 intervals from 
the cut-off points are due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 2008), the 
heterogeneous effect of rankings for institutions ranked at the margins will further 
explain how institutions respond to the arbitrary groupings of rankings.22 
Another important feature of the ranking system is volatility.  Thus, an 
institution’s ranking position will fluctuate year-to-year.  Universities might perceive that 
changes in institutional rankings, particularly a drop from their original positions, are 
directly related to their legitimacy and have significant consequences for the respective 
institution.  Therefore, schools will direct their resources to the areas that rankings weigh 
most heavily in order to improve or maintain their positions.  On the other hand, 
improvement in the ranking position might function as positive feedback and incentivize 
                                                 
22 I also analyzed the heterogeneous effect rankings by the distance to the cut-offs using an 
institution’s position in the first year ranked, as well as the average distance for the first three 
years since ranked. The results from these models were qualitatively similar to those from the 
main specification reported here. 
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the schools to increase spending.  Thus, I hypothesized that negative or positive changes 
in the ranking positions would encourage institutions to respond to rankings more 
intensively.  The regression analysis with fixed effects estimated how institutions that 
observed a drop or improvement in the ranking positions (in year t+1) react to rankings 
compared to their counterparts that maintained the same ranking position (year t). 
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Table 5.1 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on institutional expenditures by locations in the rankings: summary 
 
National Universities 
National Liberal Arts 
Colleges 
National Universities 
National Liberal Arts 
Colleges 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin (lower or upper 
margin) (vs. +/-5 or more points from the top 1, 25, 50 
and 120 cut-offs) 
Explanatory variable: Drop or Improved 
(vs. Maintained) 
Student selectivity 
Institutional grants and 
fellowships  
− lower margin − lower margin 
+ drop 
+ improved 
 
Institutional aid: % receiving  − lower margin    
Institutional aid: Average 
amount 
 − lower margin  + drop 
Non-educational services  + lower margin   
Financial resources 
Total Education and General     
Instruction + lower margin + upper margin − improved 
− drop 
− improved 
Academic Support     
Student Services     
Research     
Faculty resources 
Average faculty salaries and 
benefits 
    
Total Faculty     
Student-faculty ratio    
− drop 
− improved 
% Full-time + upper margin + upper margin  + improved 
% Tenured/tenure track  + upper margin   
% Professor     
Notes. Indicates the sign of estimated coefficients. + and – present increases and decreases in the expenditure, respectively.
  126 
Heterogeneous Effect of Rankings on Institutional Expenditures: National 
Universities 
Tables 5.2 through 5.4 present the differences-in-differences-in-differences results 
for the National Universities sample.  Each table includes the estimated effect of being 
located at the upper and lower margin (0 to 4 and -4 to -1 points from the cut, 
respectively) compared to other ranked institutions (+/-5 or more points from the cut-
offs) as well as the effect of changes in the rankings (drop or improve versus maintained), 
conditional on being ranked.  Panel (A) compares the effect of rankings across the 
ranking positions (ranked at the margin) for all ranked National Universities. Panel (B) 
reports how negative and positive changes in the ranking positions affect institutional 
expenses in the following year.  
Student selectivity related expenditures 
Panel (A) of Table 5.2 suggests that the effect of rankings on institutional 
fellowship behavior was varied among institutions with different ranking positions 
relative to the ranking group cut-offs.  National Universities that were located at the 
lower margin decreased the overall expenses spent on institutional grants by 27.7%, 
reducing the proportion of students receiving institutional fellowships by about 5.2%.  
The changes in the total institutional fellowship are equivalent to $ 466 per FTE. 
Panel (B) indicates the correlations between student selectivity related 
expenditures and year-to-year changes in the ranking positions.  National Universities 
responded to both negative and positive changes in the positions in terms of the overall 
institutional grant and fellowships.  Dropping from the previous year’s position led to a 
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7.9% increase in institutional grants and fellowships in the following year, which is a 
slightly bigger than the changes in the expenditure associated with a positive change in 
the rankings (7%).  To contextualize this, schools would increase expenses in the 
institutional grants and fellowship category slightly by $ 133 (per FTE) to respond to a 
decrease in the ranking.  An upward movement in the ranking led to a $118 per FTE 
increase.  However, there was no significant change in the distribution of institutional aid 
as well as non-educational services expenditure in relation to the year-to-year changes in 
the rankings. 
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Table 5.2 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Institutional grants & 
fellowships 
Institutional aid: % 
receiving 
Institutional aid: 
Average amount 
Non-educational 
services 
Ranked 0.125 1.432 -0.062* 0.052 
 (0.092) (1.505) (0.036) (0.042) 
Margin: upper 0.167 -1.508 0.035 -0.018 
 (0.158) (2.278) (0.040) (0.053) 
Margin: lower -0.277*** -5.198* 0.042 -0.039 
 (0.083) (3.066) (0.038) (0.073) 
Observations 4,107 2,731 2,733 6,115 
Number of institutions 199 196 196 199 
 
    
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain  
Drop 0.079* -0.000 0.005 -0.006 
 (0.042) (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) 
Improve 0.070** 0.003 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.030) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) 
Observations 1,280 1,067 1,067 1,403 
Number of institutions 126 126 126 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Financial resources related expenditures 
Panel (A) of Table 5.3 reports the differential effect of rankings on resource 
related outcomes by an institution’s location in the ranking, measured through the relative 
distance from the ranking group cut-offs.  Although schools at the margin tended to 
spend more on expenditures that are related to educational and general activities, the 
differences across the ranking positions were not statistically significant.  Yet, the DDD 
estimates suggest that schools ranked at the margin develop different ranking strategies.  
Specifically, National Universities at the lower margin of the cut-off, particularly within a 
4-point interval significantly increased the amount spent on instruction by 8%.  On 
average, this increase is equivalent of $ 987 per FTE per year at the respective 
universities.  
Panel (B) of Table 5.3 shows that schools continue their spending level regardless 
of the year-to-year changes in the position.  Dropping from the original position did not 
affect the any educational related expenditure in the following year.  However, when an 
institution’s ranking in one year was higher compared to the previous year, the ranked 
National University decreased instructional expenditure by 1.6% compared to the schools 
that stayed at the same position.  
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Table 5.3 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Total Education and 
General 
Instruction 
Academic 
support 
Student services Research 
Ranked 0.030 0.051* -0.029 -0.008 -0.134*** 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.046) (0.040) (0.049) 
Margin: upper 0.012 0.009 0.023 0.002 0.039 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.050) (0.051) (0.056) 
Margin: lower 0.054 0.080** 0.151 0.067 0.058 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.148) (0.073) (0.062) 
Observations 6,164 6,163 6,158 6,143 6,095 
Number of institutions 199 199 199 199 198 
 
     
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain 
Drop -0.012 -0.016 0.000 -0.014 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) 
Improve -0.009 -0.016* 0.009 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) 
Observations 1,416 1,415 1,411 1,400 1,412 
Number of institutions 126 126 126 126 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Faculty resources related expenditures 
While an institution’s position from the ranking group cut-offs differentiated the 
degree to which the ranked National Universities changed resource allocation in different 
expenses, an institution’s location on the ranking did not significantly affect faculty 
compensations and composition (Table 5.4).  Yet, schools ranked at the upper margin of 
the ranking group cut-offs (0 to 4 points) increased the proportion of full-time faculty 
among the instructional faculty by 4.4%, accounting for institutional, year, and 
private/public differences (Panel (A), Column (4)). 
Furthermore, results in Panel (B) suggest that faculty resources did not alter by 
year-to-year changes in the ranking position. Although a positive (negative) change in an 
institution’s ranking position tended to be related with an increase (decrease) in the 
average faculty compensations and proportion of tenure or tenure track faculty and 
professors, the point estimates were not statistically significant. 
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Table 5.4 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Average faculty 
salaries & benefits 
Total faculty 
Student-faculty 
ratio 
% full-time 
% tenured/ 
tenure track 
% professor 
Ranked 0.691*** -0.047 -0.065* 0.003 -0.000 0.006 
 (0.208) (0.034) (0.033) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) 
Margin: upper -0.359 0.045 0.079 0.044* 0.011 -0.006 
 (0.332) (0.060) (0.057) (0.023) (0.025) (0.010) 
Margin: lower 0.344 0.059 0.018 0.012 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.430) (0.083) (0.071) (0.032) (0.026) (0.013) 
Observations 5,358 2,377 2,375 2,377 1,773 5,339 
Number of institutions 199 199 199 199 197 199 
 
      
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain 
Drop -0.075 0.021 0.011 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.161) (0.020) (0.022) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) 
Improve 0.080 0.018 0.016 -0.007 0.005 0.002 
 (0.138) (0.024) (0.027) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004) 
Observations 1,363 714 712 712 657 1,363 
Number of institutions 126 126 126 126 126 126 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and private-by-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Heterogeneous Effect of Rankings on Institutional Expenditures: National Liberal 
Arts Colleges 
Next, I present the differential effect of rankings by the distance from the ranking 
group cut-offs (top 1, 25, 50 and 120) for National Liberal Arts colleges.  Tables 5.5 
through 5.7 present the estimated effect of being ranked at upper and lower margins by 4 
points (0 to 4 and -1 to -4 points from the cut, respectively) and year-to-year changes in 
the rankings, conditional on being ranked.  I first report the coefficients from the 
differences-in-differences-in-differences that estimate the effect of rankings by the 
ranking positions (located at margin) for all ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges (Panel 
(A)).  The effect of volatility in the rankings on the ranked Liberal Arts colleges will be 
then addressed (Panel (B)).  
Student selectivity related expenditures 
Table 5.5 indicates that the distance of an institution’s position may differentiate a 
Liberal Arts College’s expenditure in the admission related variables.  Panel (A) suggests 
some evidence for the status-based model hypothesis that institutions that are located 
merely above and below the next level might have different responses to the status, here 
specified by USNWR.  The DDD estimates indicate the strategic behavior of institutions 
that are closest to the lower margin of ranking groups would reduce expenditure on 
institutional fellowships: compared to other ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges 
(ranked at +/-5 or more points from the ranking group cut-offs), schools ranked up to 4 
points below the cut would have smaller changes in the total spending in institutional 
fellowship by decreasing the expenditure by 14.2%.  This decrease, which is 
  134 
approximately $ 1,024 per FTE, might result in a smaller average aid amount distributed 
to each recipient.  The decrease is about 6.1%, which is about $ 947.  
Meanwhile, Column (4) of Panel (A) suggests some evidence that the expenditure 
on non-educational services was significantly higher for the institutions near to the cut-
off point, particularly at the lower margin.  Compared to other ranked National Liberal 
Arts Colleges, schools ranked at the lower margin of each ranking group cut-off 
increased non-educational services expenses by 10.6%.  This means an annual increase of 
about $ 627 per FTE at the respective Liberal Arts Colleges.  
Panel (B) indicates that a negative change in the ranking position might encourage 
universities to alter their financial aid behavior in the following year.  Although the 
overall amount did not change, a negative change in the numerical order induced a 
Liberal Arts college to allocate 2.2% more (about $ 351) average amount per student in 
terms of institutional aid. 
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Table 5.5 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: Natioanl Liberal Arts Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Institutional grants & 
fellowships 
Institutional aid: % 
receiving 
Institutional aid: 
Average amount 
Non-educational 
services 
Ranked 0.061 1.216 0.027 0.035 
 (0.047) (1.221) (0.033) (0.031) 
Margin: upper -0.114 -3.951 0.021 -0.054 
 (0.099) (2.750) (0.068) (0.059) 
Margin: lower -0.142** 1.118 -0.061* 0.106** 
 (0.057) (3.112) (0.031) (0.045) 
Observations 2,808 1,866 1,868 4,121 
Number of institutions 134 134 134 134 
 
    
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain  
Drop 0.003 -0.007 0.022* 0.004 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.013) (0.025) 
Improve 0.003 -0.004 0.022 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) 
Observations 1,150 931 933 1,255 
Number of institutions 106 106 106 105 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Financial resource related expenditures 
Table 5.6 reports the effect of USNWR for National Liberal Arts Colleges of 
different ranking positions on the total educational and related expenses, as well as on the 
detailed areas of expenses that are measured by the rankings.  Panel (A) of the table 
shows that rankings make National Liberal Arts Colleges increase instructional expenses 
on average.  The instructional expenses for the ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges due 
to the ranking changes were significantly higher for institutions ranked at the upper 
margin of cut-off points (a 4.7% increase) (Panel A, Column (2)). The increase in the 
expenditure suggests that schools at the margin (+ 0-4) would spend extra $ 580 per 
student than the rest of ranked schools.  
Panel (B) indicates that institutions responded to changes in ranking positions by 
altering the expenses on the instruction.  The size of the change was bigger when the 
ranking position changed negatively (3.3% decrease in instructional expenditure) than 
when there was a positive change in the rankings (1.5%).  
Faculty resources related expenditures 
Panel (A) of Table 5.7 reports whether the effects of rankings vary across the 
ranking positions, in the areas that are related to faculty resources.  The results suggest 
that an institution’s ranking relative to the arbitrary cut-offs for ranking groups 
differentiate the ranked National Liberal Arts Colleges’ responses to rankings in faculty 
composition measured through the proportion of full-time and tenure or tenure track 
faculty.  For the institutions that were included to a ranking group at the margin (upper 
margin), the strategic response to rankings might be to increase the proportion of full-
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time faculty and hire more tenure track faculty.  Liberal Arts Colleges ranked at 0 to 4 
points from the cut-offs increased the proportion of full-time faculty and tenured/tenure 
track faculty by 4.5% and 2.4%, respectively.  
Panel (B) suggests how the ranked National Liberal Arts responded to the 
volatility of rankings.  The year-to-year changes resulted in significant changes in the 
direct measures of USNWR, particularly the student-faculty ratio and proportion of full-
time faculty.  When an institution’s ranking was changed in a negative direction (Drop), 
schools decreased student faculty ratio by 2.4%.  Positive changes in the rankings 
compared to the previous year’s position led to a decrease in student faculty ratio (3%), 
and increase in the proportion of full-time faculty (1.5%).  
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Table 5.6 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Total Education and 
General 
Instruction 
Academic 
support 
Student services Research 
Ranked 0.060*** 0.050** 0.052 0.059* 0.225 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.039) (0.035) (0.167) 
Margin: upper 0.012 0.047* 0.073 -0.052 -0.196 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.063) (0.059) (0.239) 
Margin: lower -0.009 0.025 0.037 0.041 -0.309 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.060) (0.054) (0.194) 
Observations 4,154 4,154 4,136 4,150 2,753 
Number of institutions 134 134 134 134 111 
 
     
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain 
Drop -0.003 -0.033* -0.005 -0.019 -0.028 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.030) (0.024) (0.051) 
Improve -0.000 -0.015* 0.018 -0.001 -0.017 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.022) (0.019) (0.044) 
Observations 1,277 1,277 1,261 1,275 1,062 
Number of institutions 106 106 106 106 83 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Table 5.7 Heterogeneous effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Liberal Arts 
Colleges 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel (A) Explanatory variable: Ranked*Margin 
Dependent Variables 
Average faculty 
salaries & benefits 
Total faculty 
Student-faculty 
ratio 
% full-time 
% tenured/ 
tenure track 
% professor 
Ranked -0.015 0.007 -0.014 0.002 0.007 0.001 
 (0.206) (0.024) (0.021) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009) 
Margin: upper 0.090 -0.022 -0.019 0.045* 0.024* -0.010 
 (0.229) (0.059) (0.037) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) 
Margin: lower 0.264 0.001 0.019 0.009 0.025 -0.008 
 (0.254) (0.045) (0.035) (0.025) (0.031) (0.017) 
Observations 3,607 1,608 1,608 1,607 1,179 3,489 
Number of institutions 134 134 134 134 131 132 
 
      
Panel (B) Explanatory variable: Drop / Improve vs. Maintain 
Drop -0.150 -0.015 -0.024* 0.013 0.003 0.001 
 (0.207) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) 
Improve -0.128 -0.024 -0.030* 0.015* 0.004 0.002 
 (0.219) (0.018) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) 
Observations 1,228 648 648 648 580 1,189 
Number of institutions 106 106 106 106 104 103 
Notes. All specifications include school fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by school in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Summary 
In order to answer the second sub-question, How do arbitrary groupings of 
rankings affect institutions’ expenditure behaviors?, I estimated whether being ranked at 
the margin of ranking group cut-offs affected the changes in both National Universities 
and National Liberal Arts Colleges’ resource allocation due to the rankings.   While 
previous studies suggested that the changes within 0-4 intervals from the cut-off points 
are due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 2008), schools ranked at the 
4-point margin (i.e. institutions being located at the top 1, 25, 50, and 120 or +/- 4 
windows from the cut-offs) differently reacted to rankings.  Depending on the expense 
areas, schools at the upper or lower margins experienced a bigger or smaller rate of 
change, compared to other ranked institutions.  How an institution’s location in the 
rankings differentiated the effect of rankings on a set of outcomes varied between the 
National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
The results indicated the heterogeneous effect of rankings by institutional position 
on the outcomes related to student selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources.  
First, institutions at the lower margin—just below the arbitrary cut-offs of ranking 
groups—were less intense in increasing fellowship expenditure.  In particular, National 
Universities at the margin distributed institutional fellowships to a smaller proportion of 
recipients.  Meanwhile, National Liberal Arts Colleges at the lower margin spent more on 
non-educational services, but decreased expenses on institutional fellowships, in terms of 
the total amount as well as the average amount received by each student.  
In terms of financial resources related outcomes, schools at the margin of the 
ranking groups had a bigger increase in a number of outcomes.  In particular, the 
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National Universities that were ranked at the lower margin of the cut-offs (-1 to -4 points 
away from the cut) increased the instructional expenses at a higher rate.  On the other 
hand, it was the upper margin that was associated with a higher increase in the total 
amount spent on instruction among the National Liberal Arts Colleges.  
Both at National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges, institutions 
ranked at the upper margin of ranking group cut-offs (0 to 4 points above the cut) had 
relatively bigger increases in the proportion of full-time faculty measured directly by 
USNWR.  Liberal Arts Colleges that were ranked at the upper margin of ranking groups 
(0-4 points) also increased the proportion of tenured or tenure track faculty. 
 Taken all together, an institution’s position in the rankings, defined as whether an 
institution is ranked at the upper or lower margins of the ranking group cut-offs, led to 
different degree of changes in particular resource areas.  This supports the status-based 
model argument that an institution’s position influences the level of compliance with 
ranking measures and strategic behaviors.  When being included to a particular ranking 
group leads to critical benefits (Bowman & Bastedo, 2009; Luca & Smith, 2011), schools 
that are close to each cut-off (particularly at the 4 point margin) demonstrated a bigger 
increase in the expenditures in the areas that rankings directly measure. The motivation is 
different across the institutions of different positions, and thus schools take different 
strategies depending on the relative standing from the ranking groups’ margins.   
It is also notable that changes within the 0-4 intervals in the USNWR are 
considered to be due to statistical noises (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 2008), but 
being located at this window matters to the degree to which institutions take actions in 
their resource allocations.  This finding was aligned with previous research that argues 
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higher education institutions fear that not engaging in the rankings game will hurt their 
school (Corley & Gioia, 2000) and thus become attentive to a small difference in the 
rankings.   
This chapter also addressed the third sub-question, How do year-to-year changes 
in ranking positions lead to changes in expenditure behaviors? The results reveal that 
volatility in the rankings, operationalized as a negative change (drop) or a positive change 
(improved) in rankings compared to the previous year’s position, did not necessarily lead 
to increased expenses of colleges and universities in all expenditures.  
When rankings declined, both National Universities and National Liberal Arts 
colleges increased the overall expenses on institutional fellowships or the average amount 
of institutional aid distributed to each recipient.  Negative changes in the ranking position 
encouraged National Liberal Arts Colleges to reduce expenses on instruction but to 
enhance performances on student-faculty ratio measure.   
  The positive change in the rankings was also related with changes in resource 
allocation at colleges and universities.  In particular, National Universities spent more on 
institutional grants and fellowships but decreased instructional expenditure as they 
observe a positive change in the rankings.  The improvement in the ranking position led 
to a decrease in instructional expenditure but to an increase in the proportion of full-time 
faculty as well as a lower student-faculty ratio. 
Taken all together, the results suggested that the volatility in rankings might 
function as a feedback mechanism for schools and encourage schools to move their 
resources from a routinized, universal expenditure to categories that are perceived to 
provide more leverage to improve rankings.  For instance, a positive change in the 
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ranking, as a positive feedback, might incentivize institutions to increase student 
selectivity and direct measures of faculty resources to continue the increase in the 
position.  On the other hand, a drop in ranking position would motivate institutions to at 
least move back to the original position.  Furthermore, if a decrease in the ranking 
positions is perceived to have a negative consequence on the admission in the coming 
year (Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999), institutions might change the financial aid practices to 
minimize the impact of rankings.   
The decrease in instructional expenditure might be explained by the importance of 
this measure in the USNWR and the relative difference across the institutions in the 
expenditure.  Instructional expenditure is only a part of the aggregated overall 
educational expenditures and the spending per student credit hour might not be 
significantly different among the institutions that are competing at similar ranking 
positions.  Thus, this expenditure might not add much leverage to improve an 
institution’s relative position in the rankings.  It is also important to point the varying 
degree of flexibility in decision-making on different outcomes. For example, changes in 
the admissions and distribution of financial aid or increasing full-time instructional staffs 
can happen quickly than making significant changes to faculty quality (e.g., increasing 
tenured/tenure track faculty (professors) with highest degree in the field).   
Based on the detailed results presented in the last two chapters, I will discuss the 
outcomes and implications for future research.  I finally conclude this dissertation with 
suggestions for policy and institutional practices.  
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Chapter 6  
CONCLUSION 
Rankings have gained popularity as they claim to offer information for college 
choice (Stensaker & Kehm, 2009), allowing students to compare the relative quality of 
universities (Brown, 2006).  The growing interest in college rankings intensified concerns 
in the higher education community about institutional aspirations for a higher ranking 
(O’Meara, 2007) and their consequences on accelerating costs (Ehrenberg, 2003).  Also, 
competition for selective students and faculty with the goal of improving rankings might 
have important implications for access and diversity (Meredith, 2004; Shaw & 
LeChasseur, 2005).  Although concerns about unintended consequences are valid, 
rankings/ratings systems have attracted the interest of policy makers as a way to achieve 
policy goals, such as affordability and access.  
While previous studies found that rankings impact student choices and resource 
attainment of colleges and universities, a dearth of research exists on how universities 
respond to rankings by changing their resource allocation behaviors.  In particular, the 
degree to which universities change specific expenditures in response to rankings 
presents a challenge in previous research.  Considering how the unique characteristics of 
rankings function as mechanisms that influence institutional behavior provides an 
opportunity to expand the literature.  In response to this gap in research, this dissertation 
contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of rankings on the management of 
  145 
colleges and universities.  In particular, the project focuses on how the three distinctive 
features of the college rankings—numerical order, arbitrary grouping, and volatility—
stimulate colleges and universities to respond to the rankings criteria.  In this final 
chapter, I discuss key findings, provide directions for future research, and offer 
implications for policy and practice.    
Discussion of Key Findings 
This discussion is organized in the following order.  First, I explain how the 
rankings system affects the resource allocation behavior of universities.  I particularly 
attend to the two dimensions of rankings—measurements and presentation of the 
results—as mechanisms that drive institutional conformity to rankings.  I synthesize the 
findings, highlighting the areas in which institutions alter resource allocations, in relation 
to what rankings measure and what institutions can manipulate.  I also discuss how the 
numerical order as well as arbitrary groupings and volatility of rankings affect 
institutional behavior.  Taken together, the results will shed light on what people can infer 
from rankings/ratings.  The potential consequences of resource allocation behaviors on 
higher education will be also considered.  Second, I address how National Universities 
and Liberal Arts Colleges respond to rankings differently, with an eye on the different 
contingencies that each type of university faces.  Finally, I consider the practice of 
rankings in the broader context of the pursuit of prestige. 
Measurements of rankings and resource allocation behavior 
The results of this dissertation confirmed that ranking systems have become a 
significant influence over time, through what they measure as well as how they present 
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the results of their evaluation of colleges and universities (Sauder & Fine, 2008; Wedlin, 
2010).  The numerical ordering of universities determined by a set of measurement 
criteria significantly increased expenditures in the all areas that USNWR evaluates—
student selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources.  The arbitrary classification 
of universities as well as year-to-year changes in rankings accelerated the changes in 
expenditures.  Overall, the total educational expenditures, particularly instructional 
expenditures, as well as the proportion of full-time faculty and the student-faculty ratio 
were the areas in which institutions consistently altered the greatest number of resources.  
Institutional fellowships increased only in the short term, while changes in non-
educational services as well as faculty compensation developed over a longer term.  
These expenditures reflect USNWR methodology as the connection between the 
resource items and rankings are clear.  Also, these expenditures are flexible and easy to 
modify immediately.  I argue that expenditures that meet these two conditions are those 
that institutions can manipulate among the ranking criteria.  The financial resources 
measure presents a good example of the criteria on which institutions can take action.  
The dollar amount spent on educational activities is a stand-alone measure in USNWR, 
which takes 10% of the overall ranking score.  Furthermore, increases in educational 
expenditures are accomplishable as educational needs are often prioritized in resource 
allocation (Lasher & Greene, 2001).  In terms of faculty resources, the proportion of full-
time faculty and student-faculty ratio are easier to manipulate without a significant cost 
increase by hiring adjunct faculty or full-time instructors (Perez & Litt, 2012; 
Toutkoushian, 1999).  Faculty salaries and benefits are something that institutions can 
adjust, but at a slower rate.  On student selectivity related expenditures, the ranking 
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measurements have no direct connection with resources.  Yet, institutional fellowships 
have been often used to create a selective class (Winston, 1997; 2000; McPherson & 
Schapiro, 1991; 1998) and therefore, schools are familiar with adjusting the respective 
practices in a short period of time.  
Together with previous studies, the findings of the current study suggest that what 
rankings measure and present reflects resources that institutions spent, as expenditures 
are alterable by universities, whereas other measures such as reputation are hard to 
change (Webster, 1992).  This factor might explain why rankings are self-perpetuating 
and institutions’ positions do not change significantly.  As higher ranking positions are 
associated with considerable benefits in resource attainment, the Matthew Effect (Merton, 
1968) intensifies stratification as schools with high status gain greater resources and 
again increase spending to further move up the ladder.  Thus, factors that ranking 
organizations put forward as representing the quality of institutions, as well as the 
comparison across institutions and year-to-year changes in the rankings need be carefully 
interpreted.   
The emphasis on resources and increasing institutional expenditures on ranking 
criteria raises an important question about the direct and indirect costs of rankings. The 
institutional responses to rankings might accompany significant financial costs when 
there is no clear connection between the increase in expenditure and the movement in the 
rankings.  Furthermore, the gains from a higher ranking might not be sufficient to cover 
the increased expenses incurred.  Previous research suggested a limited effect of rankings 
on resource attainment other than increases in out-of-state tuition as well as funding from 
government and industry (Bastedo & Bowman, 2011; Grunig, 1997; Meredith, 2004; Jin 
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& Whalley, 2007).  Yet, movement in rankings requires enormous investment.  Gnolek et 
al., (2014) simulated the average increase required for a 10-point movement (from top 30 
to top 20) as $ 112,000,000 per year.  This amount is significantly larger than the average 
change I observed from this study.  This might suggest that the probability of changing an 
institution’s ranking is low, despite the school’s constant increase in expenditures.  If 
institutions raised all they could and spent all they raised for higher prestige (Bowen, 
1980), the conformity to rankings might result in net losses or increased costs for 
students, particularly those who pay out-of-state tuition.  
The conformity to rankings might involve indirect costs in the core activities at 
campuses.  The changes in faculty composition with increased faculty compensation 
might imply a teaching-research trade-off for tenured faculty and higher burden on non-
professorate, non-tenure track teaching staff in terms of teaching load (Bettinger & Long, 
2010; Cantwell & Taylor, 2013; Zhang & Liu, 2009).  The current explanation of 
resource allocation behaviors is limited, as we do not know how institutions raise revenue 
for continuing strategic behaviors.  In addition, how the increased expenditures are used 
for specific activities on campus is not captured in the data.  Future investigations are 
needed to address how the institutional response to rankings impacts revenue streams 
(e.g., tuition, research funding, donations) as well as core activities of higher education 
institutions, particularly teaching and research. 
Presentation of rankings and resource allocation behavior 
The results suggested that institutional behavior was driven by the unique 
characteristics of rankings that a) present the evaluation results in a numerical order and 
arbitrary ranking groups and b) create year-to-year changes.  The numerical order, by 
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presenting an institution’s position relative to competing schools, creates the mechanisms 
that compel institutions to develop responses to rankings.  Being reactive, schools 
monitor their numerical position and respond promptly to rankings by changing resource 
allocations in the areas that are directly or indirectly related to ranking measurements, 
even without guarantees for increasing prestige and the quality of educational activities 
(Oliver, 1991).  
In addition to the numerical order, the arbitrary grouping in the USNWR provides 
different motivation and strategic behavior for the institutions at different ranking 
positions.  The results of this study indicated that schools located at the lower margin (-1 
to -4 points below the ranking group cut-offs) had a lower level of increase in 
institutional fellowship but higher spending on non-educational services and instruction. 
On the other hand, schools located at the upper margin (0 to 4 points above the ranking 
group cut-offs) had a proportionally higher increase in the proportion of full-time faculty 
as well as tenured/tenure track faculty.   
Previous studies pointed out that membership in a ranking group matters, through 
the front-page effect (being included to the top 25), on resource attainment (Bowman & 
Bastedo, 2009; Luca & Smith, 2011).  Using the status-based model, I argue that this 
process allows rankings to define an institution’s status, creating a competing network 
among the ranked National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges.  This theory 
explains that the aspiration for status homophily—to maintain the membership within 
each ranking group—would lead to schools at the cusp of tiers or schools with closely 
ranked nearby elite schools facing greater pressure to comply with rankings (Sauder & 
Espeland, 2009).  The findings from the current study add to this explanation by 
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providing insight into the different behavioral strategies of institutions at the lower and 
upper margins.  The expectation to move up to the next level would lead to increased 
expenses in areas that have clear links with ranking measurements, such as instructional 
expenditures.  On the other hand, schools would try to maintain the current position in the 
ranking group by complying with rankings criteria that do not necessarily require 
additional resources.  These schools also continue building institutional capacity by 
adding faculty who are likely to have a terminal degree and high status in their field, 
thereby contributing to the institution’s reputation (O’Meara, 2007). 
Meanwhile, studies have identified that the probability of an institution moving 
across ranking groups is very low (Dichev, 2001), and the changes within 0-4 intervals 
from the cut-off points are due to statistical noise (Gnolek et al., 2014; Grewal et al., 
2008).  Analyzing the rankings and total scores for the top 50 National Universities for 
1996-2014 USNWR, Martins (2015) identified distinct bands in which institutions 
fluctuate but above which they are unable to rise.  Within these competing groups, minor 
differences in scores can result in substantial differences in rank for those institutions.  
Capturing this feature of rankings as neighborhood, Martins (2015) documented the 
anxious responses of some university leaders to small drops in the rankings.  Thus, the 
arbitrary groupings of rankings, which classify institutions into a different level of status 
based on insignificant differences between the institutions, would encourage institutions 
to respond to rankings with greater intensity.  
Another mechanism that encourages institutions to attend to minor differences in 
the rankings is the year-to-year changes.  Considering the fact that schools are limited in 
their ability to directly manipulate any ranking criteria except educational expenditures 
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and several measures of faculty resources, changes in an institution’s position might 
represent statistically minor differences.  This volatility is identified as a marketing 
strategy of the media rankings, in order to continue their sales (Federkeil, 2009; Stella & 
Woodhouse, 2006).  However, institutions were attentive to year-to-year changes and 
altered their resource behaviors when they experienced both negative and positive 
changes in position.  In particular, changes in the ranking position led to immediate 
increases in institutional fellowships and the proportion of full-time faculty and decreases 
in student faculty ratio, while instructional expenses declined. This suggests that 
institutions try to recover the original position or continue improving their current 
positions based on the feedback provided by the rankings.  It is possible that schools 
acknowledge that students are one of the major stakeholders of rankings (Luca & Smith, 
2011; McDonough et al., 1998; Monks & Ehrenberg, 1999) and try to control damage on 
student selectivity due to the ranking by providing more scholarships to students, which 
will again impact upon their upcoming year’s rankings.  When 80% of ranking positions 
change every year, schools would hesitate to make significant changes to their expenses, 
but continue the status quo expenditure behavior.  
The conformity to rankings, in relation to what rankings measure and how the 
results are presented suggests that rankings shape the image of legitimate universities to 
reflect that universities spend significant resources to be selective and possess financial 
and human resources.  Also, institutional responses to arbitrary groupings and 
insignificant changes suggest that institutions internalize ranking behaviors and cannot 
decouple themselves from rankings, under pressure for higher ranking positions and 
competition with other universities (Corley & Gioia, 2000; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). In 
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the field of higher education where the end-means uncertainty is high and quality is hard 
to define and measure (Dill & Soo, 2004; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), compliance to 
rankings would continue.  Yet, whether more resources would translate into better quality 
in their core practices is an open question.  While schools that are highly ranked in 
USNWR do not necessarily have high retention and graduation rates relative to their 
student, faculty, and financial related resources (Breu & Raab, 1994), some studies found 
significant relationships between the levels of expenditures on educational activities and 
institutional grants retention and graduation outcomes (Eckles, 2010; Gansemer-Topf & 
Schuh, 2006; Webber & Ehrenberg, 2009).  In order to explain the consequences of 
institutional compliance, how the expenditures are used in terms of particular academic 
disciplines and activities should be examined.   
Response to rankings at National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges  
While institutions comply with what rankings measure, the specific expenditures 
that National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges undertake were different.  
In particular, National Universities responded to selectivity measures by increasing total 
institutional fellowships, and National Liberal Arts Colleges did so by changing non-
educational expenditures.  The increased total expenditure in educational and related 
activities was particularly driven by instructional expenses for National Universities, 
whereas National Liberal Arts Colleges raised spending on academic support, student 
services, and instruction.  Colleges and universities increased the proportion of full-time 
faculty regardless of the type; it was only National Liberal Arts Colleges that increased 
the proportion of tenured or tenure track faculty.  
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I argue that universities employ strategic behaviors in response to the rankings by 
not only comply with rankings (acquiesce), but also by balancing tactics to improve 
rankings with different contingencies (compromising) (Oliver, 1991). To explain the 
different responses of National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges, the 
distinctive mission, size, control, and expectation of constituencies would be influential 
contingencies (Beck & Walgenbach, 2005; Labianca et al., 2001; Oliver, 1991).  
Liberal Arts Colleges have long been noted for their commitment to teaching 
(Bourque, 1999) and support of academic and extracurricular experiences, compared to 
research universities (including National Universities) (Pascarella, Wolniak, Cruce, & 
Blaich, 2004). Given this unique mission, the factors that are communicated for 
legitimizing a liberal arts college include intimate learning, particularly focusing on 
student life and academic programs, as well as modern residence halls, infrastructure, and 
athletics (Fugate, 2012; Hartley & Morphew, 2008).   
Thus, the constituencies for liberal arts colleges, particularly prospective students 
and parents, have been a highly self-selecting group, with far more knowledge about 
higher education. For instance, rankings are found to be influential for admission 
outcomes of National Universities but not for those of National Liberal Arts Colleges 
(Bowman & Bastedo, 2009).  Thus, it is possible that investment in amenities, student 
services, academic services are more important for liberal arts to legitimize their practice 
than simply having a higher ranking.  
Also, Liberal Arts Colleges were considered to be especially susceptible to 
striving behavior because of their small size. Previous research has found that small 
institutions are more in need of the resources and vulnerable to market trends 
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(McPherson & Schapiro, 1997; Zemsky, Wegner, & Massy, 2005). Selective liberal arts 
colleges, are particularly so as they compete for a small number of highly qualified 
students and external funds (Ehrenberg, 2003; Winston, 2000). Yet, being mostly private 
institutions, these selective liberal arts might have more flexibility than their National 
University counterparts in moving resources under the direction of leadership.   
One of the criticisms of the USNWR is that the measurements for National 
Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges are the same, and the ranking overlooks 
the differences between the two institutional types. The different resource allocation 
behaviors at the different college types raise an important question about how measures 
and weights might consider the different approaches taken by different types of 
universities.  More in-depth understanding is required of how the audiences of rankings 
use the overall and sub-ranking, and how schools interpret the rankings in relation to their 
core activities. 
College rankings, prestige, and striving behaviors  
Prestige seeking behaviors have been considered as a cause of continuing increase 
in costs for higher education institutions.  Bowen (1980) discussed that the dominant goal 
of institutions is prestige, and they would raise all they could and spend all they raise to 
achieve this goal.  Furthermore, he argued that institutional affluence leads to a 
proportionately greater spending on institutional support than instruction.  Several 
empirical studies reinforced this argument, showing a persistent increase in 
administrative costs among the striving institutions (Alpert, 1985; Clotfelter, 1996, 
Morphew & Baker, 2004).  Furthermore, based on the idea that prestige comes from 
students and research, striving behaviors were documented as rises in institutional student 
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grants and fellowships, competitive amenities, and faculty salaries with emphasis on 
research rather than teaching (Brewer et al., 2002; O’Meara, 2007).   
The findings of this dissertation suggest that rankings would intensify the striving 
behavior as the measurements of rankings based on the traditional resource-reputation 
model of prestige that emphasizes faculty and financial resources as well as student 
selectivity (Astin, 1985; Volkwein & Grunig, 2004).  Since the components institutions 
can directly manipulate are mostly resources, this link between prestige and resources 
would be reinforced.  Rankings or ratings make prestige tangible by creating a 
hierarchical order or classification of institutions.  The cross-institutional comparison as 
well as year-to-year changes presented by rankings would further intensify institutions’ 
striving strategies.  
In response to the resource-centered definition of prestige and ranking criteria, 
some researchers argued that the definition of prestige should be expanded to reflect 
institutional support and responses to students (Seymour, 1992) or student experiences 
and educational outcomes (Chun, 2002).  Some recent rankings (e.g., the Washington 
Monthly) introduced criteria such as social mobility (recruiting and graduating low-
income students) and service (encouraging students to give something back to their 
country).  When it comes to specific measurements used to evaluate institutional 
practices and outcomes in these dimensions, it is still the resource related measurements 
that are employed by the rankings (e.g., net price that students pay or number of courses 
and staff that are allocated for the service activities).  This presents a continuing and 
significant challenge in higher education to define important goals and practices of 
universities and proxies that can accurately capture these dimensions.  I expect different 
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evaluation systems with various measurements to be proposed and debated in the higher 
education community to better adjust and use the system of rankings or ratings.    
  The ranking behaviors were aligned with what was documented as striving 
behaviors in the previous literature.  The effect of rankings on selectivity related 
expenditures were significant.  The effects develop immediately, and are considered to 
have a marginal impact on ranking position.  Additionally, colleges that are at the margin 
of ranking groups and are dropped from an original position increase spending on 
selectivity by providing more non-educational services and institutional aid, respectively.  
As the selectivity of students is also related with other measures, such as graduation and 
retention measures, this area might be considered even more critical.  While concerns 
about rankings often include unintended consequences on access, implications on the 
admission policy and outcomes, as well as effect on price (e.g., high tuition/high aid 
model) should be investigated.  
In addition, ranking organizations argue that the educational expenses category is 
a proxy for educational and academic quality, and class size measures are indicators for 
instructional experience.  Despite these measures, it seems that resources are shifted to 
administrative support rather than instruction.  Although instructional expenses increase, 
the rise is mostly explained by the increase in faculty compensation.  Also, the increase 
happens at a smaller rate than other student services, particularly at National Liberal Arts 
Colleges.  The significant increases in educational and related activities expenditures may 
include the administrative lattice (Massey & Zemsky, 1994), which explains the 
increasing administrative costs to support nonacademic support (Morphew & Baker, 
2004).  Furthermore, the increased faculty salaries and benefits as well as tenured faculty 
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suggest the continuing “faculty driven strategy” of striving (O’Meara, 2007; Toma, 
2008).  Selective liberal arts colleges and research universities try to attract faculty with 
an emphasis on research, scholarship, and other professional activities, with decreased 
course load, which is considered the academic ratchet (Volwein & Sweizer, 2006).  This 
assertion could be empirically tested through changes in faculty work and evaluation, as 
well as changes in the curriculum.  
While changes in the other expenditure areas align with the striving behaviors 
documented in previous literature, a contrasting trend was found in terms of research 
expenses.  In order to explain this contradictory finding, information about where the 
research revenue is obtained and distributed within an institution is essential.  Although a 
few studies exist in this area, one study suggests that some prestigious institutions may 
limit university funds and rely more on external funding to support research.  Using the 
case of MIT and UT-Austin, Liefner (2003) suggested that many research activities are 
directly funded by competitive funding sources, particularly grants and contracts.  Only 
limited institutional funds are allocated to the schools and colleges to meet fixed 
operational costs in the form of faculty salaries and to maintain the university 
infrastructure.  Thus, it is possible that faculty are expected to attract external funding for 
research, in part based on the competitive advantage of their ranking positions.  The 
intensified expectations and requirements for research in tenure and promotion process 
might reflect this trend (Finnegan & Gamson, 1996; O’Meara & Bloomgarden, 2006; 
Wolf Wendel & Ward, 2005).  
Furthermore, this finding also raises an interesting question about the definition of 
prestige.  Often, the concept of prestige has been operationalized by the ratings of the 
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graduate faculty and programs (Abbott & Barlow, 1972), and Carnegie classification in a 
later period (e.g., Aldersley, 1995; Finnegan & Gamson, 1996; Huisman, 1995; Iglesias, 
2014; Morphew & Baker, 2004).  According to these studies, the increase in research 
expenditure was at the schools that aimed at moving to the upper classification, 
particularly from the non-research group to research universities.  For example, Iglesias 
(2014) showed that Master’s colleges and universities and Research Universities/high 
research activity (RU/H) demonstrated a dramatic increase in research, whereas 
Doctoral/Research Universities (DRU) and Research Universities/Very High Research 
activity (RU/VH) directed more money to academic support and institutional scholarships 
and fellowships to solidify their ability to attract and retain the highest-quality students.  
If we consider that the America’s Best Colleges ranking only included schools that 
attained research university status, the upward drift to gain more prestige through 
enhanced research might not be found among those schools.  That is, institutions already 
classified as research-intensive are less likely to focus on enhancing research activity as 
an organizational ranking strategy.  It is possible that the growth in research expenditure 
is non-linear, and the spending level at the National Universities might have reached the 
threshold of possible increase in this expenditure. 
Based on this exclusive competition of National Universities and National Liberal 
Arts Colleges, and possible differences in prestige seeking behaviors among colleges of 
varying characteristics, I argue that rankings provide an additional stratification among 
the schools that are above a certain prestige threshold.  Rankings have made the prestige 
in American higher education more recognizable, more institutionalized, and more 
quantifiable (Geiger, 2000).  Thus, identifying a striving institution requires a multi-
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layered approach (O’Meara, 2007).  For example, Brewer et al. (2002) provided a 
typology of prestige: reputation building, prestige seeking, or prestigious.  These groups 
might display distinct practices in terms of USNWR.  Since USNWR has not only 
National Universities and National Liberal Arts Colleges rankings, but also regional 
university rankings (comprehensive four-year colleges), future studies could compare 
how different groups of schools respond to rankings in varying manners.  
Implications for Higher Education  
Future research on rankings/ratings and prestige 
This dissertation’s findings contributed to the research on the effect of rankings 
on the management of colleges and universities.  This study also expands the theoretical 
understanding of prestige seeking behavior of higher education institutions, identifying 
striving institutions and behavioral patterns.  Based upon the research conducted, I 
identified four areas that deserve further examination.   
First, in addition to resource allocation, institutions respond to rankings in various 
ways.  As resource dependence theory suggests (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Ulrich & Barney, 1984), institutions manage rankings by applying various tactics such as 
cooptation (e.g., providing information to the ranking system), influence tactics (e.g., 
manipulating data), collective actions (e.g., associations and alliances among 
institutions), and executive contracts (e.g., tying rankings and incentives for presidents) 
(Bastedo & Bowman, 2011).  Future studies need to address other ranking behaviors, 
including changes in institutional practices, as well as manipulation or misreporting of 
data.  Admission practices are where those gaming behaviors have been publically 
uncovered.  Some researchers suspected the increasing popularity of early admissions or 
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common application as an institutional strategy to boost applications and matriculation 
rates (Avery et al., 2005; Chaker, 2004; Liu, Ehrenberg, & Mrdjenovic, 2007).  A number 
of universities offer financial rewards to admitted students to retake SAT in hopes of 
increasing their average scores (Rimer, 2008).  Others have inflated reported SAT scores 
several times (Hechinger, 2013; Perez-Pena & Slotnik, 2012).   
Also not captured in the study is institutional strategies to enhance the reputation 
score in the rankings.  While the criterion accounts for about 25% of the ranking matrix, 
lack of data on relevant expenditures limited empirical examination of institutional 
behavior for improving the reputation sub-rankings.  Understanding whether or not 
highly organized marketing at colleges and universities, such practices as establishing 
marketing departments and hiring professional directors to head them (Bok, 2003; Kirp, 
2003; Pulley, 2003), is attributable to rankings would assist us in fully explaining the 
expensive competition caused by the rankings.  Studying how universities use USNWR 
to promote the most intangible but important feature they offer, academic teaching and 
learning, will also add to our understanding of the impact of rankings on institutions’ 
marketing efforts (Anticil, 2008; Frederickson, 2001).  
Second, a dearth of research exists on departmental rankings.  Specifically, the 
way that departmental rankings affect the inter-institutional organizations has not been 
investigated.  Although the halo-effect of institutional rankings on departmental rankings 
has been highlighted (Brooks, 2005; Clarke, 2007; Dill & Soo, 2005), research on 
prestige often hypothesized that the institutional prestige is a function of departmental 
prestige (Abbott & Barlow, 1972; Grunig, 1997; Volkwein, 1986; 1989).  To maximize 
prestige under the limited financial resources, universities need to scale down their 
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departments and programs (Abe & Watanabe, 2012).  Myers (1996) revealed that 
universities strategically downsize academic programs in an effort to improve 
undergraduate education and achieve excellence in selected graduate programs, based on 
their performance on national rankings.  Based on the National Research Council’s 
rankings of research-doctorate programs, Lebo (2011) argued that program strengths vary 
within a division, within a university, and over time, and therefore, the best strategies for 
institutional success is to limit coverage in smaller programs so that an institution has a 
comparative advantage. The relationship between departmental rankings and institutional 
rankings would generate internal competition over resource allocation (e.g., Barrow, 
1996; Gumport & Snydman, 2002; Johnson & Turner, 2009; Massy, 1996), and thus 
increase stratification within an institution (Cantwell & Taylor, 2013).  Future studies 
need to investigate how rankings affect the stratification of disciplines within an 
institution, and how the striving departments organize their academic and managerial 
practices (Massy & Zemsky, 1994). 
Third, future study could investigate organizational behavior of universities facing 
multiple external validating organizations.  Since the introduction of USNWR, various 
rankings, ratings, or classification systems have emerged over time.  The new systems 
have been developed by various agencies (e.g., governments, non-profit organizations, 
and universities), dealing with different sets of institutions in terms of focus, (e.g., 
specialty programs, community colleges, for-profit universities, and online programs), 
locations (e.g., global rankings), and emphasis (e.g., research, price, and educational 
outcomes).  While studies have identified high correlations among multiple rankings 
(Aguillo, Bar-Ilan, Levene, & Ortega, 2010), the way that colleges and universities 
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strategize institutional practices to enhance their legitimacy in various systems should 
also be studied.  How schools other than National Universities and National Liberal Arts 
Colleges addressed in this study respond to the external measurements should also be 
examined.  This line of research would contribute to explaining the stratification of 
higher education at both domestic and international levels.  
Finally, empirical research that focuses on the potential consequences of rankings 
behavior is essential.  Perrow (1961) argued that strategies to gain external validation 
might result in increased resources but at the expense of neglecting the core activities, as 
resources are diverted from the organization’s core purposes to nonessential programs or 
activities.  From this perspective, the ranking behaviors might involve unintended 
consequences on the central mission of higher education. 
Expensive competition for USNWR might influence affordability and access.  As 
colleges increase expenses on institutional fellowships, amenities, and other services 
under financial constraints, schools might move to a high-tuition, high-aid model (Geiger, 
2002), as well as establish or increase student fees (Schuh, 2003) in order to compensate 
for the expenses.  Future research should address the extent that the increases in 
expenditures due to rankings are related to tuition increases (McPherson & Shulenburger, 
2008).  The ranking competition also raises concerns about aggressive student recruiting 
practices that places more value on positioning the institution and skimming the best 
students from the applicant pool and far less value on personal contact, ensuring a good 
fit, and delivering a quality education from admission to graduation (Thacker, 2005).  
The extent to which colleges focus on recruiting physically/financially certain 
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populations and the effects on student composition on campus should be investigated 
(Rhoades, 2014). 
The other dysfunction of rankings behavior in need of further investigation is the 
administrative lattice, a growth in administrative functions that do not necessarily lead to 
a better experience and outcome in terms of teaching, learning, and research.  Since the 
expenditure data in IPEDS is reported at the aggregated level, our understanding of how 
the increased expenditure impacts the actual teaching, learning, or research function is 
limited.  Furthermore, some studies indicated no significant relationship between what 
rankings measure and the actual learning experience of students.  Pike (2002) and Kim 
and Shim (2014) tested the associations between the six major criteria of USNWR and 
learning experience at Liberal Arts Colleges.  The studies found that only student 
selectivity is positively related with students’ engagement in enriching educational 
experiences, and selectivity and financial resources measures are negatively related with 
engagement in diversity experiences.  How institutional responses to ranking measures 
are related to the organization and management of the core activities of colleges as well 
as policy values will provide important implications for the methodology and use of 
college rankings in the field of higher education. 
Policy and institutional practices 
This research is very timely given the increasing policy interest in information 
sharing and measurements as a way of assessing, tracking, and promoting accountability 
and excellence of higher education.  These include performance funding matrices, 
research-academic program rankings, and College Scorecards for affordability and value.  
Most recently, the Obama administration has proposed the Postsecondary Institution 
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Ratings System (aiming for delivery in the academic year of 2015-16) that would rate 
colleges and universities and tie the results to institutional eligibility for federal student 
financial aid programs. Although the administration has tried to quell the controversy 
(Stratford, 2014), the premises of ratings have generated concerns.  Many in the higher 
education community still believe that the ratings scheme will become a de facto ranking 
(Espinosa, Crandall, & Tukibayeva, 2014).  Furthermore, there has been a fear about the 
ratings system driving institutional behavior, especially when the result is tied to federal 
funding (Bastedo, 2014).  The possible unintended consequences on student composition 
(e.g., minority access), as well as teaching and learning at institutions (e.g., lower 
academic bars for graduation rate performance) have been the major concern (Hillman, 
2014).  
The findings of this study provide empirical evidence supporting these concerns.  
Policy makers and ranking providers need to scrutinize the structure of the measurement 
systems.  First, the measurements need to be carefully chosen, as colleges and 
universities change practices in ways that conform to the evaluation criteria.  Increase and 
reallocation of resources to those areas might be related to unintended consequences on 
cost and affordability, access, education, and research.  In the absence of agreed-upon 
comprehensive measures of higher education practice and outcomes, ad-hoc measures 
such as graduation rates and tie-to- or cost-of degree statistics are likely to be incomplete 
and misleading (Casper, 1996; Massy, Sullivan, & Mackie, 2013).   
Detailed measurements that adjust for the baseline differences and trends in inputs 
and outputs, as well as information that closely reflect the experience of key stakeholders, 
should be developed over time.  In part, this practice is currently limited by data that are 
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often reported only at the aggregated level, with specific information grouped under 
larger categories.  For example, instructional expenditure is only captured at the 
institutional level, not differentiated by fields or academic units.  Also, we do not know 
the graduation rates of different demographic and academic characteristics of students.  
Disconnection between the data on student learning and outcomes and measures of 
college’s performance is also an issue (Brooks, 2005; Kuh & Pascarella, 2004).  By 
incorporating disaggregated measures of input and outcomes as well as longitudinal 
changes of student experience and learning outcomes into the measurements, policy 
makers can encourage institutions to systematically collect and manage their data, and 
improve institutional progress through competitive mechanisms. 
Also, the difference between higher education institutions, programs, and students 
need to be recognized.  This study found that different competition strategies developed 
among the comparison groups—Research Universities and Liberal Arts Colleges.  In 
particular, the two types of institutions increased different resources in relation to student 
selectivity; research universities increased instructional expenditures, while their Liberal 
Arts counterparts increased spending on academic support and student services, in 
addition to instruction.  If these strategies were adopted due to different demands and 
expectations for colleges of different characteristics, evaluation measurements should 
reflect dimensions that recognize the mission and core practices of different types of 
institutions.  
In addition to the measurements, the way the results are presented and 
communicated in the ranking systems is important.  In particular, a rank order is 
considered as a publically acceptable method (Sanoff, 1998) because it is a less complex 
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way to provide information to consumers and stakeholders (O’Meara & Meekins, 2012).  
However, numerical order, along with recognizing specific cut-offs (ranking groups) 
drives the reactivity of institutions.  The significant impact of these mechanisms is 
alarming, as the numbers tend to exaggerate differences between institutions (Federkeil, 
2008; Locke, 2011; van Vught & Westerheijden, 2010) without scientific precision for 
distinguishing institutions of close rank (Stella & Woodhouse, 2006).  It is notable that 
the Carnegie classification, which groups universities rather than placing them in a 
pecking order, also has similar ramification (McCormick & Zhao, 2005) as schools aspire 
to be research universities (Aldersley, 1995; Finnegan & Gamson, 1996; Morphew & 
Baker, 2004).  Thus, the attributes that might be attached to the arbitrary ratings, ranking 
points, or scores that are related to the vertical stratification of higher education should be 
considered.  How the outputs of particular formats are consumed and by whom, and the 
consequences of these activities on schools need to be carefully investigated.  
Again, the current study confirmed that higher education institutions are 
responsive to external validations, particularly USNWR, despite their skepticism about 
the ranking systems.  Colleges and universities of different missions significantly 
increased expenses in all areas that USNWR evaluates, regardless of year-to-year 
changes in ranking positions and the timing of first inclusion to the numerical rankings.  
At the margin of ranking group cut-off points, where changes in the position are due to 
statistical noise, the response to ranking was happening at a higher rate.  Although 
controversial, rankings are enduring part of the educational landscape (Clarke, 2007).  As 
universities actively engage in the rankings competition, not playing the game will be 
perceived as hurting their schools (Corley & Gioia, 2000).  Top administrators at a 
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number of colleges that tried but failed to opt out from the influence of rankings (e.g., de 
Vise, 2010; Keenan, 2007) are often referred to as examples of this pressure.  In many 
universities, achieving a particular position in the rankings (or number of 
departments/programs to be recognized by rankings) is listed as a managerial goal.  
Under these circumstances, institutions try to garner some degree of managerial 
autonomy under the effect of rankings.  Sauder and Fine (2008) employed the concept of 
institutional entrepreneurs to explain institutional managers who manipulate rankings to 
suit their purposes, representing their institutions in the best light for ranking providers 
and the public.  Elsbach and Kramer (1996) insisted that this is for managing identity of 
the institution among the faculty and administrators.  Yet, I argue that administrators and 
decision makers at colleges and universities need to find ways to make rankings useful 
internally.  For example, while USNWR measure the aggregated dollar amount spent on 
educational and relevant expenses, liberal arts colleges increased expenditures on the 
areas that might be related to its educational emphasis, such as intimate learning 
experiences.  Identifying strategies that emanate from the core activities, constitution of 
student and faculty body, and missions would allow colleges, with limited resources, to 
balance the pressure of competition and the needs of students and faculty.  
Conclusion 
College ranking is a topic of national importance given its popularity and 
influence on students as well as on management of higher education.  Over the last 
decade, college rankings have become a pervasive influence on the higher education 
landscape.  Some researchers and practitioners in higher education have worried that 
rankings would intensify the aspiration for prestige, as higher positions in rankings are 
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associated with significant benefits (Hossler, 2000).  In particular, rankings reward 
increased spending on what rankings measure, and this factor leads to management by the 
U.S. News and World Report (USNWR) rankings (Ehrenberg, 2003) as well as an 
expensive competition (Machung, 1998; Michael, 2005).   
This dissertation explained the mechanisms that rankings influence institutional 
behavior given the unique characteristics of rankings—numerical order, arbitrary 
grouping, and volatility.  Analyzing the causal link between rankings and institutional 
expenditure, particularly in the areas that are heavily weighted in rankings—student 
selectivity, financial resources, and faculty resources—I found significant effects on 
institutional management caused by rankings.  Institutions constantly increase spending 
for rankings, and organize strategic behavior according to the arbitrary groupings in the 
rankings.  
Prior to using college rankings in construction of public policy, policymakers 
need to consider the structure of rankings, in terms of measurement criteria and the 
presentation of results.  Unintended consequences of rankings on policy goals, such as 
equity and diversity, financial efficiency, and effectiveness, should be closely examined.  
If rankings are here to stay, the questions of how we could improve the ranking practice 
and how stakeholders could make better use of rankings are critical.  I hope this research 
will foster dialogue around measures of higher education institutions, including ratings 
and rankings, in order to support those systems to contribute to achieving policy goals 
and improving excellence of academic practices at institutions of higher education. 
 
 
  169 
Appendix 
 
Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities.  
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities. 
Figure A.1 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on admission related 
expenditures: National Universities 
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities.  
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities. 
Figure A.2 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on financial resources related 
expenditures: National Universities 
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities.  
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 199 National Universities. 
Figure A.3 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on faculty resources related 
expenditures: National Universities 
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.   
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Figure A.4 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on admission related 
expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.   
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Figure A.5 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on financial resources 
expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the restricted (-/+5 year 
window) sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges.   
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Notes. Graphs plot the point estimates from the event study model using the full balanced panel 
sample. Institution sample includes 134 National Liberal Arts Colleges. 
Figure A.6 Event-study estimates of effect of rankings on faculty resources related 
expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
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Table A.1 Effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: National Universities 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.206** -0.223***
(0.087) (0.025)
3+years 0.104 -0.226***
(0.080) (0.025)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.128 0.162* 0.129 0.178 0.082 0.007 0.027* 0.007 0.022 -0.007
(0.079) (0.092) (0.080) (0.110) (0.100) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Revenue 0.026 -0.000
(0.084) (0.000)
Endowment -0.013 0.000**
(0.047) (0.000)
Observations 3,891 2,483 3,883 2,657 3,891 2,540 1,637 2,532 1,762 2,540
Nuber of institutions 199 126 199 198 199 196 126 196 196 196
Institutional grants & fellowships Institutional aid: % receiving
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years -0.036 0.052
(0.030) (0.033)
3+years -0.065 0.034
(0.043) (0.046)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked -0.054 -0.093*** -0.052 0.005 -0.065* 0.040 0.079 0.037 0.082 0.010
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.034) (0.038) (0.052) (0.038) (0.051) (0.053)
Revenue 0.000 0.123** 0.021
(0.000) (0.063) (0.016)
Endowment 0.000**
(0.000)
Observations 2,542 1,637 2,534 1,763 2,542 6,115 3,884 6,106 3,968 6,115
Nuber of institutions 196 126 196 196 196 199 126 199 199 199
Institutional aid: Average amount Non-educational services
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Table A.2 Effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Universities 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years -0.002 0.012 0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.036)
3+years 0.068** 0.098*** -0.011
(0.027) (0.027) (0.052)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.042* -0.058** 0.040* 0.073** 0.070** 0.066*** -0.144*** 0.064*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.025 -0.017
(0.023) (0.029) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023) (0.030) (0.032) (0.043) (0.069) (0.043) (0.053) (0.061)
Revenue 0.096** 0.099** 0.040
(0.042) (0.048) (0.076)
Endowment 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.015)
Observations 6,164 3,901 6,154 3,995 6,164 6,163 3,900 6,153 3,995 6,163 6,158 3,895 6,148 3,994 6,158
Nuber of institutions199 126 199 199 199 199 126 199 199 199 199 126 199 199 199
Total Education & General Instruction Academic Support
  184 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years -0.037 -0.113***
(0.029) (0.037)
3+years 0.026 -0.114**
(0.042) (0.052)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.003 -0.111** 0.004 0.024 0.004 -0.114*** -0.038 -0.116*** -0.134** -0.111*
(0.035) (0.056) (0.035) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.059) (0.044) (0.058) (0.063)
Revenue -0.008 0.091*
(0.040) (0.053)
Endowment 0.003 0.062***
(0.013) (0.018)
Observations 6,143 3,880 6,133 3,984 6,143 6,095 3,876 6,085 3,960 6,095
Nuber of institutions199 126 199 199 199 198 126 198 198 198
Student Services Research
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Table A.3 Effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Universities 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.024 -0.019 -0.039
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028)
3+years 0.110*** -0.050 -0.053
(0.032) (0.042) (0.044)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.638*** -0.995*** 0.636*** 0.833*** 0.392 -0.028 -0.042 -0.023 -0.039 -0.060 -0.043 -0.088** -0.042 -0.031 -0.062
(0.172) (0.261) (0.170) (0.206) (0.247) (0.030) (0.047) (0.029) (0.039) (0.048) (0.030) (0.045) (0.030) (0.036) (0.047)
Revenue 0.079** 0.189** 0.000
(0.033) (0.077) (0.000)
Endowment -0.092* 0.014 0.000***
(0.056) (0.009) (0.000)
Observations 5,358 3,392 5,348 3,611 5,358 2,377 1,503 2,375 1,301 2,377 2,375 1,501 2,373 1,388 2,375
Nuber of institutions199 126 199 199 199 199 126 199 199 199 199 126 199 199 199
Average Salaries & Benefits Total Faculty Student-Faculty Ratio
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU All NU Ranked NU All NU All NU All NU
All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.007 0.004 0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
3+years 0.035* -0.003 0.020
(0.020) (0.016) (0.021)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.016 -0.037** 0.021 0.028 0.031 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.078*** 0.004 -0.010 0.003 0.005 0.000
(0.014) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.021) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Revenue 0.000*** 0.039 0.000
(0.000) (0.024) (0.000)
Endowment 0.000*** -0.005 0.000
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Observations 2,377 1,503 2,375 1,390 2,377 1,773 1,134 1,772 1,121 1,773 5,339 3,392 5,329 3,951 5,339
Nuber of institutions199 126 199 199 199 197 126 197 197 197 199 126 199 199 199
% Full-time % Tenured/Tenure Track % Professor
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Table A.4 Effect of rankings on admission related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.029 0.287***
(0.041) (0.005)
3+years 0.020 0.281***
(0.049) (0.014)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.023 0.046 0.025 0.026 -0.013 0.009 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.007
(0.046) (0.044) (0.047) (0.058) (0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Revenue 0.028 -0.000
(0.023) (0.000)
Endowment 0.053 0.000
(0.045) (0.000)
Observations 2,671 2,137 2,624 1,844 2,671 1,735 1,387 1,687 1,204 1,735
Nuber of institutions 134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134
Institutional grants & fellowships Institutional aid: % receiving
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years -0.235*** 0.004
(0.009) (0.024)
3+years -0.215*** 0.084***
(0.022) (0.030)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.029 0.014 0.031 0.039 0.002 0.052** -0.062 0.053** 0.061* 0.044
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.024) (0.045) (0.024) (0.033) (0.029)
Revenue 0.000 0.043
(0.000) (0.027)
Endowment 0.000 0.041
(0.000) (0.025)
Observations 1,737 1,389 1,689 1,205 1,737 4,121 3,288 4,073 2,754 4,121
Nuber of institutions 134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134
Institutional aid: Average amount Non-educational services
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Table A.5 Effect of rankings on financial resources related expenditures: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.038*** 0.027 0.049*
(0.014) (0.017) (0.029)
3+years 0.075*** 0.092*** 0.095**
(0.018) (0.023) (0.042)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.061*** -0.037 0.059*** 0.075*** 0.040** 0.066*** -0.106*** 0.066*** 0.081*** 0.044* 0.077** -0.121** 0.076** 0.082* 0.081**
(0.015) (0.023) (0.015) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.020) (0.025) (0.024) (0.034) (0.051) (0.034) (0.046) (0.040)
Revenue 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.044*
(0.011) (0.017) (0.022)
Endowment 0.051** - 0.086*** 0.051
(0.023) (0.027) (0.043)
Observations 4,154 3,317 4,105 2,775 4,154 4,154 3,317 4,105 2,775 4,154 4,136 3,299 4,087 2,763 4,136
Nuber of institutions134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134
Total Education & General Instruction Academic Support
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.070*** 0.112
(0.026) (0.121)
3+years 0.053* 0.080
(0.032) (0.137)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.060** 0.037 0.058** 0.069* 0.054* 0.094 0.135 0.088 0.208 0.223
(0.027) (0.054) (0.027) (0.036) (0.030) (0.118) (0.177) (0.118) (0.157) (0.159)
Revenue -0.002 0.023
(0.025) (0.080)
Endowment 0.059** -0.040
(0.029) (0.069)
Observations 4,150 3,313 4,101 2,772 4,150 2,753 2,457 2,714 1,835 2,753
Nuber of institutions134 107 134 134 134 111 96 111 108 111
Student Services Research
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Table A.6 Effect of rankings on faculty resources related expenditures and outcomes: National Liberal Arts Colleges 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
Year All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Control
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Fixed effects
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years -0.140 -0.002 -0.010
(0.190) (0.020) (0.018)
3+years 0.208 0.020 -0.008
(0.191) (0.033) (0.024)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.067 -0.750*** 0.105 -0.102 -0.027 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.013 -0.018 -0.013 -0.023 -0.040*
(0.169) (0.240) (0.168) (0.241) (0.215) (0.021) (0.028) (0.020) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.030) (0.024)
Revenue 0.153 0.033* 0.000
(0.106) (0.017) (0.000)
Endowment - 0.110 - 0.015 0.000
(0.132) (0.019) (0.000)
Observations 3,607 2,880 3,560 2,498 3,607 1,608 1,284 1,602 920 1,608 1,608 1,284 1,602 938 1,608
Nuber of institutions134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134 134 107 134 134 134
Average Salaries & Benefits Total Faculty Student-Faculty Ratio
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA All LA Ranked LA All LA All LA All LA
All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years All Years All Years, All Years All Years All Years
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Revenue 
controlled
Endowment 
controlled
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year FE
Institution, 
private-by-
year-by-state 
FE
Panel (A) Event-study analysis
0-2 years 0.006 0.004 -0.017
(0.012) (0.014) (0.023)
3+years 0.023 0.018 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.030)
Panel (B) Differences-in-differences analysis
Ranked 0.010 -0.040*** 0.012 0.031* 0.012 0.010 -0.022 0.011 0.011 -0.038*** -0.003 0.015 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
Revenue 0.000* 0.012 -0.000
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
Endowment 0.000*** 0.005 -0.000
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000)
Observations 1,607 1,283 1,601 938 1,607 1,179 945 1,173 772 1,179 3,489 2,801 3,442 2,586 3,489
Nuber of institutions134 107 134 134 134 131 105 131 131 131 132 105 132 132 132
% Full-time % Tenured/Tenure Track % Professor
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